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On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack
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| Abstract: | Linear cryptanalysis remains the most powerful attack against DES at this time. Given $2^{43}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Matsui expected a complexity of less than $2^{43}$ DES evaluations in 85% of the cases for recovering the key. In this paper, we present a theoretical and experimental complexity analysis of this attack, which has been simulated 21 times using the idle time of several computers. The experimental results suggest a complexity upper-bounded by $2^{41}$ DES evaluations in 85% of the case, while more than the half of the experiments needed less than $2^{39}$ DES evaluations. In addition, we give a detailed theoretical analysis of the attack complexity. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2001-11468,
title={On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={secret-key cryptography / DES, linear cryptanalysis},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/056},
note={To be published in the proceedings of SAC '01 pascal.junod@epfl.ch 11564 received 9 Jul 2001, last revised 30 Aug 2001},
author={P. Junod},
year=2001
}