Optimal Verification of Operations on Dynamic Sets

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


Data in the cloud

- Data privacy
 - Server wants to learn our data
 - Can we enable the server use encrypted data in a meaningful way?
 - Computing on encrypted data
- Data and computations integrity
 - Server wants to tamper with our data
 - Are answers to queries the same as if the data were locally stored?
 - Authenticated data structures
 - Verifiable delegation of computation



Verifying outsourced computation



- Conjunctive queries
 - Emails that have the terms "Brown" and "Berkeley"
- Disjunctive queries
 - Emails that have the terms "thesis" or "publication"
- All these queries boil down to set operations!


Authenticated data structures model

Complexity


- Update at source and server
- Query at server
- Verification at client
- Size of proof
- Space

Security

- A poly-bounded adversary cannot construct invalid proofs except with negligible probability
- Need for computational assumptions




Authenticated sets collection



Queries on sets

- m: number of sets (e.g., m = 4)
- M: sum of sizes of **all** the sets (e.g., M = 6 + 4 + 3 + 5 = 18)
- t: number of queried sets (e.g., t = 2)
- δ : number of elements contained in the **answer** (e.g., $\delta = 1$)
- n: the sum of sizes of the queried sets (e.g., n = 6 + 5 = 11)



Related work and comparison

- Optimal proof size and verification time: $O(\delta)$
- Linear space: O(m + M)
- Efficient queries and updates
- Performance comparison for the intersection of c = O(1) sets

	space	query	proof	assumption
D+04 YP09	m + M	n + log m	n + log m	Generic CR
M+04	m + M	n	n	Strong RSA
PT04	m ^c	1	δ	Discrete log
PTT10	m + M	n log³ n + mε log m	δ	Bilinear q- strong DH

Our solution: Sets and polynomials

Set X with n elements

$$X = \{x_1, ..., x_n\}$$

- Set Z is the intersection of X and Y
- The intersection of X and Y is empty, i.e.,
 X ∩ Y = ∅

- Polynomial X(s) in Zp $X(s) = (s+x_1)...(s+x_n)$
- Polynomial Z(s) is the GCD of X(s) and Y(s)
- X(s) and Y(s) have GCD equal to 1, i.e., gcd(X(s),Y(s)) = 1



 There are polynomials P(s) and Q(s) such that

$$P(S)X(s) + Q(s)Y(s) = 1$$

Cryptographic tools we use


- Two multiplicative groups G and T of prime order p
- g is a generator of G
- A bilinear map e(.,.) from G to T such that
 - $e(g^a,g^b) = e(g,g)^{ab}$ for all a,b in Zp
 - e(g,g) generates T
- Bilinear q-strong Diffie Hellman Assumption
 - Pick a random s in Zp
 - s is the trapdoor
 - Compute g^s, g^{s2}, g^{s3},..., g^{sq}
 - The public key pk are the values g^s, g^{s2}, g^{s3},..., g^{sq}
 - The probability that a PPT Adv can find an a in Zp and output the tuple (a,e(g,g)¹/(s+a)) is negligible

Bilinear-map accumulator

- G and T of order p have a map e(.,.)
- $X=\{x,y,z,r\}$ in Z_p
- Base g∈G, generator of G
- Secret s ∈ Z_p
- Digest
 - $D = g^{(x+s)(y+s)(z+s)(r+s)}$
- Witness for x
 - $W_x = g^{(y+s)(z+s)(r+s)}$
- Verification
 - $e(D,g) = e(W_x,g^{(x+s)})$?
- Security: q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption
- [Nguyen (05)]


Our construction


Compute the accumulation value for every set




Our construction

- Compute the accumulation value for every set
- Build an accumulation tree on top [CCS 2008]
 - O(1/ ε) levels and O(mε) internal degree
 - O(m^εlogm) query, O(1) update and O(1) proof
- The accumulation values protect the integrity of the set elements
- The accumulation tree protects the integrity of the acc. values







Elements of intersection {c,e}



- Proof of accumulation values A₁ and A₂
- Let Π_1 and Π_2 be such proofs




- **Proof of accumulation values** A₁ and A₂
- Let Π_1 and Π_2 be such proofs
 - Values along the path of the tree
 - Construction of proofs: O(m^ε logm)
 - Size of proofs: O(1)






Subset condition:




Subset condition:

• $I \subseteq S_1$: Subset witness $W_1 = g^{(s+a)(s+b)(s+d)(s+f)} = g^{P(s)}$



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


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Complexity


- Construction: O(nlog n) (polynomial interpolation)
- Size: O(1) (2 group elements)






Completeness condition:

• $(S_1 - I) \cap (S_2 - I)$ is empty




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- Recall $W_1 = g^{P(s)}$ and $W_2 = g^{Q(s)}$



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 - $(S_1 I) \cap (S_2 I)$ is empty
 - Recall $W_1 = g^{P(s)}$ and $W_2 = g^{Q(s)}$
 - Completeness witness $F_1 = g^{A(s)}$ and $F_2 = g^{B(s)}$
 - A(s)P(s)+B(s)Q(s)=1
- Complexity: O(nlog²nlog log n) (ext. Euclidean algorithm)





- t sets are intersected and δ is the size of the answer
- N is the sum of sizes of intersected sets

element of the proof	complexity	size
Intersection elements	N	δ

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Accumulation values proofs	tm ^ε log m	t
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TOTAL	Nlog ² Nlog log N + tm ^E log m	t+δ

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element of the proof	complexity	size
Intersection elements	N	δ
Accumulation values proofs	tm ^ε log m	t
Subset witnesses	Nlog N	t
Completeness witnesses	Nlog ² Nloglog N	t
TOTAL almost optimal	Nlog ² Nlog log N + tm ^E log m	t+δ


Size of proof for X ∩ Y in practice

X	Y	[X ∩ Y]	KBytes [M+ 04]	KBytes this work
1000	1000	10	3.34	1.73
1000	100	1	1.68	1.55
1000	10	0	1.01	1.53
1000	1	0	0.46	1.53
10000	10000	100	26.88	3.53
10000	1000	10	12.15	1.73
10000	100	1	6.86	1.55
10000	10	0	3.08	1.53
100000	100000	1000	263.25	21.53
100000	10000	100	116.13	3.53
100000	1000	10	63.18	1.73
100000	100	1	26.29	1.55

Thank you!

Application: Supporting timestamps

- For timestamped documents, use segment tree over the time dimension (N timestamps)
- Search interval covered by O(log N) canonical intervals in the segment tree, each corresponding to a set of documents T_i
- Timestamped keyword search equivalent to O(log N) set intersections



Verifying outsourced computation


- Computation "on demand"
 - E.g., Google docs
 - ...



- Find the pattern comput* in my document
- Is the result correct?
- Need for efficient computations

First solution: hashing

- [Devanbu et al., Algorithmica 2004; Yang and Papadias, SIGMOD 2009]
- Two-level tree structure and hierarchical cryptographic hashing
- Space: O(m + M), update: O(log m + log n)
- Intersection of two sets: O(n + log m) proof size and verification time
- Security: Cryptographic hashing
- Same complexities: Morselli et al., INFOCOM 2004



Second solution: precomputation

- [Pang and Tan, ICDE 2004]
- Sign the answer to every possible query
- Space: O(m² + M) for a 2-intersection
- For any possible intersection space is
 - O(2^m)
- Proof size and verification: O(δ)
- **Update**: O(m²) for a 2-intersection
- Security: discrete log

```
Signatures of S_1 \cap S_2 S_1 \cap S_3 S_1 \cap S_4 S_2 \cap S_3 S_2 \cap S_4 S_3 \cap S_4
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