Online/Offline OR Composition of ∑-Protocols

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Proofs of Knowledge (PoKs)

A fundamental crypto tool with many applications

- Identification Schemes

- Simulation-Based Security

- E-Voting Systems

- …

Useful in cryptography when the witness is protected: Witness Indistinguishable (WI), Witness Hiding (WH), Zero Knowledge (ZK)

e.g., prove knowledge of one thing OR another thing OR …

Proofs of Knowledge (PoKs)

<u>In theory</u>

<u>In practice</u>

$x \in L$

x NP-reduction $\longrightarrow$ G

"(G, C) in $\mathbf{R}_{HAM}$"

WI Proof of Knowledge of Hamiltonicity
[Blum86, **L**apidot**S**hamir**90**]

P $\xrightarrow{\hspace{1.5cm} m_1 \hspace{1.5cm}}$ V

$\xleftarrow{\hspace{1.5cm} m_2 \hspace{1.5cm}}$

$\xrightarrow{\hspace{1.5cm} m_3 \hspace{1.5cm}}$

Proofs of Knowledge (PoKs)

In theory

$x \in L$

x NP-reduction G

"(G, C) in $\mathbf{R}_{HAM}$"

WI Proof of Knowledge of Hamiltonicity
[Blum86, **L**apidot**S**hamir**90**]

P $\xrightarrow{m_1}$ V

$\xleftarrow{m_2}$

$\xrightarrow{m_3}$

In practice

Σ-protocol for $\mathbf{R}$

"(x, y) in $\mathbf{R}_{Dlog}$"

e.g. Discret Log [Schnorr89])

P $x = g^y$ V

$\xrightarrow{g^r}$

$\xleftarrow{c}$

$\xrightarrow{r+cy}$

3

Proofs of Knowledge (PoKs)

In theory

$x \in L$

x → **NP-reduction** → G

"(G, C) in R_{HAM}"

WI Proof of Knowledge of Hamiltonicity
[Blum86, **L**apidot**S**hamir90]

P — m_1 → V

P ← m_2 — V

P — m_3 → V

Σ-protocol for R

"(x, y) in R_{Dlog}"

e.g. Discret Log [Schnorr89])

$x = g^y$

P   V

g^r →

← c

$r + cy$ →

Observation: [LS90] and [Schnorr89] need the theorem and witness only in the last round

∑-protocol for relation $\mathbf{R}$

P(w) x   V

a →

c ←

z →

∑-protocol for relation $\mathbf{R}$

- **Completeness**

P⁽ʷ⁾ 　　　　　x 　　　　　V

a →

c ←

z →

∑-protocol for relation $\mathbf{R}$

- **Completeness**

- **SHVZK** $\mathrm{Sim}(x,c) \Rightarrow$

$P^{(w)}$ x   V

$$\xrightarrow{\quad a \quad}$$

$$\xleftarrow{\quad c \quad}$$

$$\xrightarrow{\quad z \quad}$$

∑-protocol for relation **R**

- **Completeness**

- **SHVZK** Sim(x,c) ⟹   c

a'

z'

P⁽ʷ⁾ ⬛x V

$$a \longrightarrow$$

$$c \longleftarrow$$

$$z \longrightarrow$$

4

∑-protocol for relation $\mathbf{R}$

- **Completeness**

- **SHVZK** $\mathrm{Sim}(x,c) \Rightarrow$

$$P(w) \qquad \boxed{x} \qquad V$$

a' $\xrightarrow{\quad a \quad}$

c $\equiv$ $\xleftarrow{\quad c \quad}$

z' $\xrightarrow{\quad z \quad}$

4

∑-protocol for relation $\mathbf{R}$

- **Completeness**

- **SHVZK** $\mathrm{Sim}(x,c) \Rightarrow$

- **Special Soundness**

x

$P^{(w)}$ V

a' a →

c ≡ c ←

z' z →

4

∑-protocol for relation $\mathbf{R}$

- **Completeness**

- **SHVZK** Sim$(x,c)\Rightarrow$

- **Special Soundness**

P$^{(w)}$ $\boxed{x}$ V

a' $\xrightarrow{\quad a \quad}$

c $\equiv$ $\xleftarrow{\quad c \quad}$

z' $\xrightarrow{\quad z \quad}$

$\boxed{\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{a}\ c\ z)}$

$\boxed{\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{a}\ c'\ z')}$ $\Longrightarrow$ $\boxed{w: (\mathbf{x},w) \in \mathbf{R}}$

R_0 OR R_1

R_0 OR R_1

In theory

$(x_0 \lor x_1)$ $\xrightarrow{\text{NP-reduction}}$ G

"(G, C) in R_{HAM}"

WI Proof of Knowledge of Hamiltonicity
[Blum86, LS90]

P $\longrightarrow$ V

$\longleftarrow$

$\longrightarrow$

In practice

Consider the ∑-protocols Σ_0 and Σ_1 for R_0 and R_1 and compile them using

[**C**ramer**D**amgard**S**choenmakers**94**]

In both cases you get 3 rounds, WI and PoK

$\mathbf{R}_0$ OR $\mathbf{R}_1$: The Gap

In theory

$(x_0 \lor x_1) \xrightarrow{\text{NP-reduction}} G$

"(G, C) in $\mathbf{R}_{\text{HAM}}$"

WI Proof of Knowledge of Hamiltonicity
[Blum86, **LS90**]

P $\longrightarrow$ V

$\longleftarrow$

$\longrightarrow$

In practice

Consider the Σ-protocols Σ_0 and Σ_1 for $\mathbf{R}_0$ and $\mathbf{R}_1$ and compile them using

[**C**ramer**D**amgard**S**choenmakers**94**]

R_0 OR R_1: The Gap

In theory

$(x_0 \lor x_1) \xrightarrow{\text{NP-reduction}} G$

"(G, C) in R_{HAM}"

WI Proof of Knowledge of Hamiltonicity
[Blum86, **LS90**]

P ────────────▶ V

No need to know any theorem already at the 1rd round

In practice

Consider the ∑-protocols Σ_0 and Σ_1 for R_0 and R_1 and compile them using

[**C**ramer**D**amgard**S**choenmakers**94**]

x_0 and x_1 are needed already at the 1rd round

R_0 OR R_1: The Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- **Delayed-Input Completeness**

## In practice

[CDS94]

- **Completeness**

Delayed-Input Completeness

P   V

a

c

Delayed-Input Completeness

$$X$$

$$P^{(w)} \qquad\qquad V$$

$$\xrightarrow{\quad a \quad}$$

$$\xleftarrow{\quad c \quad}$$

Delayed-Input Completeness

X

$P^{(w)}$

V

a

⟶

c

⟵

z

⟶

R_0 OR R_1: The Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- **Delayed-Input Completeness**

- **Adaptive-Input Proof of Knowledge**

In practice

[CDS94]

- **Completeness**

- **Proof of Knowledge**

Adaptive-Input PoK

P^* x

Extractor

a

c

Adaptive-Input PoK

P^* x

Extractor

a →

c ←

z →

Adaptive-Input PoK

P* x

Extractor

a

x
(a,c,z)

Adaptive-Input PoK

Adaptive-Input PoK

Adaptive-Input PoK

P^* x'

Extractor

a

c'

z'

x
(a,c,z)
x'
(a,c',z')

w witness for x

R_0 OR R_1: The Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- **Delayed-Input Completeness**
- **Adaptive-Input Proof of Knowledge**
- **Adaptive-Input Witness Indistinguishable**

In practice

[CDS94]

- **Completeness**
- **Proof of Knowledge**
- **Witness Indistinguishable**

Adaptive-Input WI

P V^*

a
$\longrightarrow$

c
$\longleftarrow$

Adaptive-Input WI

$$(x, w_1, w_2)$$

$$P^{(w_b)} \qquad V^*$$

$$a \longrightarrow$$

$$c \longleftarrow$$

w_1, w_2 witnesses for x

Adaptive-Input WI

$$(x, w_1, w_2)$$

$$P^{(w_b)} \qquad V^*$$

a →

c ←

z →

w_1, w_2 witnesses for x

R_0 OR R_1: The Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- **Delayed-Input Completeness**

- **Adaptive-Input Proof of Knowledge**

- **Adaptive-Input Witness Indistinguishable**

- **Assumption:** OWP

In practice

[CDS94]

- **Completeness**

- **Proof of Knowledge**

- **Witness Indistinguishable**

- **Assumption:** none

R_0 OR R_1: The Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- **Delayed-Input Completeness**

- **Adaptive-Input Proof of Knowledge**

- **Adaptive-Input Witness Indistinguishable**

- **Assumption:** OWP

- **Requires NP-reduction and gives Computational WI**

In practice

[CDS94]

- **Completeness**

- **Proof of Knowledge**

- **Witness Indistinguishable**

- **Assumption:** none

- **No NP-reduction and gives Perfect WI**

$\mathbf{R}_0$ OR $\mathbf{R}_1$: The Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- **Delayed-Input Completeness**

- **Adaptive-Input Proof of Knowledge**

- **Adaptive-Input Witness Indistinguishable**

- **Assumption:** OWP

- **Requires NP-reduction and gives Computational WI**

- **Applicable to All NP**

In practice

[CDS94]

- **Completeness**

- **Proof of Knowledge**

- **Witness Indistinguishable**

- **Assumption:** none

- **No NP-reduction and gives Perfect WI**

- **Restricted to Σ-protocols**

R_0 OR R_1

The Gap → A larger protocols using [CDS94] instead of [LS90] may have a worse round complexity

R_0 OR R_1

The Gap → A larger protocols using [CDS94] instead of [LS90] may have a worse round complexity

e.g. [Pass – Eurocrypt 03], [KaOs – Crypto 04], [YuZh – Eurocrypt 07][ScVi – Eurocrypt 12]…

R_0 OR R_1

The Gap → A larger protocols using [CDS94] instead of [LS90] may have a worse round complexity

e.g. [Pass – Eurocrypt 03], [KaOs – Crypto 04], [YuZh – Eurocrypt 07][ScVi – Eurocrypt 12]…

Recently Delayed-Input completeness is widely used

[GMPP16 – tomorrow], [Kiayias0Z15 – CCS15], [BBKPV16 – eprint]…

Our Results

1) From PoK to Adaptive-Input PoK

2) Bridging the gap

Our First Result: from PoK to Adaptive-Input PoK

∑-Protocols (in general) are not Adaptive-Input PoK

P*   Extractor

$$g^r \longrightarrow$$

$$\longleftarrow c \qquad\qquad \longleftarrow c'$$

$$x= g^y \quad \underrightarrow{z=r+cy} \qquad x'= g^{y'} \quad \underrightarrow{z'=r+c'y'}$$

Issue observed in [**B**ernhard**P**ereira**W**arinschi**12**] about the weak Fiat-Shamir transform

Our Transform
From PoK to Adaptive-Input PoK

P   V

g^r $g^{r'}$

c

$x = g^y$ $z = r + cy$ $z = r' + c\mathbf{r}$

Our Transform
From PoK to Adaptive-Input PoK

P
g^r
$g^{r'}$
V

c

$x = g^y$
$z = r + cy$
$z = r' + cr$

Our Transform
From PoK to Adaptive-Input PoK

Our transform applies to the class described in
[**C**ramer**96**, **M**aurer**15**, **C**ramer**D**amgard**98**]

e.g. Schnorr, Guillou–Quisquater, Diffie–Hellman, Multiplication proof
for pedersen commitments, …

Our Results

1) From PoK to Adaptive-Input PoK

2) Bridging the gap

$\mathbf{R}_0$ OR $\mathbf{R}_1$: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]

In practice

[CDS94]

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]

This work

R_0 OR R_1: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]
- Delayed-Input Completeness

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]
- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness

In practice

[CDS94]
- Completeness

This work
- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input

$\mathbf{R}_0$ OR $\mathbf{R}_1$: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- Delayed-Input Completeness
- Adaptive-Input PoK

In practice

[CDS94]

- Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]

- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge

This work

- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input
- Proof of Knowledge

$\mathbf{R}_0$ OR $\mathbf{R}_1$: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]
- Delayed-Input Completeness
- Adaptive-Input PoK
- Adaptive-Input WI

In practice

[CDS94]
- Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Witness Indistinguishable

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]
- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Semi-Adaptive Input WI: one of two instances is adaptively chosen by V*

This work
- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input
- Proof of Knowledge
- Adaptive-Input WI

R_0 OR R_1: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- Delayed-Input Completeness
- Adaptive-Input PoK
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: OWP

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]

- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Semi-Adaptive Input WI: one of two instances is adaptively chosen by V*
- Assumption: none

In practice

[CDS94]

- Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Witness Indistinguishable
- Assumption: none

This work

- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input
- Proof of Knowledge
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: DDH

R_0 OR R_1: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]

- Delayed-Input Completeness
- Adaptive-Input PoK
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: OWP
- Works with multiple OR compositions

In practice

[CDS94]

- Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Witness Indistinguishable
- Assumption: none
- Works with multiple OR compositions

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]

- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Semi-Adaptive Input WI: one of two instances is adaptively chosen by V*
- Assumption: none
- Works with only one OR composition

This work

- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input
- Proof of Knowledge
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: DDH
- Works with multiple OR compositions

R_0 OR R_1: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]
- Delayed-Input Completeness
- Adaptive-Input PoK
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: OWP
- Works with multiple OR compositions
- Requires NP-reduction and gives Computational WI

In practice

[CDS94]
- Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Witness Indistinguishable
- Assumption: none
- Works with multiple OR compositions
- No NP-reduction and gives Perfect WI

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]
- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Semi-Adaptive Input WI: one of two instances is adaptively chosen by V*
- Assumption: none
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This work
- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input
- Proof of Knowledge
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: DDH
- Works with multiple OR compositions
- No NP-reduction and gives Computational WI

R_0 OR R_1: Bridging the Gap

In theory

[LS90]
- Delayed-Input Completeness
- Adaptive-Input PoK
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: OWP
- Works with multiple OR compositions
- Requires NP-reduction and gives Computational WI
- Applicable to All NP

In practice

[CDS94]
- Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Witness Indistinguishable
- Assumption: none
- Works with multiple OR compositions
- No NP-reduction and gives Perfect WI
- Restricted to Σ-protocols

[CPS+ TCC 2016-A]
- Semi-Delayed Input Completeness
- Proof of Knowledge
- Semi-Adaptive Input WI: one of two instances is adaptively chosen by V*
- Assumption: none
- Works with only one OR composition
- No NP-reduction and gives Perfect WI
- Restricted to (a large class of) Σ-protocols

This work
- Delayed-Input Completeness: All input Σ-protocols have to be Delayed-Input
- Proof of Knowledge
- Adaptive-Input WI
- Assumption: DDH
- Works with multiple OR compositions
- No NP-reduction and gives Computational WI
- Restricted to (a large class of) Σ-protocols

Comparison: Summary

	Assumption	Completeness	Adaptive WI	Adaptive PoK	Online Efficiency
[LS90]	OWP	Delayed-Input	k out of n (all adaptive)	k out of n	NP-reduction
[CDS94]	/	/	/	k out of n*	Entire protocol
[CPSSV16]	/	Semi-Delayed Input	1 out of 2 (1 adaptive)	k out of n*	Entire protocol
This work	**DDH**	Delayed-Input	k out of n (all adaptive)	k out of n*	≤ CDS94

Our Construction: Tools

Sen   Rec

$$com = ((com_1, com_2, \ldots, com_n), \Pi)$$

- (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

Our Construction: Tools

Sen

com=((com$_1$, com$_2$, …, com$_n$), Π)

At least k are perfectly binding

Rec

- (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

Our Construction: Tools

Sen

At least k are perfectly binding

Rec

$$com=((com_1, com_2, \ldots, com_n), \Pi)$$

- (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

  n-k commitments can be equivocated

  - $Com_{KN}(m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n)$ ➡ com
  - $Open_{KN}(com, m_1^*, m_2^*, \ldots, m_{n-k}^*)$ ➡ dec

Our Construction: Tools

Sen

At least k are perfectly binding

Rec

com=((com$_1$, com$_2$, …, com$_n$), $\mathbf{\Pi}$)

- (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

  - Com$_{KN}$(m$_1$, m$_2$, …, m$_n$) ➡️ com
  - Open$_{KN}$(com, m$_1^*$, m$_2^*$, …, m$_{n-k}^*$) ➡️ dec

  n-k commitments can be equivocated

- $\sum$: Delayed-Input $\sum$-protocol for the relation $\mathbf{R}$

Our Construction: Tools

Sen

At least k are perfectly binding

Rec

$com = ((com_1, com_2, \ldots, com_n), \Pi)$

- (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

  - $Com_{KN}(m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n)$ ➡ com

    n-k commitments can be equivocated

  - $Open_{KN}(com, m_1^*, m_2^*, \ldots, m_{n-k}^*)$ ➡ dec

- Σ: Delayed-Input Σ-protocol for the relation R

- Sim_Σ: SHVZK simulator for Σ

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \text{ }_{OR} \mathbf{R}$$

P

V

P_{Σ} ➡ a_1, a_2

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \; _{OR} \; \mathbf{R}$$

P

V

P_Σ ➡ a_1, a_2

$com=Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \text{ OR } \mathbf{R}$$

P   V

P_Σ → a_1, a_2 com=Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2) →

                                              ← c

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \ _{OR} \ \mathbf{R}$$

P

V

X_1, X_2

P_{Σ} ➡️ a_1, a_2

$com = Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$

c

W_b

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \text{ }_{OR} \mathbf{R}$$

P

V

$\boxed{\mathbf{X_1, X_2}}$

P_Σ ➡ a_1, a_2

$com = Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$

$\boxed{\mathbf{W_b}}$

c

$P_\Sigma(x_b, w_b, a_1, c)$ ➡ z_1

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \text{ OR } \mathbf{R}$$

P   V

$\mathbf{x_1, x_2}$

$P_\Sigma \Rightarrow a_1, a_2$

$com = Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$

$\longrightarrow$

c

$\longleftarrow$

$\mathbf{w_b}$

$P_\Sigma(x_b, w_b, a_1, c) \Rightarrow$

$a_1 \; z_1$

$\longrightarrow$

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$R \text{ OR } R$$

P   V

x_1, x_2

P_Σ ➡ a_1, a_2

$com = Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$

⟶

c

⟵

w_b

$P_\Sigma(x_b, w_b, a_1, c)$ ➡

$Sim_\Sigma(x_{1-b}, c)$ ➡ $a^*\ z^*$

$a_1\ z_1$

⟶

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Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \text{ OR } \mathbf{R}$$

P   V

$\boxed{\mathbf{x_1, x_2}}$

P_Σ ➡ a_1, a_2

$com = Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$ ──────────➤

$\boxed{\mathbf{w_b}}$

◄────────── c

$P_\Sigma(x_b, w_b, a_1, c)$ ➡

$Sim_\Sigma(x_{1-b}, c)$ ➡

$a^* \, z^*$ $a_1 \, z_1$ ──────────➤

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \;_{OR}\; \mathbf{R}$$

P   V

x_1, x_2

P_Σ ➡ a_1, a_2

$$com = Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2) \longrightarrow$$

$$\longleftarrow c$$

w_b

$P_\Sigma(x_b, w_b, a_1, c)$ ➡

$Sim_\Sigma(x_{1-b}, c)$ ➡

$Open_{KN}(com, a^*)$ ➡ dec $a^* \; z^* \qquad a_1 \; z_1 \longrightarrow$

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R} \text{ OR } \mathbf{R}$$

P   V

$\mathbf{x_1, x_2}$

P_Σ ➡ a_1, a_2 com=Com$_{KN}$(a_1, a_2) →

c ←

$\mathbf{w_b}$

$P_\Sigma(x_b, w_b, a_1, c)$ ➡

$Sim_\Sigma(x_{1-b}, c)$ ➡

$Open_{KN}(com, a^*)$ ➡   dec a^* z^* a_1 z_1 →

Our Construction: Main Idea

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$\mathbf{R}_{OR}\mathbf{R}$$

P   V

x_1, x_2

P_{Σ} → a_1, a_2 com=$Com_{KN}(a_1, a_2)$ →

w_b c ←

$P_{\Sigma}(x_b, w_b, a_1, c)$ →

$Sim_{\Sigma}(x_{1-b}, c)$ →

$Open_{KN}(com, a^*)$ →   dec a^* z^* a_1 z_1 →

-Is dec a valid opening for a^*
and a_1 w.r.t com?
-Is (a^*, c, z^*) accepting for Σ?
-Is (a_1, c, z_1) accepting for Σ?

How to Construct an Efficient (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

Ingredient 1: DDH

$$(g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) \approx (g^a, g^b, g^c)$$

How to Construct an Efficient (K,N) Trapdoor Commitment

Ingredient 1: DDH

$$(g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) \approx (g^a, g^b, g^c)$$

DH tuple

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DH tuple non-DH tuple

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Ingredient 2: Instance dependent trapdoor commitment (**IDTC**) from DDH

Given $\mathbf{T}=(g^a, g^b, g^c)$ $\mathrm{Com}(\mathbf{T}, m) \Rightarrow$ dec, com

If T is **NDH** ➡️ Binding Perfect
Hiding Computational

If T is **DH** ➡️ Binding Computational
Equivocal

Constructions of IDTC follow directly from known constructions of Trapdoor Commitments from ∑-Protocols [Dam10, HL10, DN02]

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Sen

Rec

$(com_1, com_2, \ldots, com_n), \Pi$

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At least k are perfectly binding

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Sen $\qquad$ Rec

$$(com_1, com_2, \ldots, com_n), \Pi$$

1) Select $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$

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Sen   Rec

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
1) Select $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$

2) Run $Com(T_i, m_i) \Rightarrow (dec_i, com_i)$ **for** $i=1,\ldots,n$ and send $(com_1, com_2, \ldots, com_n)$

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At least k are perfectly binding

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3) Prove with Π that at least **k** of the n tuples $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$ are **non-DH** (prove with [CDS94])

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1) Select $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$

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Prove with Π that at least **k** of the n tuples $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$ are **non-DH**

e.g. k=1, n=2

$\mathbf{T_1}=(g^{a_1}, g^{b_1}, g^{c_1})$

$\mathbf{T_2}=(g^{a_2}, g^{b_2}, g^{c_2})$

P   V

Prove with Π that at least **k** of the n tuples $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$
are **non-DH**

e.g. k=1, n=2

$T_1 = (g^{a_1}, g^{b_1}, g^{c_1})$

$T_2 = (g^{a_2}, g^{b_2}, g^{c_2})$

$T_1{}' = (g^{a_1}, g^{b_1}, g^{a_1 \cdot b_1})$

$T_2{}' = (g^{a_2}, g^{b_2}, g^{c_3})$

P   V

Prove with Π that at least **k** of the n tuples $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$ are **non-DH**

e.g. k=1, n=2

$$T_1=(g^{a_1},g^{b_1},g^{c_1})$$

$$T_1{}'=(g^{a_1},g^{b_1},g^{a_1\cdot b_1})$$

$$T_2=(g^{a_2},g^{b_2},g^{c_2})$$

$$T_2{}'=(g^{a_2},g^{b_2},g^{c_3})$$

P Π^{CDS94}: "$T_1{}'$ is DH **OR** $T_2{}'$ is DH"   V

Prove with Π that at least **k** of the n tuples $T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n$

are **non-DH**

e.g. k=1, n=2

$T_1 = (g^{a_1}, g^{b_1}, g^{c_1})$

$T_2 = (g^{a_2}, g^{b_2}, g^{c_2})$

$T_1' = (g^{a_1}, g^{b_1}, g^{a_1 \cdot b_1})$

$T_2' = (g^{a_2}, g^{b_2}, g^{c_3})$

P Π^{CDS94}: "T_1' is DH **OR** T_2' is DH"   V

V accepts $\Leftrightarrow$ One out of

T_1, T_2 is a non-DH tuple

More Results of Our Work

- Our previous construction works for any (**k**,**n**)

- In the paper you can also find a construction that works for different NP-relations (e.g. R_{Dlog} or R_{DH}) (This construction is non-trivial ad uses as a sub-protocol the construction showed before)

- We give also a compiler that transform a ∑-Protocol (belonging to the class described in [Cra96, Mau15, CD98]) in an **Adaptive-Input PoK**

- **Open problem**
  - Is it possible to extend adaptive PoK to a larger class of ∑-Protocols?

thanks