An interesting result without any cryptological implications

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An interesting result without any cryptological implications – p.1/6

There exists a sequence of finite fields of increasing size over which the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem can be solved in subexponential time.

Theorem. Let $\epsilon > 0$. Then one can solve the discrete logarithm problem in elliptic curves over finite fields of the form \mathbb{F}_{q^n} with $(2 + \epsilon) \cdot n^2 \leq \log_2(q)$ in an expected time which is polynomial in q.

Corollary. Let again $\epsilon > 0$, and let $a > 2 + \epsilon$. Then one can solve the discrete logarithm problem in elliptic curves over finite fields of the form \mathbb{F}_{q^n} with

$$(2+\epsilon) \cdot n^2 \le \log_2(q) \le a \cdot n^2$$

in an expected time of

 $e^{\mathcal{O}(1) \cdot (\log(q^n))^{2/3}}$

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Indeed, the expected running time is polynomial in

$$q = 2^{\log_2(q)} = 2^{(\log_2(q))^{(1+1/2) \cdot 2/3}} \le 2^{(\sqrt{a} \cdot n \log_2(q))^{2/3}}$$

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A question

Why was the result presented at the Rump Session of Eurocrypt 2008?