

Tight Security Bounds for Key-Alternating Ciphers

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
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
Block Cipher

Permutation



AES Cipher


Permutation




\approx_C Random Permutation \mathcal{Q}

Key-Alternating Ciphers (Ideal Permutation Model)


Uniformly Random and Independent




Key-Alternating Ciphers



Indistinguishability Experiment



Indistinguishability Security



$$\text{Adv}(D) := \left| \Pr[D^{P_1, \dots, P_t, E_k} = 1] - \Pr[D^{P_1, \dots, P_t, Q} = 1] \right|$$

Previous Work

- ◇ Security: $N = 2^n$
 - ◇ $t = 1, \Omega(N^{1/2})$ [EM97]
 - ◇ $t \geq 2, \Omega(N^{2/3})$ [BKLSST12]
 - ◇ $t \geq 3, \Omega(N^{3/4})$ [S12]
 - ◇ $\forall t = 2k, \Omega(N^{t/(t+2)})$ [LPS12]
 - ◇ $\forall t, \Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$ [CS14]

D has to make at least $N^{1/2}$ queries to distinguish the real world from the ideal world with advantage > 0.5

$$\frac{t}{t+2} = \frac{t/2}{t/2+1}$$


- ◇ Attack:
 - ◇ $\forall t, \mathcal{O}(N^{t/(t+1)})$ [BKLSST12]

$N^{t/(t+1)}$ queries are sufficient to distinguish the real world from the ideal world with advantage > 0.5

Transcripts

Transcript:

$$\tau = \{(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (c_1, d_1), (c_2, d_2), (x_1, y_1)\}$$



Information-Theoretic Setting

Transcript:

$$\tau = \{(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (c_1, d_1), (c_2, d_2), (x_1, y_1)\}$$

1. No query direction
2. No query order

We can assume w.l.o.g. that D is **deterministic**.

$$P_2(a_2) \rightarrow b_2 \quad P_1^{-1}(d_1) \rightarrow c_1 \quad E_k(x_1) \rightarrow y_1 \cdots$$


Statistical Distance of Transcripts

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}(D) &:= \left| \Pr[D^{P_1, \dots, P_t, E_k} = 1] - \Pr[D^{P_1, \dots, P_t, Q} = 1] \right| \\ &\quad \downarrow \qquad \qquad \qquad \searrow \\ &= \left| \Pr[X \in S] - \Pr[Y \in S] \right| \\ &\leq \max_{S \subseteq T} \left| \Pr[X \in S] - \Pr[Y \in S] \right| \\ &= \Delta(X, Y) \end{aligned}$$

$S = \{\tau \in T : D(\tau) = 1\}$

$$\text{Adv}(D) \leq \Delta(X, Y)$$


Patarin's H-coefficient Technique [P09]



$$\Delta(X, Y) \leq \varepsilon + \Pr[Y \in T_{\text{bad}}]$$


$$\Delta(X, Y) = 1 - \mathbf{E}_{\tau \sim Y} \left[\min \left(1, \frac{\Pr[X = \tau]}{\Pr[Y = \tau]} \right) \right]$$

Reveal the Key



D is given the **key** for free **AFTER** making all of its queries

Definition of Bad Transcripts



$$\tau \in T_{\text{bad}} \Leftrightarrow \exists l, \#(p_l)_\tau > C \cdot E_{\tau \sim Y}[\#(p_l)]$$

$$\text{Example: } E_{\tau \sim Y}[\#(p_3)] = \frac{q^3}{N^2} \quad \#(p_3)_\tau > C \frac{q^3}{N^2}$$

$$\text{Markov Inequality} \Rightarrow \Pr[Y \in T_{\text{bad}}] = O(t^2) \frac{1}{C} \approx 0$$

Lower Bounding the Probability Ratio for Good Transcripts (Major Challenge)

$$\tau = \left\{ \begin{array}{ccccc} \tau_1 & \tau_2 & \dots & \tau_t & \tau_0 \\ (u_1^1, v_1^1) & (u_1^2, v_1^2) & \dots & (u_1^t, v_1^t) & (x_1, y_1) \\ (u_2^1, v_2^1) & \frac{\Pr[X^2 = \tau]}{\Pr[Y = \tau]} \cdot (u_2^2, v_2^2) & \dots & (u_2^t, v_2^t) & (x_2, y_2) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \vdots & \vdots \\ (u_q^1, v_q^1) & (u_q^2, v_q^2) & \dots & (u_q^t, v_q^t) & (x_q, y_q) \end{array} \right\} \cup \{k^*\}$$

$P_1 \qquad P_2 \qquad \qquad P_t \qquad E_k / Q$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[X = \tau]}{\Pr[Y = \tau]} &= \frac{\Pr[E_k \triangleright \tau_0, P_1 \triangleright \tau_1, \dots, P_t \triangleright \tau_t, k = k^*]}{\Pr[Q \triangleright \tau_0, P_1 \triangleright \tau_1, \dots, P_t \triangleright \tau_t, k = k^*]} \\ &= \frac{\Pr[E_k \triangleright \tau_0 \mid \mathcal{G}_1] \triangleright \tau_1, \dots, P_t \triangleright \tau_t, k = k^*]}{\Pr[Q \triangleright \tau_0 \mid \mathcal{G}_1] \triangleright \tau_1, \dots, P_t \triangleright \tau_t, k = k^*]} \end{aligned}$$

Lower Bounding the Probability Ratio for Good Transcripts (Major Challenge)

$$\frac{\Pr[X = \tau]}{\Pr[Y = \tau]} = \frac{\Pr[E_k \triangleright \tau_0 | \mathbf{G}]}{\Pr[Q \triangleright \tau_0 | \mathbf{G}]} \geq 1 - \varepsilon \quad \mathbf{G} \Leftrightarrow P_1 \triangleright \tau_1, \dots, P_t \triangleright \tau_t, k = k^*$$


$$\tau_0 = \{(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_q, y_q)\}$$

Ideal World


Real World

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[Q \triangleright \tau_0 | \mathbf{G}] &= \Pr[Q \triangleright \tau_0] = \Pr[x_1 \rightarrow y_1, x_2 \rightarrow y_2, \dots, x_q \rightarrow y_q | \mathbf{G}] \\ &= \Pr[x_1 \rightarrow y_1] \times \Pr[x_2 \rightarrow y_2 | x_1 \rightarrow y_1] \times \dots \times \Pr[x_q \rightarrow y_q | x_i \rightarrow y_i, i < q, \mathbf{G}] \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N-1} \cdot \dots \cdot \frac{1}{N-q+1} \times \Pr[x_1 \rightarrow y_1 | \mathbf{G}] \end{aligned}$$

Lower Bounding the Probability Ratio for Good Transcripts (Major Challenge)





Lower Bounding the Probability Ratio for Good Transcripts (Major Challenge)



Q: What is the probability of z being free?

Lower Bounding the Probability Ratio for Good Transcripts (Major Challenge)



The End

Thanks & Any Questions?