Truncation in Cryptographic Hash Functions

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Hash Truncation Dilemma

- Some standards organizations are urgently trying to find a suitable replacement for SHA-1 because the confidence in it has been shaken due to the recent collision results.
- One suggestion that has been made in standards proposals is to truncate the output of other hash functions:
  - e.g., Truncate-160(SHA-256(M)).
- However, this might be a bad idea if the first 160 bits of SHA-256 have any weaknesses or bias.
  - Of course, a hash function that is collision resistant should “in theory” not have weak bits.
  - In particular, weak bits imply a bias in the output distribution which would in-turn reduce the complexity of a birthday attack.
- One possible avenue for a solution: randomness extractors…
Complexity-theorists have done much work on randomness extractors which can "extract" a short uniformly random string from a longer string that has high-min entropy (but which is not uniformly random).

Such extractors can be implemented efficiently
- Two-universal hash functions are provably good extractors [IZ89].
- Definition: For all $x \neq y$, $\Pr[k[H_k(x) = H_k(y)] < \varepsilon$.
- Example: over a finite field like $GF(2^n)$: $H_k(x) = kx$

Potential approach: $(\text{Extractor}_k(\text{SHA-256}(m)), k)$

Issue: randomness extractors require some random seed to start with, but it can be public (no secret key required)!
- Might be OK for randomized hash functions [HK05].
- Perhaps there is a good possible source of randomness elsewhere.
- Randomness can be specific to a protocol implementation.
- Perhaps can use cryptographic hash function to generate randomness (though you may sacrifice provable security: chicken and egg problem).