Abstract. In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of n parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some functionality of their inputs. One of the most fundamental results of information-theoretically secure computation was presented by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) in 1988. They demonstrated that any n-party functionality can be computed with perfect security, in the private channels model. The most technically challenging part of this result is a protocol for multiplying two shared values, with perfect security in the presence of up to t<n/3 malicious adversaries.
In this paper we provide a full specification of the BGW perfect multiplication protocol. This includes one new step for the perfect multiplication protocol in the case of n/4≤t<n/3. As in the original BGW protocol, this protocol works whenever the parties hold univariate (Shamir) shares of the input values. In addition, we present a new multiplication protocol that utilizes bivariate secret sharing in order to achieve higher effiency while maintaining a round complexity that is constant per multiplication. Both of our protocols are presented with full proofs of security.