

New Attacks on SHA-3

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Rump session of Asiacrypt 2012

SHA-3 = Keccak

- On October 2-nd, NIST announced their choice of **Keccak** as **SHA-3**
- Keccak is currently the **hottest target for cryptanalysis!**
- Lots of **interesting observations**, but **very few published attacks**

The Four Flavors of Keccak

- Keccak-224
- Keccak-256
- Keccak-384
- Keccak-512

Collision Attacks on Keccak: > 1 year ago

- Keccak-224 - none
- Keccak-256 - none
- Keccak-384 - none
- Keccak-512 - none

Collision Attacks on Keccak: Indocrypt 2011

Maria Naya-Plasencia, Andrea Rock, and Willi Meier

- Keccak-224 – 2 rounds
- Keccak-256 – 2 rounds
- Keccak-384 - none
- Keccak-512 - none

Collision Attacks on Keccak: FSE 2012

Itai Dinur, Orr Dunkelman and Adi Shamir

- Keccak-224 – 4 rounds
- Keccak-256 – 4 rounds
- Keccak-384 - none
- Keccak-512 - none

Collision Attacks on Keccak: New results

Itai Dinur, Orr Dunkelman and Adi Shamir

- Keccak-224 – 4 rounds
- Keccak-256 – 5 rounds
- Keccak-384 – 4 rounds
- Keccak-512 – 3 rounds


Our New Cryptanalytic Technique: Self-Differential Cryptanalysis

- In **standard differential attacks**, we consider **pairs of plaintexts**, and follow the evolution of their differences
- In **self-differential attacks**, we consider **a single plaintext**, and follow the evolution of differences between various parts of the single state during the first few rounds


Our New Cryptanalytic Technique: Self-Differential Cryptanalysis

- We use the fact that most of the operations in SHA-3 **preserve some state symmetries**
- The designers were aware of this problem
- They tried to avoid it by **adding asymmetric constants** at each round of SHA-3
- However, these constants have **very low HW**
- We follow the **evolution of such asymmetries**
- We use a **Squeeze attack** to map **many inputs** into the small set of **almost symmetric outputs**

Squeeze Attack



Squeeze Attack



Final Comments about SHA-3:

- These are **the first published collision attacks** on reduced round **Keccak-384** and **Keccak-512**
- We **improve the best published attack** on **Keccak-256**
- However, full Keccak has **24 rounds**
- So we are still **very far from breaking SHA-3...**
- **More details:** see our **new ePrint paper**