

The Torsion-Limit for Algebraic Function Fields and Its Application to Arithmetic Secret Sharing

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Let \mathbb{F}_q be a finite field, $k, n \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1}$ (k “size of the secret”, n “number of shares”).

Definition (n -Code)

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such that

- 1 The “secret” coordinate* of C can take any value in \mathbb{F}_q^k .

*Think of $\mathbf{x} \in C$ as $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}_0, x_1, \dots, x_n)$ where:

$\mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ secret “coordinate”

$x_1, \dots, x_n \in \mathbb{F}_q$ share coordinates.

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- 2 The n “share” coordinates of C jointly determine the secret coordinate.

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Definition (r -reconstructing)

An n -code C for \mathbb{F}_q^k is r -reconstructing ($1 \leq r \leq n$) if it holds that any r shares determine the secret.

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An n -code C for \mathbb{F}_q^k is t -disconnected if $t = 0$, or else if $1 \leq t < n$, the secret is “independent” of any t shares.

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If, additionally, any set of t shares is uniformly distributed in \mathbb{F}_q^t C has t -uniformity.

Definition (Powers of an n -Code)

Let $d \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$. For C an n -code for \mathbb{F}_q^k , let

$$C^{*d} := \mathbb{F}_q \langle \{ \mathbf{c}^{(1)} * \dots * \mathbf{c}^{(d)} : \mathbf{c}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{c}^{(d)} \in C \} \rangle .$$

(where $*$ denotes coordinatewise product)

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Remark (Powering Need Not Preserve n -Code)

Let $C \subset \mathbb{F}_q^k \times \mathbb{F}_q^n$ be an n -code for S . Consider C^{*d} ($d \geq 2$).

- *Trivially, the secret coordinate of C^{*d} can take any value.*

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- Trivially, the secret coordinate of C^{*d} can take any value.
- **But:** the share coordinates of C^{*d} need not determine the secret coordinate.
- Thus: C^{*d} **need not be an n -code for \mathbb{F}_q^k .**

Definition

An (n, t, d, r) -arithmetic secret sharing scheme for \mathbb{F}_q^k (over \mathbb{F}_q) is an n -code C for \mathbb{F}_q^k such that:

- 1 $t \geq 1, d \geq 2$.
- 2 The n -code C is t -disconnected.
- 3 C^{*d} is in fact an n -code for \mathbb{F}_q^k .
- 4 The n -code C^{*d} is r -reconstructing.

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The arithmetic SSS has *uniformity* if, in addition, the n -code C has t -uniformity.

An $(n, t, 2, n - t)$ -arithmetic SSS is a t -strong multiplicative linear SSS (Cramer/Damgaard/Maurer EUROCRYPT 2000).

This notion is in turn generalized by *arithmetic codices*.

Remark (Arithmetic SSS exist)

If $n + k \leq q$ and $d(t + k - 1) < n - t$, then:

Shamir (or Franklin/Yung for $k > 1$) schemes are $(n, t, d, n - t)$ -arithmetic SSS with uniformity for \mathbb{F}_q^k .

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Question (2006):

What happens if q is fixed and n is unbounded?

Can positive rates ($t = \Omega(n)$) be achieved?

(Note: We consider d constant, as otherwise $t = \Omega(n)$ is provably impossible).

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- Chen/Cramer (2006): Yes, if $A(q) > 2d$. * Includes q square with $q > (2d + 1)^2$ and all q very large.
- Cascudo/Chen/Cramer/Xing(2009): For $d = 2$ and **without uniformity**, *any* finite field \mathbb{F}_q .

* $A(q)$ Ihara's constant of \mathbb{F}_q

Original application: IT-secure multi-party computation,
malicious adversary case (Cramer/Damgaard/Maurer 2000).
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But lately: Unexpected applications in two-party cryptography,
usually via MPC-in-the-head paradigm:

**“secure two-party computation” with small error
and low communication.**

“Players” are virtual processes!.

- (STOC 2007) Ishai/Kushilevitz/Ostrovsky/Sahai:
Zero knowledge from multi-party computation.
- (TCC 2008) Harnik/Ishai/Kushilevitz/BuusNielsen:
OT-Combiners via Secure Computation.
- (CRYPTO 2008) Ishai/Prabhakaran/Sahai:
Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer - Efficiently.
- (FOCS 2009) Ishai/Kushilevitz/Ostrovsky/Sahai:
Extracting Correlations. Requires uniformity.
- (CRYPTO 2011, Previous talk!)
Ishai/Kushilevitz/Ostrovsky/Prabhakaran/Sahai/Wullschlegel:
Constant-Rate Oblivious Transfer from Noisy Channels.
- (2011) Cramer/Damgaard/Pastro:
Amortized Complexity of Zero Knowledge Proof of Multiplicative Relations. Note: $d > 2$ here.

Theorem (Cramer/Daza/Gracia/Jimenez/Leander/Marti/Padro, CRYPTO 05)

Let C be a $(n, t, 2, n - t)$ -arithmetic SSS for \mathbb{F}_q^k over \mathbb{F}_q . Then C has efficient error correction of the secret in the presence of t faulty shares.

Efficient error correction

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We generalize this:

Theorem

Let C be a $(n, t, d, n - t)$ -arithmetic SSS for \mathbb{F}_q^k over \mathbb{F}_q . Then $C^{(d-1)}$ has efficient error correction of the secret in the presence of t faulty shares.*

Main results

In this paper:

- We introduce a new technique to construct algebraic geometric SSS.
- We define a new AG notion (torsion limit) and prove bounds for it.
- As a result we get (case $d = 2$):

Theorem

For $q = 8, 9$ and all $q \geq 16$ there is an infinite family of $(n, t, 2, n - t)$ -arithmetic SSS for \mathbb{F}_q^k over \mathbb{F}_q with t -uniformity where n is unbounded, $k = \Omega(n)$ and $t = \Omega(n)$.

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CC06 could only achieve this for q square, $q > 49$.

Furthermore, in many cases, we achieve a larger rate t/n .

Algebraic Geometric codes

Let F an algebraic function field over \mathbb{F}_q .

Definition

For G a divisor of F , $P_1, \dots, P_n, Q_1, \dots, Q_k$ rational places of F , $P_i, Q_j \notin \text{supp}G$, denote $D := \sum P_i + \sum Q_j$ and consider the AG-code:

$$C(G; D) = \{(f(Q_1), \dots, f(Q_k), f(P_1), \dots, f(P_n)) \mid f \in \mathcal{L}(G)\}$$

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Remark

If $C = C(G; D)$, then $C^{*d} \subseteq C(dG; D)$.

Arithmetic SSS from Algebraic Geometric Codes

For $A \subset \{1, \dots, n\}$ with $A \neq \emptyset$, define $P_A = \sum_{j \in A} P_j \in \text{Div}(F)$.
Let $K \in \text{Div}(F)$ be a canonical divisor.

Theorem

If the “Riemann-Roch system of equations”

$$\{\ell(dX - D + P_A + Q) = 0, \ell(K - X + P_A + Q) = 0\}_{A \subset I^*, |A|=t}$$

has solution $X := G$, then $C(G; D)$ is an $(n, t, d, n - t)$ -arithmetic secret sharing scheme for \mathbb{F}_q^k over \mathbb{F}_q (with uniformity).

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In CC06: Strong conditions on F (large number rational places)
 \Rightarrow **any** divisor of a certain degree is a solution.

Solvability of RR systems

Let h be the class number of F , A_r number of effective divisors of degree r .

Theorem

Consider the system:

$$\{\ell(d_i X + Y_i) = 0\}_{i=1}^L.$$

If for some $s \in \mathbb{Z}$,

$$h > \sum_{i=1}^L A_{r_i(s)} \cdot |\mathcal{J}_F[d_i]|,$$

*where $r_i(s) = d_i s + \deg Y_i$, $i = 1, \dots, L$,
then the system has a solution G of degree s .*

- Bounds on A_r/h were obtained in several works in coding theory.
- $|\mathcal{J}_F[d]|$ not previously studied in that context (as far as we know).
- This is because the role of $|\mathcal{J}_F[d]|$ is linked to the requirements on C^{*d} .

The Torsion Limit

For F/\mathbb{F}_q a function field, and $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ we consider the r -torsion point group in \mathcal{J}_F , i.e., $\mathcal{J}_F[r] := \{[D] \in \mathcal{J}_F : r[D] = 0\}$.

Definition

For a family $\mathcal{F} = \{F/\mathbb{F}_q\}$ of function fields with $g(F) \rightarrow \infty$, we define its r -torsion limit:

$$J_r(\mathcal{F}) := \liminf_{F \in \mathcal{F}} \frac{\log_q |\mathcal{J}_F[r]|}{g(F)}.$$

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Definition

For a prime power q and a real $a \in (0, A(q)]$, let \mathfrak{F} the (non-empty) set of families $\mathcal{F} = \{F/\mathbb{F}_q\}$ with $g(F) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\lim \frac{|\mathbb{P}^{(1)}(F)|}{g(F)} \geq a$. Then define, for $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$,

$$J_r(q, a) := \liminf_{\mathcal{F} \in \mathfrak{F}} J_r(\mathcal{F}).$$



Theorem

Fix \mathbb{F}_q and $d \geq 2$. Suppose $A(q) > 1 + J_d(q, A(q))$.

Then there is an infinite family of $(n, t, d, n - t)$ -arithmetic SSS for \mathbb{F}_q^k over \mathbb{F}_q with t -uniformity such that

- $n \rightarrow \infty$, $k = \Omega(n)$ and $t = \Omega(n)$.
- $C, \dots, C^{*(d-1)}$ have efficient t -error correction for the secret.

Theorem

Let \mathbb{F}_q be a finite field and let $r > 1$ be a prime.

- (i) If $r \mid (q - 1)$, then $J_r(q, A(q)) \leq \frac{2}{\log_r q}$.
- (ii) If $r \nmid (q - 1)$, then $J_r(q, A(q)) \leq \frac{1}{\log_r q}$.
- (iii) If q is square and $r \mid q$, then $J_r(q, \sqrt{q} - 1) \leq \frac{1}{(\sqrt{q}+1)\log_r q}$.

Conclusions

- Arithmetic SSS are an important abstract primitive in IT secure cryptography.
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- Asymptotics have become important: recent applications in two party cryptography.
- Algebraic geometry seem only handle to obtain good asymptotic constructions.
- Probabilistic methods do not seem to work! (as opposed to code theory).
- Results: More general definitions and framework, new methodology to construct AG-SSS, existential results not known to be possible before, new notion of torsion limit and upper bounds for it.