

10-Round Feistel is Indifferentiable from an Ideal Cipher^{*}

Dana Dachman-Soled^{**}, Jonathan Katz^{***}, and Aishwarya Thiruvengadam^{***}

University of Maryland
danadach@ece.umd.edu, {jkatz, aish}@cs.umd.edu

Abstract. We revisit the question of constructing an ideal cipher from a random oracle. Coron et al. (Journal of Cryptology, 2014) proved that a 14-round Feistel network using random, independent, keyed round functions is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher, thus demonstrating the feasibility of such a transformation. Left unresolved is the number of rounds of a Feistel network that are needed in order for indifferentiability to hold. We improve upon the result of Coron et al. and show that 10 rounds suffice.

1 Introduction

The security of practical block ciphers—i.e., pseudorandom permutations—is not currently known to reduce to well-studied, easily formulated, computational problems. Nevertheless, modern block-cipher constructions are far from ad-hoc, and a strong theory for their construction has been developed. An important area of research is to understand the provable security guarantees offered by these classical paradigms.

One of the well-known approaches for building practical block ciphers is to use a *Feistel network* [9], an iterated structure in which key-dependent, “random-looking” *round functions* on $\{0, 1\}^n$ are applied in a sequence of rounds to yield a permutation on $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. In analyzing the security that Feistel networks provide, it is useful to consider an information-theoretic setting in which the round functions are instantiated by truly random and independent (keyed) functions. The purpose of such an analysis is to validate the *structural* robustness of the approach. Luby and Rackoff [12] proved that when independent, random round functions are used, a three-round Feistel network is indistinguishable from a random permutation under chosen-plaintext attacks, and a four-round Feistel network is indistinguishable from a random permutation under chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks.

^{*} This work was performed under financial assistance award 70NANB15H328 from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology.

^{**} Work supported in part by NSF CAREER award #1453045. This work was done in part while the author was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, supported by the Simons Foundation and by the DIMACS/Simons Collaboration in Cryptography through NSF grant #1523467.

^{***} Work supported in part by NSF award #1223623.

In the Luby-Rackoff result, the round functions are secretly keyed and the adversary does not have direct access to them; the security notion considered—namely, *indistinguishability*—is one in which the key of the overall Feistel network is also unknown to the adversary. A stronger notion of security, called *indifferentiability* [14], applies even when the round functions are *public*, and aims to show that a block cipher behaves like an *ideal cipher*, i.e., an oracle for which each key defines an independent, random permutation. Proving indifferentiability is more complex than proving indistinguishability: to prove indifferentiability of a block-cipher construction \mathbf{BC} (that relies on an ideal primitive \mathcal{O}) from an ideal cipher \mathbf{IC} , one must exhibit a *simulator* \mathbf{S} such that the view of any distinguisher interacting with $(\mathbf{BC}^{\mathcal{O}}, \mathcal{O})$ is indistinguishable from its view when interacting with $(\mathbf{IC}, \mathbf{S}^{\mathcal{O}})$. For Feistel networks, it is known (see [1, 11]) that one can simplify the problem, and focus on indifferentiability of the Feistel network when using random and independent *unkeyed* round functions from a *public random permutation*; an ideal cipher is then obtained by keying the round functions.

In a recent result building on [2, 16, 11], Coron et al. [1] proved that when using independent, random round functions, a 14-round Feistel network is indistinguishable from a public random permutation. The main question left open by the work of Coron et al. is: precisely how many rounds of a Feistel network are needed for indifferentiability to hold? It is known from prior work [1] that 5 rounds are not sufficient, while (as we have just noted) 14 rounds are. In this work, we narrow the gap and show that 10 rounds suffice.¹

We provide an overview of our proof, and the differences from that of Coron et al., in Section 2.

Concurrent work. In concurrent and independent work, Dai and Steinberger [4] have also shown indifferentiability of a 10-round Feistel network from an ideal cipher. We provide a brief comparison between our work and theirs in Section 2.3.

Subsequent work. Dai and Steinberger [5] have more recently improved their analysis and shown that an 8-round Feistel network is indistinguishable from an ideal cipher. The true number of rounds needed remains open.

1.1 Other Related Work

Coron et al. [2] claimed that a 6-round Feistel network is indistinguishable from an ideal cipher. Their proof of indistinguishability introduced the *partial chain detection technique* that we also rely on here. Seurin [16] gave a simpler proof of indistinguishability for a 10-round Feistel network, and introduced a clever technique for bounding the simulator complexity. Holenstein et al. [11] later showed that there was a distinguishing attack against the simulator of Coron et al. [2], and a gap in the proof of the 10-round simulator by Seurin [16]; however,

¹ Seurin previously claimed that a 10-round Feistel network is indistinguishable from a random permutation [16], but this claim was later retracted by the author [17].

they prove that a 14-round Feistel network is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher by building on prior work as well as incorporating several new techniques.

Ramzan and Reyzin [15] proved that a 4-round Feistel network remains indistinguishable from a random permutation even if the adversary is given access to the middle two round functions. Gentry and Ramzan [10] showed that a 4-round Feistel network can be used to instantiate the random permutation in the Even-Mansour cipher [8], and proved that such a construction is a pseudorandom permutation even if the round functions of the Feistel network are publicly accessible. Dodis and Puniya [7] studied security of the Feistel network in a scenario where the adversary learns intermediate values when the Feistel network is evaluated, and/or when the round functions are unpredictable but not (pseudo)random.

Various relaxations of indifferentiability, such as *public indifferentiability* [7, 18] or *honest-but-curious indifferentiability* [6], have also been considered. Dodis and Puniya [6] proved that a Feistel network with super-logarithmic number of rounds is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher in the honest-but-curious setting. Mandal et al. [13] proved that the 6-round Feistel network is publicly indifferentiable from an ideal cipher.

1.2 Organization of the Paper

In Section 2 we provide a high-level overview of our proof, and how it differs from the proof of indifferentiability of the 14-round Feistel network [1, 11]. After some brief background in Section 3, we jump into the technical details, describing our simulator in Section 4 and giving the proof of indifferentiability in Section 5. Additional discussion and proofs that have been omitted here are available in the full version of this work [3].

2 Overview of Our Proof

We first describe the proof structure used for the proof of indifferentiability of the 14-round Feistel network from an ideal cipher [1, 11], and then describe how our proof differs.

2.1 Techniques for the 14-Round Simulator

Consider a naive simulator for an r -round Feistel construction, which responds to distinguisher queries to each of the round functions $\mathbf{F}_1, \dots, \mathbf{F}_r$, by always returning a uniform value. Unfortunately, there is a simple distinguisher who can distinguish oracle access to $(\text{Feistel}_r^{\mathbf{F}}, \mathbf{F})$ from oracle access to $(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{S}^{\mathbf{P}})$: The distinguisher queries (x_0, x_1) to the first oracle, receiving (x_r, x_{r+1}) in return, and uses oracle access to the second oracle to evaluate the r -round Feistel and compute (x'_r, x'_{r+1}) on its own, creating a *chain* of queries (x_1, \dots, x'_r) . Note that in the first case $(x_r, x_{r+1}) = (x'_r, x'_{r+1})$ with probability 1, while in the second case the probability that $(x_r, x_{r+1}) = (x'_r, x'_{r+1})$ is negligible.

An approach to addressing the above attack, which essentially gives the high-level intuition for how a successful simulator works, is as follows: If the simulator learns the value of $\mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1) = (x_r, x_{r+1})$ before the distinguisher queries the entire chain, then the simulator assigns values for the remaining queries $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$, conditioned on the restriction $\text{Feistel}_r^{\mathbf{F}}(x_0, x_1) = (x_r, x_{r+1})$. More specifically, if there are two consecutive rounds $(i, i + 1)$, where $i \in \{1, \dots, r - 1\}$, which have not yet been queried, the simulator adapts its assignments to $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$, $\mathbf{F}_{i+1}(x_{i+1})$ to be consistent with $\mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1) = (x_r, x_{r+1})$. When the simulator adapts the assignment of $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$ to be consistent with a constraint $\mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1) = (x_r, x_{r+1})$, we say that this value of $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$ has been assigned via a *ForceVal* assignment. Further details of the 14-round simulator are discussed below.

Partial chain detection and preemptive completion. To allow the simulator to preemptively discover $\mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1) = (x_r, x_{r+1})$, the authors fix two “detect zones” which are sets of consecutive rounds $\{1, 2, 13, 14\}$, $\{7, 8\}$. Each time the simulator assigns a value to $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$, it also checks whether there exists a tuple of the form $(x_1, x_2, x_{13}, x_{14})$ such that (1) $\mathbf{F}_1(x_1)$, $\mathbf{F}_2(x_2)$, $\mathbf{F}_{13}(x_{13})$, and $\mathbf{F}_{14}(x_{14})$ have all been assigned and (2) $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{F}_1(x_1) \oplus x_2, x_1) = (x_{14}, \mathbf{F}_{13}(x_{13}) \oplus x_{14})$; or whether there exists a tuple of the form (x_7, x_8) such that $\mathbf{F}_7(x_7)$ and $\mathbf{F}_8(x_8)$ have both been assigned. A pair of consecutive round values (x_k, x_{k+1}) is referred to as a “partial chain,” and when a new partial chain is detected in the detect zones described above, it is “enqueued for completion” and will later be dequeued and preemptively completed. When a partial chain is detected due to a detect zone that includes both x_1 and x_r , we say it is a “wraparound” chain. Note that preemptive completion of a chain can cause new chains to be detected and these will then be enqueued for completion. This means that in order to prove indifferenciability, it is necessary to argue that for x_i that fall on multiple completed chains, all restrictions on the assignment of $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$ can be *simultaneously* satisfied. In particular the “bad case” will be when some assignment $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$ must be adapted via a ForceVal assignment, but an assignment to $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$ has previously been made. If such a case occurs, we say the value at an adapt position has been “overwritten.” It turns out that to prove indifferenciability, it is sufficient to prove that this occurs with negligible probability.

4-Round buffer zone. In order to ensure that overwrites do not occur, the notion of a 4-round buffer zone is introduced in [1, 11]. Their simulator has two 4-round buffer zones, corresponding to rounds $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$ or $\{9, 10, 11, 12\}$. Within the buffer zones, positions $\{3, 6\}$ (respectively, $\{9, 12\}$) are known as the *set uniform positions*, and positions $\{4, 5\}$ (respectively, $\{10, 11\}$) are known as the *adapt positions*. They prove the following property (which we call henceforth the *strong set uniform property*): At the moment a chain is about to be completed, the set uniform positions of the buffer zone are always unassigned. This means that the simulator will always assign uniform values to $\mathbf{F}_3(x_3)$ and $\mathbf{F}_6(x_6)$ (respectively, $\mathbf{F}_9(x_9)$ and $\mathbf{F}_{12}(x_{12})$) immediately before assigning values to $\mathbf{F}_4(x_4)$ and $\mathbf{F}_5(x_5)$ (respectively, $\mathbf{F}_{10}(x_{10})$ and $\mathbf{F}_{11}(x_{11})$) using ForceVal. This ensures that ForceVal overwrites with negligible probability, because $x_4 = x_2 \oplus \mathbf{F}_3(x_3)$ is only determined at the moment $\mathbf{F}_3(x_3)$ is assigned and so the probability that

$\mathbf{F}_4(x_4)$ has already been assigned is negligible (a similar argument holds for the other adapt positions).

Rigid structure. The rigid structure of [1, 11] helps their proof in two ways: First, since all assignments across all completed chains are uniform except in the fixed adapt positions $\{4, 5\}$ and $\{10, 11\}$, it is easier to argue about “bad events” occurring. In particular, since the 4-round buffer of one chain ($\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$ or $\{9, 10, 11, 12\}$) cannot overlap with the detect zone of another chain ($\{1, 2, 13, 14\}$ or $\{7, 8\}$), they are able to argue that if a “bad event” occurs while detecting a chain C , then either an equivalent chain was already enqueued or it must have been caused by a uniform setting of $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$.

Bounding the simulator’s runtime. The approach of [1, 11] (originally introduced in [2]) is to bound the total number of partial chains that get completed by the simulator. In order to create a partial chain of the form $(x_1, x_2, x_{13}, x_{14})$, it must be the case that $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{F}_1(x_1) \oplus x_2, x_1) = (x_{14}, \mathbf{F}_{13}(x_{13}) \oplus x_{14})$ and so, intuitively, the distinguisher had to query either \mathbf{P} or \mathbf{P}^{-1} in order to achieve this. Thus, the number of partial chains of the form $(x_1, x_2, x_{13}, x_{14})$ (i.e. wraparound chains) that get detected and completed by the simulator is at most the total number of queries made by the distinguisher. Since there is only a single middle detect zone $\{7, 8\}$, once we have a bound on the number of wraparound chains that are completed, we can also bound the number of completed partial chains of the form (x_7, x_8) .

2.2 Our Techniques

We next briefly discuss how our techniques differ from those of the 14-round simulator [1, 11], focusing on the four areas discussed above.

Separating detection from completion for wrap-around chains. When the distinguisher makes a query $\mathbf{F}_i(x_i)$ to the simulator, our simulator proceeds in two phases: In the first phase, the simulator does not make any queries, but enqueues for completion all partial chains which it *predicts* will require completion. In the second phase, the simulator actually completes the chains and detects and enqueues only on the *middle* detect zone (which in our construction corresponds to rounds $\{5, 6\}$). This simplifies our proof since it means that after the set of chains has been detected in the first phase, the simulator can complete the chains in a manner that minimizes “bad interactions” between partial chains. In particular, in the second phase, the simulator first completes chains C with the property that one of the set uniform positions is “known” and hence could already have been assigned (in the completion of another chain D) before the chain C gets dequeued for completion. (Although this violates the strong set uniform property of [1, 11], in our proof we are able to avoid this requirement. See the discussion of the *weak set uniform property* below for further details.) The simulator then proceeds to complete (and detect and enqueue) other chains. This allows us to reduce the complexity of our analysis.

Relaxed properties for the 4-round buffer zone. When a partial chain C is about to be completed, we allow one of the set uniform positions, say $x_{\ell-1}$, to already be assigned, as long as the adapt position x_ℓ adjacent to this set uniform position has not yet been assigned. Chains that exhibit the property where one of the set uniform positions is already assigned before the completion of the chain are said to exhibit the *weak set uniform property*. In Claim 36, we prove that for chains exhibiting the weak set uniform property, the adapt position is not assigned till the chain is dequeued for completion.

Relaxed structure. Requiring only the weak set uniform property allows us to consider a more relaxed structure for detect zones and 4-round buffer zones. Instead of requiring that for every chain that gets completed the 4 round buffer positions (i.e., $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$ or $\{9, 10, 11, 12\}$ in $[1, 11]$) are always unassigned, we allow more flexibility in the position of the 4-round buffer. For example, depending on whether the detected chain is of the form (x_1, x_2, x_{10}) , (x_1, x_9, x_{10}) , or (x_5, x_6) , our 4-round buffer will be one of: $\{3, 4, 5, 6\}$ or $\{6, 7, 8, 9\}$, $\{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ or $\{5, 6, 7, 8\}$, $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ or $\{7, 8, 9, 10\}$, respectively. This flexibility allows us to reduce the number of rounds. Now, however, the adapt zone of one chain may coincide with the detect zone of another chain. Since there are no dedicated roles for fixed positions, and since partial chains in the middle detect zone are detected during the completion of other chains, we define additional bad events **BadlyHitFV** and **BadlyCollideFV** and argue that they occur with low probability. Intuitively, **BadlyHitFV** captures the event where a FORCEVAL assignment occurs at x_ℓ such that it forms a valid Feistel sub-sequence $x_{\ell-1}$, x_ℓ and $x_{\ell+1}$ where $x_{\ell-1}$ and $x_{\ell+1}$ refer to adjacent positions to x_ℓ that they have already been assigned. This is analogous to the bad event **BadlyHit** defined in [1, 11] with the difference being that **BadlyHit** refers to a uniform assignment and **BadlyHitFV** refers to a FORCEVAL assignment. Similarly, **BadlyCollideFV** captures the event where a FORCEVAL assignment occurs at x_ℓ such that it causes two chains to “collide” at some position. This is analogous to the bad event **BadlyCollide** defined in [1, 11] with the difference being that **BadlyCollide** refers to a uniform assignment and **BadlyCollideFV** refers to a FORCEVAL assignment. Furthermore, in order to prove that a new wraparound chain does not get created during the completion of other chains we introduce and bound the probability of a new bad event **BadlyCollideP**. Intuitively, **BadlyCollideP** captures the event where a query to the random permutation returns a value (x_0, x_1) such that two chains “collide” on x_1 or returns a value (x_{10}, x_{11}) such that two chains collide on x_{10} .

Balancing detection with the simulator’s runtime. There is a clear trade-off between the achieved security bound and the running time of the simulator. If the simulator is too “aggressive” and detects too many chains too early, then we may perhaps achieve better security at the cost of extremely high simulator complexity. In comparison to the construction of [1, 11], our construction has more detect zones and, moreover, for wraparound chains, we detect on partial chains consisting of three consecutive queries instead of four consecutive queries. Nevertheless, at a high-level, our proof that the simulator runtime is polynomial follows very similarly to the proof in [1, 11]. As there, we first bound the number

of completed partial chains of the form (x_1, x_2, x_{10}) and (x_1, x_9, x_{10}) (such chains are wraparound chains since they contain both x_1 and x_{10}). Once we have done this, we again have only a single non-wraparound detect zone and so we can follow the argument of [1, 11] to bound the number of completed partial chains of the form (x_5, x_6) . Once we have a bound on the number of completed partial chains, it is fairly straightforward to bound the simulator complexity.

2.3 Comparison with Concurrent Work

As noted previously, Dai and Steinberger [4] have independently announced the same result we claim here. The starting point of their work is the 10-round simulator proposed by Seurin [16]. They use only two adapt zones (namely, $\{3, 4\}$ and $\{7, 8\}$) and allow the distinguisher to learn the values at both positions surrounding the adapt zones. In contrast, our simulator allows the distinguisher to learn the value at only one of the two positions² surrounding the adapt zones; due to our flexible 4-round buffer zone, our adapt zones can be any pair of consecutive rounds except $\{1, 2\}$, $\{5, 6\}$, and $\{9, 10\}$. Additionally, our proof follows the same high-level structure as in [1], whereas Dai and Steinberger present a new proof inspired by changes made to Seurin’s simulator [16]. (Their subsequent improvement [5] showing indistinguishability of an 8-round Feistel network from an ideal cipher relies on the observation that detection on wrap-around chains can span only three rounds, rather than four.)

With regard to concrete security, our results are incomparable. Say q is the number of queries made by the distinguisher, and let n be the input/output length of the round functions. Dai and Steinberger [4] show indistinguishability $\epsilon = O(q^8/2^n)$ using a simulator running in time $T = O(q^{10})$; we show indistinguishability $\epsilon = O(q^{12}/2^n)$ using a simulator that runs in time $T = O(q^6)$. It is interesting to observe that both works achieve the same tradeoff for the product $\epsilon \cdot T$.

3 Background

We use the definition of indistinguishability used by the work on 14-round Feistel network [1, 11], based on the definition of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [14].

Definition 1. *Let \mathbf{C} be a construction that, for any n , accesses functions $\mathbf{F} = (\mathbf{F}_1, \dots, \mathbf{F}_r)$ over $\{0, 1\}^n$ and implements an invertible permutation over $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. (We stress that \mathbf{C} allows evaluation of both the forward and inverse directions of the permutation.) We say that \mathbf{C} is indistinguishable from a random permutation if there exists a simulator \mathbf{S} and a polynomial t such that for all distinguishers \mathbf{D} making at most $q = \text{poly}(n)$ queries, \mathbf{S} runs in time $t(q)$ and*

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{D}^{\mathbf{C}^{\mathbf{F}}}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{D}^{\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{S}^{\mathbf{P}}}(1^n) = 1]|$$

² We refer to that position as the “bad” set uniform position.

is negligible, where \mathbf{F} are random, independent functions over $\{0, 1\}^n$ and \mathbf{P} is a random permutation over $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. (We stress that \mathbf{P} can be evaluated in both the forward and inverse directions.)

The r -round Feistel construction, given access to $\mathbf{F} = (\mathbf{F}_1, \dots, \mathbf{F}_r)$, is defined as follows. Let (L_{i-1}, R_{i-1}) be the input to the i -th round, with (L_0, R_0) denoting the initial input. Then, the output (L_i, R_i) of the i -th round of the construction is given by $L_i := R_{i-1}$ and $R_i := L_{i-1} \oplus \mathbf{F}_i(R_{i-1})$. So, for a r -round Feistel, if the $2n$ -bit input is (L_0, R_0) , then the output is given by (L_r, R_r) .

4 Our Simulator

4.1 Informal Description of the Simulator

The queries to $\mathbf{F}_1, \dots, \mathbf{F}_{10}$ are answered by the simulator through the public procedure $\mathbf{S.F}(i, x)$ for $i = 1, \dots, 10$. When the distinguisher asks a query $\mathbf{F}(i, x)$, the simulator checks to see if the query has already been set. The queries that are already set are held in tables G_1, \dots, G_{10} as pairs (x, y) such that if $\mathbf{F}(i, x)$ is queried, and if $x \in G_i$, then y is returned as the answer to query $\mathbf{F}(i, x)$. If the query has not already been set, then the simulator adds x to the set A_i^j where j indicates the j th query of the distinguisher. The simulator then checks if $i \in \{1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10\}$ (where these positions mark the endpoints of the detect zones) and, if so, checks to see if any new partial chains of the form $(x_9, x_{10}, 9)$, $(x_1, x_2, 1)$, or $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ need to be enqueued. If no new partial chains are detected, the simulator just sets the value of $G_i(x)$ uniformly and returns that value. If new partial chains are detected and enqueued in Q_{enq} , then the simulator evaluates these partial chains “forward” and “backward” as much as possible (without setting any new values of $G_m(\cdot)$) for all $m \in \{1, \dots, 10\}$. Say the evaluation stopped with $x_m \notin G_m$. Then, the simulator adds x_m to A_m^j and checks if $m \in \{1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10\}$ and if so, detects any additional partial chains that form with (x_m, m) and enqueues them for completion if necessary and repeats the process again until no more partial chains are detected.

The chains enqueued for completion during this process are enqueued in queues Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} and Q_{all} . Any chain that has been enqueued in Q_{enq} is also enqueued in Q_{all} . Chains enqueued in Q_b for $b \in \{1, 5, 6, 10\}$ are those that may exhibit the *weak set uniform property*. Specifically, say $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is a chain that is enqueued to be adapted at position ℓ i.e. the “adapt” positions for C are at $\ell, \ell + 1$ and the “set uniform” positions are at $\ell - 1, \ell + 2$ with the “set uniform” position that is adjacent to the query that caused C to be enqueued being at “good” set uniform position g and the other “set uniform” position at b . If, at the time of enqueueing, the chain C can be evaluated up to the “bad” set uniform position b and the value of chain C at b , say x_b , is such that $x_b \notin G_b$, then C is enqueued in Q_b . (Note that there are chains that exhibit this property but are not enqueued for completion. These are the chains that belong to the set SimPChains . This is only to simplify the analysis for the bound of the complexity of the simulator. We will later show that ignoring these chains

does not affect the simulation and in fact, these chains belong to **CompChains** at the end of the simulator’s run while answering **D**’s j^{th} query.)

The completion of enqueued chains starts with the completion of the chains enqueued in Q_b for $b \in \{1, 5, 6, 10\}$. A chain C is dequeued from Q_b and if $C \notin \mathbf{CompChains}$, the simulator “completes” the chain. This process proceeds similarly to the completion process in [1]. The simulator evaluates the chain forward/backward upto the 4-round buffer setting $G_i(x_i)$ values uniformly for any $x_i \notin G_i$ that comes up while evaluating forward/backward. In the 4-round buffer consisting of the “set uniform” positions and the “adapt” positions, the simulator sets the values of C at the set uniform positions uniformly (if they have not already been set) and forces the values at the adapt positions such that evaluation of the Feistel is consistent with the random permutation. (Note that this could possibly lead to a value in $G_i(\cdot)$ getting overwritten. A major technical part of the proof is to show that this happens with negligible probability.) After this process, the simulator places C in the set **CompChains** along with “equivalent” chains obtained by evaluating C on the detect zone positions i.e. chains of the form (x_k, x_{k+1}, k) for $k = 1, 5, 9$.

Once the simulator completes the chains enqueued in Q_b for all $b \in \{1, 5, 6, 10\}$, the simulator completes the remaining chains enqueued in Q_{all} . The completion process for the remaining chains enqueued in Q_{all} is the same as the completion process described above except that the simulator detects additional partial chains of the form $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ during the completion and enqueues them in the queue Q_{mid} i.e. during the completion of a chain C in Q_{all} , if an assignment occurs such that $x_k \in G_k$ for some $k \in \{5, 6\}$ due to the assignment and $x_k \notin G_k$ before the assignment, then the simulator enqueues the partial chain $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ in Q_{mid} for all $x_{k'} \in G_{k'}$ such that $k' \in \{5, 6\}$ and $k \neq k'$. (Note that the assignment could be a **FORCEVAL** assignment as well.) Finally, the simulator completes all the chains in Q_{mid} that are not already in **CompChains**. The completion process again is the same as the process described for chains enqueued in Q_b . The simulator then returns the answer $G_i(x)$ to the query $F(i, x)$.

4.2 Formal Description of the Simulator

The simulator **S** internally uses hashables G_1, \dots, G_{10} to store the function values. Additionally, it uses sets A_1^j, \dots, A_{10}^j for the j^{th} distinguisher query to detect partial chains that need to be completed; these sets store values that would be added to G_i in the future. A queue Q_{enq} to detect partial chains that need to be completed and stores a copy of Q_{enq} in a queue Q_{all} that is used during completion. Queues Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} are used to store the chains in Q_{enq} whose “bad” set uniform position is known at the time of detection. Queue Q_{mid} is used to store new chains of the form $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ that are enqueued during the completion of chains from Q_{all} . A set **CompChains** is used to remember the chains that have been completed already. Finally, a set **SimPChains** is used to hold chains of the form $(x_1, x_2, 1)$ and $(x_9, x_{10}, 9)$ that are detected due to P/P^{-1} queries made by the simulator. This set is needed only for the purpose of analyzing the complexity of the simulator.

The variables used below are: Queues $Q_{\text{enq}}, Q_{\text{all}}, Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10}, Q_{\text{mid}}$; Hashtables G_1, \dots, G_{10} ; Sets $A_i^j := \emptyset$ for $i = 1, \dots, 10$ and $j = 1, \dots, q$ where q is the maximum number of queries made by the distinguisher, Sets $\text{CompChains} := \emptyset$ and $\text{SimPChains} := \emptyset$. Initialize $j := 0$. The procedure $F(i, x)$ provides the interface to a distinguisher.

```

1  procedure  $F(i, x)$ :
2       $j := j + 1$ 
3      for  $i \in \{1, \dots, 10\}$  do
4           $A_i^j := \emptyset$ 
5       $F^{\text{ENQ}}(i, x)$ 
6      while  $\neg Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}()$  do
7           $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b) := Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{DEQUEUE}()$ 
8          if  $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k) \notin \text{CompChains}$  then
9               $(x_r, x_{r+1}, r) := \text{EVFWDENQ}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell - 2)$ 
10             if  $r + 1 = b \wedge x_{r+1} \notin G_{r+1}$  then
11                  $Q_b.\text{ENQUEUE}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ 
12              $(x_r, x_{r+1}, r) := \text{EVBWDENQ}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell + 2)$ 
13             if  $r = b \wedge x_r \notin G_r$  then
14                  $Q_b.\text{ENQUEUE}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ 
15     for each  $Q \in \langle Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10}, Q_{\text{all}}, Q_{\text{mid}} \rangle$  do ▷ processed in that order
16         while  $\neg Q.\text{EMPTY}()$  do
17              $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b) := Q.\text{DEQUEUE}()$ 
18             if  $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k) \notin \text{CompChains}$  then
19                  $(x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}) := \text{EVFWDCOMP}(Q, x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell - 2)$ 
20                  $(x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}) := \text{EVBWDCOMP}(Q, x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell + 2)$ 
21                  $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$ 
22                  $(x_1, x_2) := \text{EVBWDCOMP}(\perp, x_k, x_{k+1}, k, 1)$ 
23                  $(x_5, x_6) := \text{EVFWDCOMP}(\perp, x_1, x_2, 1, 5)$ 
24                  $(x_9, x_{10}) := \text{EVFWDCOMP}(\perp, x_1, x_2, 1, 9)$ 
25                  $\text{CompChains} := \text{CompChains} \cup \{(x_1, x_2, 1), (x_5, x_6, 5), (x_9, x_{10}, 9)\}$ 
26      $F^{\text{COMP}}(\perp, i, x)$ 
27     return  $G_i(x)$ 

28 procedure  $\text{EVFWDENQ}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, m)$ : 39  $k := k + 1$ 
29     if  $k = 5$  then 40  $\text{flagMid} := 0$ 
30          $\text{flagMid} := 1$  41 return  $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$ 
31     while  $(k \neq m) \wedge ((k = 10) \vee$ 
32          $F^{\text{ENQ}}(k+1, x_{k+1}) \neq \perp)$  42 procedure  $\text{EVBWDENQ}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k, m)$ :
33         do 43 if  $k = 5$  then
34             if  $k = 10$  then 44  $\text{flagMid} := 1$ 
35                  $(x_0, x_1) := \mathbf{P}^{-1}(x_{10}, x_{11})$  45 while  $(k \neq m) \wedge ((k = 0) \vee$ 
36                  $k := 0$  46  $F^{\text{ENQ}}(k, x_k) \neq \perp)$ 
37             else 47 do
38                 if  $k = 9 \wedge \text{flagMid} = 1$  then 48 if  $k = 0$  then
39                      $\text{SimPChains} :=$  49  $(x_{10}, x_{11}) := \mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1)$ 
40                      $\text{SimPChains} \cup \{(x_k, x_{k+1}, k)\}$  48  $k := 10$ 
41                      $x_{k+2} := x_k \oplus G(k+1, x_{k+1})$  49 else

```

```

50         if  $k = 1 \wedge \text{flagMid} = 1$  then
51             SimPChains :=
52             SimPChains  $\cup \{(x_k, x_{k+1}, k)\}$ 
53              $k := k - 1$ 
54             flagMid := 0
55             return  $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$ 
56     procedure FENQ( $i, x$ ):
57         if  $x \in G_i$  then
58             return  $G_i(x)$ 
59         else if  $x \in A_i^j$  then
60             return  $\perp$ 
61         else
62              $A_i^j := \{x\} \cup A_i^j$ 
63             if  $i \in \{1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10\}$  then
64                 ENQNEWCHAINS( $i, x$ )
65             return  $\perp$ 
66     procedure CHKFWD( $x_0, x_1, x_{10}$ ):
67          $(x'_{10}, x'_{11}) := \mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1)$ 
68         return  $x'_{10} \stackrel{?}{=} x_{10}$ 
69     procedure CHKBWD( $x_{10}, x_{11}, x_1$ ):
70          $(x'_0, x'_1) := \mathbf{P}^{-1}(x_{10}, x_{11})$ 
71         return  $x'_1 \stackrel{?}{=} x_1$ 
72     procedure FORCEVAL( $x, y, \ell$ ):
73          $G_\ell(x) := y$ 
74     procedure EvFWDCOMP(
75          $Q, x_k, x_{k+1}, k, m$ ):
76         while  $k \neq m$  do
77             if  $k = 10$  then
78                  $(x_0, x_1) := \mathbf{P}^{-1}(x_{10}, x_{11})$ 
79                  $k := 0$ 
80             else
81                  $x_{k+2} := x_k \oplus$ 
82                 FCOMP( $Q, k+1, x_{k+1}$ )
83                  $k := k+1$ 
84             return  $(x_m, x_{m+1})$ 
83     procedure EvBWDCOMP(
84          $Q, x_k, x_{k+1}, k, m$ ):
85         while  $k \neq m$  do
86             if  $k = 0$  then
87                  $(x_{10}, x_{11}) := \mathbf{P}(x_0, x_1)$ 
88                  $k := 10$ 
89             else
90                  $x_{k-1} := x_{k+1} \oplus$ 
91                 FCOMP( $Q, k, x_k$ )
92                  $k := k-1$ 
93             return  $(x_m, x_{m+1})$ 
92     procedure FCOMP( $Q, i, x$ ):
93         if  $x \notin G_i$  then
94              $G_i(x) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ 
95         if  $Q \neq \perp \wedge Q = Q_{\text{all}} \wedge i \in \{5, 6\}$ 
96         then
97             ENQNEWMIDCHAINS( $i, x$ )
98             return  $G_i(x)$ 
98     procedure ENQNEWMIDCHAINS( $i, x$ ):
99         if  $i = 5$  then
100             for all  $(x_5, x_6) \in \{x\} \times G_6$  do
101                  $Q_{\text{mid}}.\text{ENQUEUE}(x_5, x_6, 5, 2, 4, 1)$ 
102         if  $i = 6$  then
103             for all  $(x_5, x_6) \in G_5 \times \{x\}$  do
104                  $Q_{\text{mid}}.\text{ENQUEUE}(x_5, x_6, 5, 8, 7, 10)$ 
105     procedure ENQNEWCHAINS( $i, x$ ):
106         if  $i = 1$  then
107             for all  $(x_9, x_{10}, x_1) \in (G_9 \cup A_9^j) \times G_{10} \times \{x\}$  do
108                 if CHKBWD( $x_{10}, G_{10}(x_{10}) \oplus x_9, x_1$ ) then
109                     if  $(x_9, x_{10}, 9) \notin \text{SimPChains}$  then
110                          $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{ENQUEUE}(x_9, x_{10}, 9, 3, 2, 5)$ 
111                          $Q_{\text{all}}.\text{ENQUEUE}(x_9, x_{10}, 9, 3, 2, 5)$ 
112         if  $i = 2$  then
113             for all  $(x_{10}, x_1, x_2) \in (G_{10} \cup A_{10}^j) \times G_1 \times \{x\}$  do

```

```

114         if CHKFWD( $x_2 \oplus G_1(x_1), x_1, x_{10}$ ) then
115             if  $(x_1, x_2, 1) \notin \text{SimPChains}$  then
116                  $Q_{\text{enq.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_1, x_2, 1, 4, 3, 6$ )
117                  $Q_{\text{all.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_1, x_2, 1, 4, 3, 6$ )
118     if  $i = 5$  then
119         for all  $(x_5, x_6) \in \{x\} \times (G_6 \cup A_6^j)$  do
120              $Q_{\text{enq.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_5, x_6, 5, 2, 4, 1$ )
121              $Q_{\text{all.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_5, x_6, 5, 2, 4, 1$ )
122     if  $i = 6$  then
123         for all  $(x_5, x_6) \in (G_5 \cup A_5^j) \times \{x\}$  do
124              $Q_{\text{enq.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_5, x_6, 5, 8, 7, 10$ )
125              $Q_{\text{all.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_5, x_6, 5, 8, 7, 10$ )
126     if  $i = 9$  then
127         for all  $(x_9, x_{10}, x_1) \in \{x\} \times G_{10} \times (G_1 \cup A_1^j)$  do
128             if CHKBWD( $x_{10}, G_{10}(x_{10}) \oplus x_9, x_1$ ) then
129                 if  $(x_9, x_{10}, 9) \notin \text{SimPChains}$  then
130                      $Q_{\text{enq.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_9, x_{10}, 9, 6, 8, 5$ )
131                      $Q_{\text{all.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_9, x_{10}, 9, 6, 8, 5$ )
132     if  $i = 10$  then
133         for all  $(x_{10}, x_1, x_2) \in \{x\} \times G_1 \times (G_2 \cup A_2^j)$  do
134             if CHKFWD( $x_2 \oplus G_1(x_1), x_1, x_{10}$ ) then
135                 if  $(x_1, x_2, 1) \notin \text{SimPChains}$  then
136                      $Q_{\text{enq.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_1, x_2, 1, 7, 9, 6$ )
137                      $Q_{\text{all.}}$ .ENQUEUE( $x_1, x_2, 1, 7, 9, 6$ )

138 procedure ADAPT( $Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b$ ):
139     flagMidAdapt0 := 0
140     flagMidAdapt1 := 0
141      $F^{\text{COMP}}$ ( $Q, \ell - 1, x_{\ell-1}$ )
142      $x_{\ell} := x_{\ell-2} \oplus G_{\ell-1}(x_{\ell-1})$ 
143     if  $(Q = Q_{\text{all}}) \wedge (\ell = 5 \vee \ell = 6) \wedge (x_{\ell} \notin G_{\ell})$  then
144         flagMidAdapt0 := 1
145      $F^{\text{COMP}}$ ( $Q, \ell + 2, x_{\ell+2}$ )
146      $x_{\ell+1} := x_{\ell+3} \oplus G_{\ell+2}(x_{\ell+2})$ 
147     if  $(Q = Q_{\text{all}}) \wedge (\ell + 1 = 5 \vee \ell + 1 = 6) \wedge (x_{\ell+1} \notin G_{\ell+1})$  then
148         flagMidAdapt1 := 1
149     FORCEVAL( $x_{\ell}, x_{\ell+1} \oplus x_{\ell-1}, \ell$ )
150     if flagMidAdapt0 = 1 then
151         ENQNEWMIDCHAINS( $\ell, x_{\ell}$ )
152     FORCEVAL( $x_{\ell+1}, x_{\ell} \oplus x_{\ell+2}, \ell + 1$ )
153     if flagMidAdapt1 = 1 then
154         ENQNEWMIDCHAINS( $\ell + 1, x_{\ell+1}$ )

```

5 Proof of Indifferentiability

Let Feistel denote the 10-round Feistel construction, let \mathbf{F} be 10 independent random functions with domain and range $\{0, 1\}^n$, and let \mathbf{P} denote a random permutation on $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. Let \mathbf{S} denote the simulator from the previous section. We prove:

Theorem 2. *The probability that a distinguisher \mathbf{D} making at most q queries outputs 1 in an interaction with $(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{S}^{\mathbf{P}})$ and the probability that it outputs 1 in an interaction with $(\text{Feistel}^{\mathbf{F}}, \mathbf{F})$ differ by at most $O(q^{12}/2^n)$. Moreover, \mathbf{S} runs in time $O(q^6)$ except with probability $O(q^{12}/2^n)$.*

For the rest of the paper, fix a distinguisher \mathbf{D} making at most q queries.

5.1 Proof Overview

Our proof structure utilizes four hybrid experiments H_1, \dots, H_4 as in the proof of indifferentiability of the 14-round Feistel network [1, 11]. Hybrid H_1 denotes the scenario in which \mathbf{D} interacts with $(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{S}^{\mathbf{P}})$, and H_4 denotes the scenario in which \mathbf{D} interacts with $(\text{Feistel}^{\mathbf{F}}, \mathbf{F})$. To prove indifferentiability, we show that the difference between the probability \mathbf{D} outputs 1 in H_1 and the probability \mathbf{D} outputs 1 in H_4 is at most $\text{poly}(q)/2^n$.

In H_2 , the random permutation \mathbf{P} is replaced with a two-sided random function \mathbf{R} . Following [1, 11], we first bound the simulator complexity in hybrid H_2 and use that to bound the simulator’s complexity in H_1 .

Next, we define certain “bad events” that can occur in an execution of H_2 , and show that these events occur with low probability. We then show that as long as these events do not occur in an execution of H_2 , then certain “good” properties hold; in particular, we can prove that for every call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x, \cdot, j)$ that occurs in the execution, we have $x \notin G_j$ before the call. If this is true, we say that “FORCEVAL does not overwrite.” This is the main technical part of the proof and can be found in Section 5.3.2.

In H_3 , the two-sided random function \mathbf{R} is replaced with the 10-round Feistel construction. The distinguisher interacts with $(\text{Feistel}, \hat{\mathbf{S}}^{\text{Feistel}^+})$ where Feistel^+ is the Feistel construction with additional procedures CHKFWD and CHKBWD . Given the “good” properties that were proven in Section 5.3.2, we prove that H_2 and H_3 are indistinguishable. The proof follows exactly along the lines of the proof in [1, 11].

Finally, in H_4 , the distinguisher interacts with $(\text{Feistel}^{\mathbf{F}}, \mathbf{F})$ and hence accesses the random functions \mathbf{F} directly instead of through the simulator. We prove that H_3 and H_4 are indistinguishable similar to the proof of [1, 11].

Due to space constraints, we omit some of the proofs in the following sections. The omitted proofs can be found in the full version [3].

5.2 Indistinguishability of the First and Second Experiments

In H_2 , we replace the random permutation with the two-sided random function \mathbf{R} , and \mathbf{D} interacts with $(\mathbf{R}, \hat{\mathbf{S}}^{\mathbf{R}})$. The simulator $\hat{\mathbf{S}}$ in H_2 is exactly the same as the simulator \mathbf{S} described in Section 4.2 except that it implements procedures $\hat{\mathbf{S}}.\text{CHKFWD}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{S}}.\text{CHKBWD}$ by calling the procedures $\mathbf{R}.\text{CHKFWD}$ and $\mathbf{R}.\text{CHKBWD}$ that are provided by \mathbf{R} (described below).

The two-sided function \mathbf{R} maintains a hashtable P containing elements of the form (\downarrow, x_0, x_1) and $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$. Whenever $\mathbf{R}.\text{P}(x_0, x_1)$ is queried, \mathbf{R} checks if $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \in P$ and if so, answers accordingly. Otherwise, an independent uniform output (x_{10}, x_{11}) is picked and (\downarrow, x_0, x_1) as well as $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ are added to P , mapping to each other. In addition to P and P^{-1} , \mathbf{R} contains the procedures $\text{CHKFWD}(x_0, x_1, x_{10})$ and $\text{CHKBWD}(x_{10}, x_{11}, x_1)$.³ $\text{CHKFWD}(x_0, x_1, x_{10})$ works as follows: If $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \in P$, it returns true if (\downarrow, x_0, x_1) maps to (x_{10}, x_{11}) for some value of $x_{11} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and false otherwise. Procedure $\text{CHKBWD}(x_{10}, x_{11}, x_1)$ works as follows: If $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \in P$, it returns true if $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ maps to (x_0, x_1) for some value of $x_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and false otherwise. The pseudocode for the two-sided random function \mathbf{R} , using hashtable P , is as follows:

<pre> 1 procedure P(x_0, x_1): 2 if $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \notin P$ then 3 $(x_{10}, x_{11}) \stackrel{\\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ 4 $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) := (x_{10}, x_{11})$ 5 $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) := (x_0, x_1)$ 6 return $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$ </pre>	<pre> 12 procedure P⁻¹(x_{10}, x_{11}): 13 if $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \notin P$ then 14 $(x_0, x_1) \stackrel{\\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ 15 $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) := (x_0, x_1)$ 16 $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) := (x_{10}, x_{11})$ 17 return $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ </pre>
<pre> 7 procedure CHKFWD(x_0, x_1, x_{10}): 8 if $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \in P$ then 9 $(x'_{10}, x'_{11}) := P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$ 10 return $x'_{10} \stackrel{?}{=} x_{10}$ 11 return false </pre>	<pre> 18 procedure CHKBWD(x_{10}, x_{11}, x_1): 19 if $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \in P$ then 20 $(x'_0, x'_1) := P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ 21 return $x'_1 \stackrel{?}{=} x_1$ 22 return false </pre>

Fig. 1: Random Two-sided Function \mathbf{R} .

The proof of indistinguishability of H_1 and H_2 can be found in the full version [3]. In particular, we prove the following statements regarding the indistinguishability of H_1 and H_2 and the simulator complexity.

Lemma 3. *The probability that \mathbf{D} outputs 1 in H_1 differs from the probability that it outputs 1 in H_2 by at most $\frac{2 \cdot 10^{15} q^{12}}{2^n}$.*

Lemma 4. *In H_1 , the simulator runs for at most $O(q^6)$ steps and makes at most $3.2 \times (10q)^6$ queries except with probability at most $\frac{10^{15} q^{12}}{2^n}$.*

We will prove some properties of H_2 in the following section that will be useful to prove the indistinguishability of the second and third experiments.

³ This is similar to the CHECK procedure in [1, 11].

5.3 Properties of H_2

We introduce some definitions and establish some properties of executions in H_2 . The definitions here follow closely along the lines of the definitions in [1, 11]. A *partial chain* is a triple $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, \dots, 10\}$. If $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$ is a partial chain, we let $C[1] = x_k$, $C[2] = x_{k+1}$, and $C[3] = k$.

Definition 5. Fix tables $G = \hat{\mathbf{S}}.G$ and $P = \mathbf{R}.P$ in an execution of H_2 , and let $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$ be a partial chain. We define functions next , prev , val^+ , val^- , and val as follows:

<pre> 1 procedure next(x_k, x_{k+1}, k): 2 if $k < 10$ then 3 if $x_{k+1} \notin G_{k+1}$ then 4 return \perp 5 $x_{k+2} := x_k \oplus G_{k+1}(x_{k+1})$ 6 return $(x_{k+1}, x_{k+2}, k + 1)$ 7 else if $k = 10$ then 8 if $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \notin P$ then 9 return \perp 10 $(x_0, x_1) := P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ 11 return $(x_0, x_1, 0)$ </pre>	<pre> 12 procedure prev(x_k, x_{k+1}, k): 13 if $k > 0$ then 14 if $x_k \notin G_k$ then 15 return \perp 16 $x_{k-1} := x_{k+1} \oplus G_k(x_k)$ 17 return $(x_{k-1}, x_k, k - 1)$ 18 else if $k = 0$ then 19 if $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \notin P$ then 20 return \perp 21 $(x_{10}, x_{11}) := P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$ 22 return $(x_{10}, x_{11}, 10)$ </pre>
<pre> 1 procedure val$_i^+$(C): 2 while $(C \neq \perp) \wedge (C[3] \notin \{i - 1, i\})$ 3 do 4 $C := \text{next}(C)$ 5 if $C = \perp$ then return \perp 6 if $C[3] = i$ then return $C[1]$ 7 else return $C[2]$ </pre>	<pre> 7 procedure val$_i^-$(C): 8 while $(C \neq \perp) \wedge (C[3] \notin \{i - 1, i\})$ 9 do 10 $C := \text{prev}(C)$ 11 if $C = \perp$ then return \perp 12 if $C[3] = i$ then return $C[1]$ 13 else return $C[2]$ </pre>
<pre> 1 procedure val$_i$(C): 2 if val$_i^+$(C) $\neq \perp$ then return val$_i^+$(C) 3 else return val$_i^-$(C) </pre>	

We say that $\perp \notin G_i$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, 10\}$. So, if $\text{val}_i(C) \notin G_i$, then either $\text{val}_i(C) = \perp$ or $\text{val}_i(C) \neq \perp$ and $\text{val}_i(C) \notin G_i$.

Definition 6. For a given set of tables G, P , two partial chains C, D are equivalent (denoted $C \equiv D$) if they are in the reflexive, transitive closure of the relations given by next and prev .

So, two chains C and D are equivalent if $C = D$, or if D can be obtained by applying next and prev finitely many times to C .

Definition 7. The set of table-defined chains contains all chains C for which $\text{next}(C) \neq \perp$ and $\text{prev}(C) \neq \perp$.

Definition 8. A chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is called an *enqueued chain* if C is enqueued for completion. For such an enqueued chain, we define $\text{next}(C)$ as the procedure next applied to the partial chain (x_k, x_{k+1}, k) i.e. $\text{next}(C) := \text{next}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$. The procedures prev , val^+ , val^- and val on an enqueued chain C are defined in a similar manner.

Definition 9. The set Q_{all}^* contains chains that are enqueued in Q_{all} but not in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} .

Definition 10. We say a uniform assignment to $G_k(x_k)$ occurs when the simulator sets $G_k(x_k)$ through an assignment $G_k(x_k) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, i.e., a uniform value is chosen from the set of n -bit strings and $G_k(x_k)$ is assigned that value.

A uniform assignment to $G_k(x_k)$ occurs in line 94 of the simulator’s execution. In particular, if $G_k(x_k)$ is set through a $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_k, \cdot, k)$ call, then it is not a uniform assignment.

Definition 11. We say a uniform assignment to P occurs in a call to $\mathbf{R.P}(x_0, x_1)$ if $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \notin P$ when the call is made and $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$ is set through the assignment $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) := (x_{10}, x_{11})$ where (x_{10}, x_{11}) is chosen uniformly from the set of $2n$ -bit strings.

Similarly, it occurs in a call to $\mathbf{R.P}^{-1}(x_{10}, x_{11})$ if $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \notin P$ when the call is made and $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ is set through the assignment $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) := (x_0, x_1)$ where (x_0, x_1) is chosen uniformly from the set of $2n$ -bit strings.

A uniform assignment to $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$ occurs in line 4 of \mathbf{R} in Figure 7 and a uniform assignment to $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ occurs in line 15 of \mathbf{R} in Figure 7.

In the following section, we define a set of “bad” events, and show that these occur with negligible probability. Following that, we analyze execution of the experiment assuming that none of these bad events occur.

In the remainder of the section, we let $T = O(q^2)$ be an upper bound on the sizes of G_i and P as well as the upper bound on the number of enqueued chains and hence, the number of calls to the ADAPT procedure in an execution of H_2 . The derivation of the bound on T and the proof of the lemmas below can be found in the full version [3].

5.3.1 Bad Executions

Definition 12. We say that event BadP occurs in H_2 if either:

- Immediately after choosing (x_{10}, x_{11}) in a call to $\mathbf{R.P}(\cdot, \cdot)$, either $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \in P$ or $x_{10} \in G_{10}$.
- Immediately after choosing (x_0, x_1) in a call to $\mathbf{R.P}^{-1}(\cdot, \cdot)$, either $(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) \in P$ or $x_1 \in G_1$.

Lemma 13. The probability of event BadP in H_2 is at most $2T^2/2^n$.

A partial chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$ that has been enqueued by our simulator may not get table-defined till it is completed since it is possible that $x_k \in G_k$ while $x_{k+1} \in A_{k+1}^j$ for some j but not in G_{k+1} . Hence, we augment the definitions of **BadlyHit** and **BadlyCollide** given in [1, 11] to refer to interactions with enqueued chains and refer to the augmented definitions as **BadlyHit⁺** and **BadlyCollide⁺**.

Definition 14. We say that event **BadlyHit⁺** occurs in H_2 if either:

- Immediately after a uniform assignment to $G_k(x_k)$, there is a partial chain (x_k, x_{k+1}, k) such that $\text{prev}(\text{prev}(x_k, x_{k+1}, k)) \neq \perp$.
- Immediately after a uniform assignment to $G_k(x_k)$, there is a partial chain $(x_{k-1}, x_k, k-1)$ such that $\text{next}(\text{next}(x_{k-1}, x_k, k-1)) \neq \perp$.

and the relevant partial chain is either table-defined or an enqueued chain in Q_{all} .

Lemma 15. The probability of event **BadlyHit⁺** in H_2 is at most $40T^3/2^n$.

Definition 16. We say that event **BadlyCollide⁺** occurs in H_2 if a uniform assignment to $G_i(x_i)$ is such that there exist two partial chains C and D such that for some $\ell \in \{0, \dots, 11\}$ and $\sigma, \rho \in \{+, -\}$ all of the following are true:

- Immediately before the assignment, C and D are not equivalent.
- Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_\ell^\sigma(C) = \perp$ or $\text{val}_\ell^\rho(D) = \perp$.
- Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_\ell^\sigma(C) = \text{val}_\ell^\rho(D) \neq \perp$.

and one of the following is true:

- Immediately after the assignment, C and D are table-defined.
- Immediately after the assignment, C is table-defined and D is a chain enqueued in Q_{all} .
- C and D are chains enqueued in Q_{all} .

Lemma 17. The probability of event $(\text{BadlyCollide}^+ \wedge \neg \text{BadlyHit}^+ \wedge \neg \text{BadP})$ in H_2 is at most $21160T^5/2^n$.

Definition 18. We say that event **BadlyCollideP** occurs in H_2 if either:

- A uniform assignment $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) := (x_{10}, x_{11})$ is such that there exist partial chains C, D such that for some $\sigma, \rho \in \{+, -\}$ the following are all true:
 - Immediately before the assignment, C and D are not equivalent.
 - Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_{10}^\sigma(C) = \perp$ or $\text{val}_{10}^\rho(D) = \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_{10}^\sigma(C) = \text{val}_{10}^\rho(D) = x_{10} \neq \perp$.

and one of the following conditions hold:

- Before the assignment, C and D are chains in Q_{all}^* .
 - Immediately after the assignment, C and D are table-defined.
 - Before the assignment, C is a chain enqueued in Q_{all} and immediately after the assignment, D is table-defined.
- A uniform assignment $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) := (x_0, x_1)$ is such that there exist partial chains C, D such that for some $\sigma, \rho \in \{+, -\}$ the following are all true:

- Immediately before the assignment, C and D are not equivalent.
 - Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_1^\sigma(C) = \perp$ or $\text{val}_1^\sigma(D) = \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_1^\sigma(C) = \text{val}_1^\sigma(D) = x_1 \neq \perp$.
- and one of the following conditions hold:
- Before the assignment, C and D are chains in Q_{all}^* .
 - Immediately after the assignment, C and D are table-defined.
 - Before the assignment, C is a chain enqueued in Q_{all} and immediately after the assignment, D is table-defined.

Lemma 19. *The probability of event BadlyCollideP in H_2 is at most $314T^5/2^n$.*

Proof. Consider the case that after a uniform choice of (x_0, x_1) leading to an assignment $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) := (x_0, x_1)$, event BadlyCollideP occurs. The value $\text{val}_1^-(C)$ for a chain C does not change due to the assignment since it is a $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ assignment and $\text{val}_1^-(C)$ can change only due to a $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$ assignment by definition of $\text{val}^-(\cdot)$.

Suppose that $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_1^-(D) \neq \perp$ before the assignment and after the assignment $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \text{val}_1^-(D) = x_1$. The value $\text{val}_1^-(D)$ does not change due to the assignment as mentioned above. So, the probability that $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \text{val}_1^-(D) = x_1$ is 2^{-n} .

Suppose that $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \text{val}_1^+(D) = \perp$ before the assignment and after the assignment $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \text{val}_1^+(D) = x_1$. For this to happen, $\text{val}_{10}(C) = \text{val}_{10}(D) = x_{10}$ and $\text{val}_{11}(C) = \text{val}_{11}(D) = x_{11}$ implying that C and D are equivalent chains. So, the probability of this event is 0.

Suppose that $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_1^+(D) \neq \perp$ before the assignment and after the assignment $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \text{val}_1^+(D) = x_1$. Now, the value of $\text{val}_1^+(D)$ stays the same after the assignment (even if BadP occurs). So, the probability that $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \text{val}_1^+(D) = x_1$ is 2^{-n} .

The analysis for the other case follows similarly. There are at most T assignments of the form $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11})$ or $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1)$. There are at most $11T^2$ possibilities for a chain to be table-defined before the assignment and T possibilities for a chain to be table-defined after the assignment but not before. There are at most T chains enqueued for completion in Q_{all} . So, the probability of event BadlyCollideP is at most $\left(T \cdot ((11T^2 + T)^2 + T^2 + T \cdot (11T^2 + T)) \cdot 2\right) \cdot 2^{-n}$.

Definition 20. *We say event BadlyHitFV occurs in H_2 if a uniform assignment to $G_s(x_s)$ that occurs in a call $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$, for some $s \in \{g, b\}$ one of the following happens (where we let $C = (x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, \ell - 2)$):*

- $s = \ell + 2$ and the following holds:
 - Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) = \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) \neq \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $y := \text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \oplus \text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C)$ is such that $x'_{\ell+1} \oplus x'_{\ell-1} = y$ for some $x'_{\ell+1} \in G_{\ell+1}$ and $x'_{\ell-1} \in G_{\ell-1}$.
- $s = \ell - 1$ and the following holds:
 - Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_\ell^+(C) = \perp$.

- Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_\ell^+(C) \neq \perp$.
- Immediately after the assignment, $y := \text{val}_{\ell+2}(C) \oplus \text{val}_\ell^+(C)$ is such that $x'_{\ell+2} \oplus x'_\ell = y$ for some $x'_{\ell+2} \in G_{\ell+2}$ and $x'_\ell \in G_\ell$.

Lemma 21. *The probability of event BadlyHitFV in H_2 is at most $2T^3/2^n$.*

Proof. Consider the first case where $s = \ell + 2$. Note that for a chain C with $s = \ell + 2$ the “value” at the adapt position $\ell + 1$ is set as $\text{val}_{\ell+1}(C) := \text{val}_{\ell+3}(C) \oplus G_s(\text{val}_s(C))$ where $\text{val}_{\ell+3}(C) \neq \perp$ is one of the arguments to ADAPT. Since the assignment to $G_s(x_s)$ happens inside the ADAPT call, $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) = \perp$ until the assignment and $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) \neq \perp$ immediately after the assignment.

Now, $y := \text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \oplus \text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C)$. Note that $\text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \neq \perp$ since $\text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) = x_{\ell-1}$ is one of the arguments of the ADAPT procedure. So, for $y := \text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \oplus \text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) \oplus G_s(\text{val}_s(C))$ to be such that $y = x'_{\ell-1} \oplus x'_{\ell+1}$ where $x'_{\ell-1} \in G_{\ell-1}$ and $x'_{\ell+1} \in G_{\ell+1}$, y needs to take one of $T^2/2^n$ values. Note that there are at most T such calls to ADAPT by assumption. So, the probability of the first case is at most $T^3/2^n$. The analysis for the second case is analogous.

Definition 22. *We say that event BadlyCollideFV occurs in H_2 if a uniform assignment to $G_s(x_s)$ that occurs in a call to $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$, for some $s \in \{g, b\}$ the following happens (where we let $C = (x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, \ell - 2)$ and D is a chain in Q_{all}^*):*

- $s = \ell + 2$, and for some $(k, k') \in \{(\ell - 1, \ell + 1), (\ell + 1, \ell - 1)\}$ the following holds:
 - Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_k(D) \neq \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) \neq \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $y := \text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \oplus \text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C)$ is such that $x \oplus y = \text{val}_k(D)$ for some $x \in G_{k'}$.
- $s = \ell - 1$, and for some $(k, k') \in \{(\ell, \ell + 2), (\ell + 2, \ell)\}$ the following holds:
 - Immediately before the assignment, $\text{val}_\ell^+(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_k(D) \neq \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $\text{val}_\ell^+(C) \neq \perp$.
 - Immediately after the assignment, $y := \text{val}_{\ell+2}(C) \oplus \text{val}_\ell^+(C)$ is such that $x \oplus y = \text{val}_k(D)$ for some $x \in G_{k'}$.

Lemma 23. *The probability of event BadlyCollideFV in H_2 is at most $4T^3/2^n$.*

Proof. Consider the first case where $s = \ell + 2$. Note that during the ADAPT call the “value” at the adapt position $\ell + 1$ is set as $\text{val}_{\ell+1}(C) := \text{val}_{\ell+3}(C) \oplus G_s(\text{val}_s(C))$ where $\text{val}_{\ell+3}(C) \neq \perp$ is one of the arguments to ADAPT. Since the assignment to $G_s(x_s)$ happens inside the ADAPT call, $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) = \perp$ until the assignment and $\text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) \neq \perp$ immediately after the assignment.

Now, $y := \text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \oplus \text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C)$. Note that $\text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \neq \perp$ since it is one of the arguments of ADAPT. Also note that if $\text{val}_k(D) \neq \perp$ before the assignment, then $\text{val}_k(D)$ does not change due to the assignment. Say $k = \ell - 1$ and $k' = \ell + 1$. So, for $y := \text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \oplus \text{val}_{\ell+1}^-(C) \oplus G_s(x_s)$ to be such that $y = x \oplus \text{val}_k(D)$ where $x \in G_{\ell+1}$, the value y would have to take one of $T^2/2^n$ values. (This

is because T is the upper bound on the number of chains enqueued in Q_{all} by assumption and on the size of $G_{\ell+1}$.) Similarly for the case where $k = \ell + 1$ and $k' = \ell - 1$. So, for a single call to ADAPT where $s = \ell + 2$, we have that the probability that the event occurs is $2T^2/2^n$. There are at most T calls to ADAPT by assumption and hence, the probability of the first case is at most $2T^3/2^n$.

The analysis for the second case is analogous.

We say an execution of H_2 is *good* if none of BadP, BadlyHit⁺, BadlyCollide⁺, BadlyCollideP, BadlyHitFV, or BadlyCollideFV occur. Lemmas 13–23 imply:

Lemma 24. *The probability that an execution of H_2 is good is $1 - O(T^5)/2^n$.*

5.3.2 Properties of Good Executions

Notation. For a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ that is enqueued for completion, the “adapt positions” are at $\ell, \ell+1$. These positions are those where the simulator uses FORCEVAL(\cdot, \cdot, ℓ) and FORCEVAL($\cdot, \cdot, \ell+1$) to force the values at $G_\ell(\cdot)$ and $G_{\ell+1}(\cdot)$. Also, for the chain C , the “set uniform” positions are at $\ell - 1, \ell + 2$. (These are the buffer zones that surround the adapt positions.) One of these “set uniform” positions is adjacent to the query that caused the chain to be enqueued and this position is denoted by g and referred to as the “good” set uniform position. The other “set uniform” position is referred to as the “bad” set uniform position. Note that $g, b \in \{\ell - 1, \ell + 2\}$ and $g \neq b$; Let a be the adapt position that is adjacent to “bad” set uniform position. So, if $b = \ell - 1$, then $a = \ell$; Else, if $b = \ell + 2$, $a = \ell + 1$. Consider a call ADAPT($x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b$), if $b = \ell - 1$ define $x_a = x_\ell$ as $x_\ell := x_{\ell-2} \oplus G_{\ell-1}(x_{\ell-1})$ if $x_{\ell-1} \in G_{\ell-1}$, and $x_\ell = \perp$ otherwise. Analogously, if $b = \ell + 2$, define $x_a = x_{\ell+1} := x_{\ell+3} \oplus G_{\ell+2}(x_{\ell+2})$ if $x_{\ell+2} \notin G_{\ell+2}$ and $x_{\ell+1} = \perp$ otherwise.

Also, for a chain C enqueued in Q_b we say *adapting is safe* if just before the call to ADAPT for C , we have $x_g \notin G_g$ and $x_a \notin G_a$. Analogously, for a chain C in Q_{all}^* or Q_{mid} we say *adapting is safe* if just before the call to ADAPT for C , we have $x_{\ell-1} \notin G_{\ell-1}$ and $x_{\ell+2} \notin G_{\ell+2}$. Also, we loosely use the statement $C \in \text{CompChains}$ where $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ to mean that $(x_k, x_{k+1}, k) \in \text{CompChains}$.

High-level overview. The aim of this section is to prove that during a good execution of H_2 , every call to FORCEVAL(x, \cdot, a) is such that $x \notin G_a$, i.e., to prove that a FORCEVAL call does not “overwrite.”

To prove that FORCEVAL does not “overwrite,” we prove that for every call to ADAPT that occurs during the completion of a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$, we have $\text{val}_g(C) \notin G_g$ before the call and if C is enqueued in Q_b , $\text{val}_a(C) \notin G_a$ before the call; else, $\text{val}_b(C) \notin G_b$ before the call i.e. every call to ADAPT is “safe”. In order to prove the above statements, we will prove that at the time a chain C is enqueued in Q_{all} , $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ and if C is a chain enqueued in Q_b for some $b \in \{1, 5, 6, 10\}$, then $\text{val}_b(C) \notin G_b$; else, $\text{val}_b(C) = \perp$ when C was enqueued. Similarly, if a chain C is enqueued in Q_{mid} , then just before the assignment

that precedes C being enqueued occurs, we will prove that $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_b(C) = \perp$. We also need to prove properties of equivalent chains in order to prove that if a chain equivalent to C has been completed before C , then $C \in \text{CompChains}$ when it is dequeued. All of this put together will help us prove that FORCEVAL does not “overwrite” (Theorem 39). While the structure explained above is similar to the structure of the proof in [1, 11], the major difference is in how we prove the properties of chains at the time they are enqueued. This is due to the fact that we separate enqueueing from completion in our simulation.

Due to space constraints, we state some lemmas without proofs, and refer to the full version of our work for details [3].

Properties of Equivalent Chains

Lemma 25. *Consider a good execution of H_2 . Suppose that at some point in the execution, two partial chains C and D are equivalent. Then there exists a sequence of partial chains C_1, \dots, C_r such that*

- $C = C_1$ and $D = C_r$, or else $D = C_1$ and $C = C_r$,
- for $r \geq 2$, $C_i = \text{next}(C_{i-1})$ and $C_{i-1} = \text{prev}(C_i)$ for all $i \in \{2, \dots, r\}$,
- for $r \geq 3$, C_2, \dots, C_{r-1} is table-defined,
- $D = (\text{val}_j^\rho(C), \text{val}_{j+1}^\rho(C), j)$ where $\text{val}_j^\rho(C) \neq \perp$ and $\text{val}_{j+1}^\rho(C) \neq \perp$ for some $\rho \in \{+, -\}$,
- $C = (\text{val}_k^\sigma(D), \text{val}_{k+1}^\sigma(D), k)$ where $\text{val}_k^\sigma(D) \neq \perp$ and $\text{val}_{k+1}^\sigma(D) \neq \perp$ for some $\sigma \in \{+, -\}$.

Lemma 26. *Consider some point in a good execution of H_2 and assume that $x \notin G_j$ before every call to FORCEVAL(x, \cdot, j) prior to this point in the execution. Then, if the partial chains $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k)$ with $k \in \{1, 5, 9\}$ and $D = (x'_m, x'_{m+1}, m)$ with $m \in \{1, 5, 9\}$ are equivalent at this point in the execution, then $C \in \text{CompChains}$ if and only if $D \in \text{CompChains}$.*

Properties of Enqueued Chains

Recall that $\{1, 5, 6, 10\}$ are “bad” set uniform positions.

Lemma 27. *Say a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is enqueued to be completed in Q_b . Then at the time C is enqueued, $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_b(C) \notin G_b$.*

Effects of a Call to ForceVal

For the following lemmas, note that $g, b \in \{\ell - 1, \ell + 2\}$ and $g \neq b$.

Lemma 28. *In a good execution of H_2 , let $x_{\ell-1} \notin G_{\ell-1}$ (respectively $x_{\ell+2} \notin G_{\ell+2}$) immediately before a call ADAPT($Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b$). Then, before the call to FORCEVAL(x_ℓ, \cdot, ℓ) (respectively FORCEVAL($x_{\ell+1}, \cdot, \ell + 1$)) in that ADAPT call, we have $x_\ell \notin G_\ell$ (respectively $x_{\ell+1} \notin G_{\ell+1}$).*

The lemma above immediately gives us the following corollary.

Corollary 29. *Consider a call $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$ in a good execution of H_2 and assume that adapting was safe for all chains C that were dequeued before this ADAPT call. Then, before the call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_\ell, \cdot, \ell)$ and $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_{\ell+1}, \cdot, \ell+1)$ that occurs in $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$, we have $x_\ell \notin G_\ell$ and $x_{\ell+1} \notin G_{\ell+1}$ respectively.*

Lemma 30. *Suppose that $x_{\ell-1} \notin G_{\ell-1}$ (respectively $x_{\ell+2} \notin G_{\ell+2}$) immediately before a call $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$ in a good execution of H_2 . Then, if C is a table-defined chain before the call to ADAPT , $\text{val}_i(C)$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, 10\}$ stays constant during the call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_\ell, \cdot, \ell)$ (respectively $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_{\ell+1}, \cdot, \ell+1)$).*

Lemma 31. *Suppose that $x_{\ell-1} \notin G_{\ell-1}$ (respectively $x_{\ell+2} \notin G_{\ell+2}$) immediately before a call $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$ in a good execution of H_2 . Then, if C is a chain enqueued in Q_{all} , $\text{val}_i(C)$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, 10\}$ stays constant during the call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_\ell, \cdot, \ell)$ (respectively $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_{\ell+1}, \cdot, \ell+1)$) that occurs in the ADAPT call.*

Lemma 32. *Consider a call to $\text{ADAPT}(Q, x_{\ell-2}, x_{\ell-1}, x_{\ell+2}, x_{\ell+3}, \ell, g, b)$ in a good execution of H_2 for some $Q \in \{Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10}\}$. Assume that adapting was safe for all chains C that were dequeued from Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} before this ADAPT call. If $x_a \notin G_a$ and $x_g \notin G_g$ (where a is the adapt position adjacent to the “bad” set uniform position) before the ADAPT call, then if C is a chain enqueued in Q_{all} , $\text{val}_i(C)$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, 10\}$ stays constant during the call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x_a, \cdot, a)$ that occurs in the ADAPT call.*

Additional Properties of Enqueued Chains

For the following lemma, if a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is enqueued in Q_{mid} , then the assignment $G_i(x_i)$ that precedes C being enqueued happens either in lines 94, 149 or 152 of the simulator’s execution.

Lemma 33. *Suppose that a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is enqueued in Q_{mid} during a good execution of H_2 such that no chain equivalent to C has been enqueued for completion so far. Suppose also that adapting has been safe for every chain dequeued from Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} or Q_{all}^* so far. Then $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_b(C) = \perp$ just before the assignment $G_i(x_i)$ that precedes C being enqueued. Also, $\text{val}_9(C) = \text{val}_2(C) = \perp$ just before the assignment $G_i(x_i)$ that precedes C being enqueued.*

Proof. Say a chain $C = (x_5, x_6, 5, 2, 4, 1)$ is enqueued in Q_{mid} with $g = 4$ and $b = 1$. Then, the assignment $G_5(x_5)$ that precedes the enqueueing of C is such that $x_5 \notin G_5$ before the assignment, by construction of the simulator. Otherwise, $\text{ENQNEWMIDCHAINS}(5, x_5)$ is not called. Hence, $\text{val}_4^-(C) = \perp$ just before the assignment $G_5(x_5)$ that precedes C being enqueued. Also, since $\text{val}_4^-(C) = \perp$, we have $\text{val}_1^-(C) = \perp$.

Before we prove $\text{val}_4^+(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \perp$ (and hence, $\text{val}_4(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_1(C) = \perp$), we make the following observation. If a partial chain $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ is enqueued in Q_{mid} such that no equivalent chain has been enqueued previously, by construction of the simulator, either (1) $\text{val}_5(D) = x_5$ for a chain D belonging to Q_{all}^* where $\text{val}_5(D) = \perp$ when D was enqueued or (2) $\text{val}_6(E) = x_6$ for a chain E enqueued in Q_{all}^* where $\text{val}_6(E) = \perp$ when E was enqueued or (3) both. In other words, either $x_5 \notin G_5 \cup A_5^t$ or $x_6 \notin G_6 \cup A_6^t$ or both when $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}() = \text{true}$ in line 6 of the simulator's execution after \mathbf{D} 's t^{th} query.

Consider a chain $C = (x_5, x_6, 5, 2, 4, 1)$ which was enqueued in Q_{mid} such that no chain equivalent to C was enqueued previously. Such a chain C is enqueued in Q_{mid} , when $x_6 \in G_6$, $\text{val}_5(C) = \text{val}_5(D) = x_5$ and $x_5 \in G_5$ right before C was enqueued (and not earlier) where D is a chain belonging to Q_{all}^* and $x_5 \in G_5$ due to the completion of D .

For $\text{val}_1(C) \neq \perp$ at the time of the assignment that precedes the enqueueing of C , we need $\text{val}_1^+(C) \neq \perp$. Then, in particular, we have that $x_7 := \text{val}_7(C) \in G_7$ and $x_8 := \text{val}_8(C) \in G_8$ (otherwise, $\text{val}_9^+(C) = \perp$ implying that $\text{val}_1^+(C) = \perp$).

Consider the partial chains $C = (x_5, x_6, 5)$, $C_1 = (x_6, x_7, 6)$ and $C_2 = (x_7, x_8, 7)$. For $\text{val}_9^+(C) \neq \perp$ just before the assignment that precedes the enqueueing of C , we need (1) $C_1 = \text{next}(C)$, $C_2 = \text{next}(C_1)$ (and hence, $x_6 \in G_6$ and $x_7 \in G_7$) and (2) $x_5 = \text{val}_5(D)$ for a chain D in Q_{all}^* and (3) $x_8 \in G_8$ or $x_8 = \text{val}_8(E)$ of a chain E enqueued in Q_{all} . Note that this condition is not true at the time the simulator finished enqueueing chains in Q_{all} since we have either $x_5 \notin G_5 \cup A_5^t$ or $x_6 \notin G_6 \cup A_6^t$ or both. Hence, the conditions must have been met during the completion of chains in Q_{all} . Consider the last assignment that was made before all the above conditions were met.

Consider the case that when the last assignment (such that all the conditions listed above were met immediately after this assignment) happened, the chain C_1 was already table-defined. Now, if the assignment was a P/P^{-1} assignment, then **BadP** occurred. It cannot be a **FORCEVAL** assignment since **FORCEVAL** does not change the value of a chain enqueued in Q_{all} by Lemmas 31 and 32. If it were a uniform assignment to $G_i(x_i)$, then, **BadlyCollide⁺** occurred.

Consider the case that when the last assignment (such that all the conditions listed above were met immediately after this assignment) happened, the chain C_1 was not table-defined before the assignment but table-defined immediately after. Recall that if $C_1 = (x_6, x_7, 6)$ is table-defined then $x_6 \in G_6$ and $x_7 \in G_7$. So, the assignment was either to $G_6(x_6)$ or $G_7(x_7)$.

Consider the case that it set $G_7(x_7)$. If this were a uniform assignment to $G_7(x_7)$, then **BadlyCollide⁺** occurred since $C_1(\equiv C)$ and E are not equivalent as no chain equivalent to C has been enqueued previously. If this were a **FORCEVAL** assignment, then **BadlyCollideFV** occurred. This is because 7 is an adapt position only for partial chains that are either of the form (a) $X = (x_9, x_{10}, 9)$ such that $(x_9, x_{10}, 9, 6, 8, 5)$ belongs to Q_{all}^* . By assumption for chains in Q_{all}^* , we have $\text{val}_5(X) \notin G_5$ before the **ADAPT** call for such a chain or, (b) $Y = (x_1, x_2, 1)$ such that $(x_1, x_2, 1, 7, 9, 6)$ is enqueued in Q_6 . In this case, the adapt position 7 is adjacent to the "bad" set uniform position 6. By assumption for chains enqueued

in Q_6 , we have $\text{val}_9(Y) \notin G_9$ before the ADAPT call for such a chain. Hence, BadlyCollideFV occurred due to the assignment $G_5(\text{val}_5(X))$ or $G_9(\text{val}_9(Y))$ that occurs in the ADAPT call. The analysis for the case when $G_6(x_6)$ is set is similar. So, the above conditions are not met for a chain C to be enqueued in Q_{mid} . Hence, for such a chain $C = (x_5, x_6, 5, 2, 4, 1)$, $\text{val}_9^+(C) = \perp$ just before the assignment that caused C to be enqueued. Since $\text{val}_9^+(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_4^-(C) = \perp$ before the assignment, we have $\text{val}_4(C) = \perp$, $\text{val}_9(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_1(C) = \perp$ just before the assignment that precedes C being enqueued. The analysis for the case where $C = (x_5, x_6, 5, 8, 7, 10)$ is analogous.

Lemma 34. *Consider a good execution of H_2 . Just before the execution of line 27 during the simulator's execution, if adapting was safe for every chain dequeued from Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} , Q_{all}^* or Q_{mid} so far, then it holds that:*

- i. if $x_9 \in G_9, x_{10} \in G_{10}, x_1 \in G_1$ such that $\mathbf{R.CHKBWD}(x_{10}, x_9 \oplus G_{10}(x_{10}), x_1) = \text{true}$, then $(x_9, x_{10}, 9) \in \text{CompChains}$.*
- ii. if $x_1 \in G_1, x_2 \in G_2, x_{10} \in G_{10}$ such that $\mathbf{R.CHKFWD}(x_2 \oplus G_1(x_1), x_1, x_{10}) = \text{true}$, then $(x_1, x_2, 1) \in \text{CompChains}$.*
- iii. if $x_5 \in G_5, x_6 \in G_6$, then $(x_5, x_6, 5) \in \text{CompChains}$.*

Proof. We start by proving (i). For a triple (x_9, x_{10}, x_1) , we say that “condition holds” if (x_9, x_{10}, x_1) is such that $x_9 \in G_9, x_{10} \in G_{10}, x_1 \in G_1$ and $\mathbf{R.CHKBWD}(x_{10}, x_9 \oplus G_{10}(x_{10}), x_1) = \text{true}$. Also, we refer to the partial chain $(x_9, x_{10}, 9)$ as the partial chain associated with the triple (x_9, x_{10}, x_1) . So, our aim is to prove that for every triple (x_9, x_{10}, x_1) such that condition holds, the associated partial chain $(x_9, x_{10}, 9) \in \text{CompChains}$. Assume that the lemma has held right before (and hence immediately after) line 27 of the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's $(t-1)^{\text{th}}$ query to $F(\cdot, \cdot)$. Let the distinguisher ask its t^{th} query $F(k, x)$. The aim is to prove that at line 27 of the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query to $F(\cdot, \cdot)$, if a triple $T^* = (x_9, x_{10}, x_1)$ is such that condition holds, then the partial chain $C^* = (x_9, x_{10}, 9)$ associated with the triple is such that $C^* \in \text{CompChains}$. Note that the distinguisher could have made queries to P/P^{-1} between the $(t-1)^{\text{th}}$ and t^{th} queries to $F(\cdot, \cdot)$; but if those queries resulted in condition being true, then BadP occurred.

Suppose that there exists a triple T^* such that condition holds at line 27 of the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query. If condition held at the end of simulator's execution while answering the previous distinguisher query, then by assumption that the lemma has held so far, the partial chain C^* associated with the triple T^* is such that $C^* \in \text{CompChains}$. If condition held at the end of the simulator's execution of the current query t (and not at the end of the previous query), we differentiate cases where the associated partial chain C^* was enqueued for completion during the simulator's execution while answering the t^{th} query and when it's not.

Consider the case where a chain equivalent to C^* was enqueued in Q_{all} during the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's current query.

If $C^* = (x_9, x_{10}, 9)$ was enqueued during the t^{th} query, then $(x_9, x_{10}, 9) \in \text{CompChains}$ by construction of the simulator. Note also that chains in SimPChains are not enqueued for completion by the simulator. By definition of the set SimPChains , these chains are such that they are equivalent to a chain of the form $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ that has been enqueued for completion. Since BadP does not occur and FORCEVAL does not overwrite, the equivalence holds when $(x_5, x_6, 5) \in \text{CompChains}$ and hence, by Lemma 26, such a chain in SimPChains is placed in CompChains as well. By the same argument, if a chain equivalent to C^* has been enqueued for completion, then too $C^* \in \text{CompChains}$ by the end of the simulator's execution of the current query. So, if a chain equivalent to C^* was enqueued for completion or was in SimPChains during the simulator's execution while answering the current query t , then $C^* \in \text{CompChains}$.

Consider the case where no chain equivalent to C^* was enqueued in Q_{all} and $C^* \notin \text{SimPChains}$ during the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's current query. We differentiate between the cases where (1) $C = \text{next}(C^*) \neq \perp$, $\text{next}(C) \neq \perp$ when $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}() = \text{true}$ in line 6 of the simulator's execution when answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query and (2) when it's not.

Consider the case when $C = \text{next}(C^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{next}(C) \neq \perp$ at the time the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Q_{all} i.e. when $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}() = \text{true}$ in line 6 of the simulator's execution when answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query. This implies that $x_{10} \in G_{10}$ and $(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) \in P$ where $x_{11} := x_9 \oplus G_{10}(x_{10})$ and hence, $C = (x_{10}, x_{11}, 10)$ is table-defined at the time the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Q_{all} . Since the triple T^* is such that the associated partial chain $C^* = (x_9, x_{10}, 9)$ was not enqueued for completion and not in SimPChains , we have that either (a) $x_9 \notin G_9 \cup A_9^t$ or (b) $x_1 \notin G_1 \cup A_1^t$ when $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}() = \text{true}$ in line 6. For the condition to be true, we need $x_1 \in G_1$ and $x_9 \in G_9$ and hence, we have that condition does not hold for the triple T^* when $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}() = \text{true}$ in line 6. Consider the case where $x_1 \notin G_1 \cup A_1^t$. For $x_1 \in G_1$ to be true by the end of the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query, it must be the case that $\text{val}_1(D) = \text{val}_1(C) = x_1$ at some point for a chain D that has been enqueued in Q_{all} or Q_{mid} . Before analyzing the case that $\text{val}_1(D) = \text{val}_1(C) = x_1$ occurs, we make the following observations. Firstly, C and D are not equivalent as $C \equiv C^*$ and no chain equivalent to C^* (including itself) has been enqueued. Secondly, for all chains D that have been enqueued in Q_{all} , $\text{val}_1(D) \neq x_1$ when enqueued since $x_1 \notin G_1 \cup A_1^t$. Now, if $\text{val}_1(D) \neq x_1$ and $\text{val}_1(D) \neq \perp$, it cannot be that $\text{val}_1(D) = x_1$ at a later point since FORCEVAL does not overwrite and BadP does not occur. Hence, if $\text{val}_1(D) = x_1$ at a later point, then $\text{val}_1(D) = \perp$ when enqueued. Similarly, for all chains D that have been enqueued in Q_{mid} $\text{val}_1(D) = \perp$ just before the assignment that precedes the enqueueing of D by Lemma 33. Since BadlyHit^+ and BadlyHitFV do not occur, $\text{val}_1(D) = \perp$ at the time D is enqueued. Now, if $\text{val}_1(D) = \text{val}_1(C) = x_1$, then this is during the completion of some chain E during the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query. Consider the last assignment before $\text{val}_1(D) = \text{val}_1(C) = x_1$ was true. This cannot be a uniform assignment to $G_i(x_i)$ since then BadlyCollide^+

occurred. This cannot be due to a uniform assignment to P since then **BadP** or **BadlyCollideP** occurred. This cannot be a **FORCEVAL** assignment since that would contradict Lemmas 30, 31 or 32. The analysis for the case where $x_9 \notin G_9 \cup A_9^t$ when the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Q_{all} is analogous. So, if C was table-defined when the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Q_{all} , then condition does not hold for the triple T^* at the end of the simulator's execution of the current query.

Consider the case when either $\text{next}(C^*) = \perp$ or $C = \text{next}(C^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{next}(C) = \perp$ at the time the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Q_{all} i.e. when $Q_{\text{enq}}.\text{EMPTY}() = \text{true}$ in line 6 of the simulator's execution when answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query. Now if the triple $T^* = (x_9, x_{10}, x_1)$ is such that condition holds by the end of the simulator's execution of the current query, then it must be the case that $\text{next}(C^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{next}(\text{next}(C^*)) \neq \perp$ by the end of the simulator's execution. In particular, it means that the partial chain $\text{next}(C^*) = C = (x_{10}, x_{11}, 10)$ where $x_{11} := x_9 \oplus G_{10}(x_{10})$ is table-defined (with $\text{val}_1(C) = x_1$) by the end of the simulator's execution. Note that at the moment that C becomes table-defined either $x_1 \notin G_1$ or $x_9 \notin G_9$ as otherwise either **BadP** or **BadlyHit⁺** occurred. Furthermore, immediately before the assignment that causes C to be table-defined we have either $\text{val}_1(C) = \perp$ or $\text{val}_9(C) = \perp$ and immediately after the assignment, we have $\text{val}_9(C) \neq \perp$ and $\text{val}_1(C) \neq \perp$ by definition. Say $\text{val}_1(C) = \perp$ immediately before the assignment that caused C to be table-defined and $\text{val}_1(C) (= x_1) \neq \perp$ immediately after. For $x_1 \in G_1$ to be true by the end of the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's t^{th} query, it must be the case that $\text{val}_1(D) = \text{val}_1(C) = x_1$ at some point for a chain D that has been enqueued in Q_{all} or Q_{mid} . Consider the last assignment before $\text{val}_1(D) = \text{val}_1(C) = x_1$ was true. The rest of the analysis proceeds similarly to the analysis above. The case when $\text{val}_9(C) = \perp$ immediately before the assignment that caused C to be table-defined and $\text{val}_9(C) (= x_9) \neq \perp$ immediately after follows in a similar fashion. So, if $\text{next}(C^*) = \perp$ or if $\text{next}(C^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{next}(\text{next}(C^*)) = \perp$ when the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Q_{all} , then too the condition does not hold for the triple T^* at the end of the simulator's execution of the current query. Summarizing, if a chain equivalent to C^* was not enqueued in Q_{all} and $C^* \notin \text{SimPChains}$ during the simulator's execution while answering the distinguisher's current query, then condition does not hold for the triple T^* at the end of the simulator's execution of the current query.

The proof of (ii) follows exactly along the lines of the proof of (i) given above.

The proof of (iii) is as follows. Let \mathbf{D} ask its t^{th} query $F(k, x)$. Just before the simulator returns $G_k(x)$ in line 27, let the lemma be false and let this be the first time that the lemma does not hold implying that there exists $x_5 \in G_5$, $x_6 \in G_6$ such that $(x_5, x_6, 5) \notin \text{CompChains}$.

If the lemma has held so far, in particular it has held right before (and immediately after) line 27 of the simulator's execution while answering \mathbf{D} 's $(t-1)^{\text{th}}$ query to $F(\cdot, \cdot)$. Note that the distinguisher could have made queries to P/P^{-1} between the $(t-1)^{\text{th}}$ and t^{th} queries to $F(\cdot, \cdot)$; but those queries cannot result in $x_5 \in G_5$ or $x_6 \in G_6$.

So, $x_5 \in G_5$, $x_6 \in G_6$ such that $(x_5, x_6, 5) \notin \text{CompChains}$ happened during the simulator's execution while answering \mathbf{D} 's t^{th} query. Now, if $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ were enqueued for completion during the t^{th} query then $(x_5, x_6, 5) \in \text{CompChains}$. If a chain equivalent to $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ were enqueued for completion during the t^{th} query, then $(x_5, x_6, 5) \in \text{CompChains}$. This is because equivalent chains are placed in CompChains simultaneously since BadP does not occur and FORCEVAL does not overwrite. So, for $x_5 \in G_5$, $x_6 \in G_6$ such that $(x_5, x_6, 5) \notin \text{CompChains}$ to be true, the simulator did not enqueue this partial chain. (Note that chains of the type $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ are not added to SimPChains .)

Let $x_6 \in G_6$, and say an assignment occurs such that before the assignment $x_5 \notin G_5$, but after the assignment $x_5 \in G_5$ leading to the creation of a partial chain of the form $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ with $x_5 \in G_5, x_6 \in G_6$. (The analysis for the other case is analogous.) Such an assignment can happen only by completion of a chain in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} or completion of a chain in Q_{all}^* . We analyze these next.

Case 1: An assignment happens to $G_5(x_5)$ during the completion of a chain C enqueued in Q_b where $b \in \{1, 5, 6, 10\}$ and $x_6 \in G_6$ before this assignment. Now, if $x_6 \in G_6$ before assignment causing $x_5 \in G_5$, then either $x_6 \in G_6$ before \mathbf{D} 's t -th query or $x_6 \in G_6$ due to the completion of a chain D enqueued in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} and dequeued before C . Again, by construction of the simulator, chains C that are enqueued in Q_b are such that either $\text{val}_5(C) \in A_5^t$ or $\text{val}_5(C) \in G_5$ at the time C was enqueued and similarly, chains D that are enqueued in Q_b are such that either $\text{val}_6(D) \in A_6^t$ or $\text{val}_6(D) \in G_6$ at the time D was enqueued. Since BadP does not occur and FORCEVAL does not overwrite, $\text{val}_5(C) = x_5 \in A_5^t$ (since $x_5 \notin G_5$ before this assignment) and $\text{val}_6(D) = x_6 \in G_6 \cup A_6^t$. And so, $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ is enqueued for completion by construction of simulator.

Case 2: An assignment happens to $G_5(x_5)$ during the completion of a chain C in Q_{all}^* and $x_6 \in G_6$ before this assignment. If $x_6 \in G_6 \cup A_6^t$ and $x_5 \in A_5^t$ when the simulator enqueues chains in Q_{all} , then $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ is enqueued for completion in Q_{all} . Else, $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ is enqueued for completion in Q_{mid} .

This completes the proof.

Lemma 35. *Consider a good execution of H_2 . If a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ belongs to Q_{all}^* such that at the time C is enqueued, adapting was safe for every chain dequeued from $Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10}, Q_{\text{all}}^*$ or Q_{mid} so far, then $\text{val}_b(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ at the time C is enqueued.*

Proof. Say $C = (x_9, x_{10}, 9, 3, 2, 5)$ is enqueued where the query preceding the chain's enqueueing is $G_1(x_1)$ where $\text{val}_1(C) = x_1$. Then, by definition of simulator, $x_1 \notin G_1$ as otherwise, $\text{ENQNEWCHAINS}(1, x_1)$ is not called. So, $\text{val}_2^+(C) = \perp$. Now, we claim that $\text{val}_5^-(C) \notin G_5$. This is because if $\text{val}_5^-(C) \in G_5$, then $\text{val}_6^-(C) \in G_6$ since otherwise, $\text{val}_5^-(C) = \perp$. This implies that the partial chain $(x_5, x_6, 5)$ where $x_5 = \text{val}_5^-(C)$ and $x_6 = \text{val}_6^-(C)$ is such that $x_5 \in G_5$ and $x_6 \in G_6$. Hence, by Lemma 34, we have that $(x_5, x_6, 5) \in \text{CompChains}$ since no new G_i assignments have been issued between the moment the simulator returned the answer (line 27 of its execution) and the moment when a chain

C is enqueued in Q_{all} . However, since **BadP** does not occur, this means that $x_1 \in G_1$ contradicting the first statement. Thus, we have that $\text{val}_5^-(C) \notin G_5$. Now, $\text{val}_5^+(C) = \perp$ since $\text{val}_2^+(C) = \perp$. So, $\text{val}_5(C) \notin G_5$.

Since C is not enqueued in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} , we have $\text{val}_5(C) = \perp$ when C is enqueued. So $\text{val}_2(C) = \perp$ and $\text{val}_5(C) = \perp$, where $g = 2$ and $b = 5$. The other cases are analogous.

ForceVal(x, \cdot, j) does not Overwrite $G_j(x)$

Lemma 36. *Let $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ be a partial chain enqueued in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6 or Q_{10} during a good execution of H_2 . At the moment $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is dequeued, assume that adapting was safe for every chain C' in Q_{all}^* or Q_{mid} dequeued so far. Then,*

- At the moment $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is dequeued, $C \in \text{CompChains}$, or
- Just before the call to **ADAPT** for C , $\text{val}_g(C) \notin G_g$ and $\text{val}_a(C) \notin G_a$ (where a is the adapt position adjacent to the “bad” set uniform position b).

Proof. Assume that the lemma has held until the moment that a chain $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is dequeued. Note that if the lemma has held until now we have that for every call to **FORCEVAL**(x, \cdot, j) so far, $x \notin G_j$ by Corollary 29.

Consider the case that at the moment C was dequeued there is a chain D equivalent to C that was dequeued before C . Now, if D was dequeued before C , then $D \in \text{CompChains}$ by construction of the simulator. If C and D are equivalent chains such that $D \in \text{CompChains}$, then $C \in \text{CompChains}$ by Lemma 26.

Let us consider the case where no chain equivalent to C was dequeued before C was dequeued. Say $C \notin \text{CompChains}$ when dequeued. Note that if we prove $\text{val}_g(C) \notin G_g$ and $\text{val}_a(C) \notin G_a$ at the time C was dequeued, we have that $\text{val}_g(C) \notin G_g$ and $\text{val}_a(C) \notin G_a$ just before the call to **ADAPT** for C since otherwise **BadP** or **BadlyHit**⁺ occurred.

By Lemma 27, we have that $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ at the time C was enqueued. If $\text{val}_g(C) \in G_g$ at the time C was dequeued, then this was due to the completion of a chain D which was enqueued in $Q_{b'}$ where $b' \in \{1, 5, 6, 10\}$ due to the same distinguisher query as C and dequeued (and completed) before C such that $\text{val}_g(C) = \text{val}_g(D) \neq \perp$.

Consider the last assignment that was made before $\text{val}_g(C) = \text{val}_g(D) \neq \perp$ was true. This cannot have been a uniform assignment to $G_i(x_i)$ since that implies that **BadlyCollide**⁺ occurred. This is because C and D are not equivalent (by assumption) and C and D are both enqueued for completion in Q_{all} and either $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ or $\text{val}_g(D) = \perp$ before the assignment (otherwise this is not the last assignment before $\text{val}_g(C) = \text{val}_g(D) \neq \perp$) and $\text{val}_g(C) = \text{val}_g(D) \neq \perp$ after the assignment.

The assignment cannot have been of the form $P(\downarrow, x_0, x_1) = (x_{10}, x_{11})$ or $P(\uparrow, x_{10}, x_{11}) = (x_0, x_1)$ since then **BadP** occurred. The assignment cannot have been a **FORCEVAL** query. This is because from Lemmas 32 and 31 we have that **FORCEVAL** does not change $\text{val}_i(C)$ for a chain C enqueued in Q_{all}

(including those enqueued in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10}) during completion of chains in Q_1, Q_5, Q_6, Q_{10} .

Now, consider the argument for $\text{val}_a(C) \notin G_a$ when C is dequeued. By Lemma 27, we have that $\text{val}_b(C) \notin G_b$ and $\text{val}_g(C) = \perp$ at the time C was enqueued, implying that $\text{val}_a(C) = \perp$ when C was enqueued (where a is the adapt position adjacent to “bad” set uniform position). The argument for this case follows similar to the one above for $\text{val}_g(C)$.

Lemma 37. *Consider a good execution of H_2 . Let $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ be a partial chain in Q_{all}^* . At the moment $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ is dequeued, assume that adapting was safe for every chain C' in Q_{mid} dequeued so far. Then,*

- At the moment C is dequeued, $C \in \text{CompChains}$ or,
- Just before the call to ADAPT for C , $\text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \notin G_{\ell-1}$ and $\text{val}_{\ell+2}(C) \notin G_{\ell+2}$.

Lemma 38. *Consider a good execution of H_2 . Let $C = (x_k, x_{k+1}, k, \ell, g, b)$ be a partial chain enqueued in Q_{mid} . Then,*

- At the moment C is dequeued, $C \in \text{CompChains}$, or
- Just before the call to ADAPT for C , $\text{val}_{\ell-1}(C) \notin G_{\ell-1}$ and $\text{val}_{\ell+2}(C) \notin G_{\ell+2}$.

Theorem 39 (No overwrites). *In a good execution of H_2 , for any call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x, \cdot, j)$ we have $x \notin G_j$ before the call.*

Proof. Combining the result of Lemmas 36, 37 and 38 with Corollary 29, we have that for every call to $\text{FORCEVAL}(x, \cdot, j)$, $x \notin G_j$ before the call.

5.4 Indistinguishability of H_2 and H_4

Relying on the properties of good executions of H_2 from the previous section, we prove that H_2 and H_4 are indistinguishable.

Lemma 40. *The probability that a distinguisher \mathbf{D} outputs 1 in H_2 differs at most by $O(q^{10})/2^n$ from the probability that it outputs 1 in H_3 .*

Lemma 41. *The probability that a distinguisher outputs 1 in H_3 differs by at most by $O(q^{10})/2^n$ from the probability that it outputs 1 in H_4 .*

This concludes the proof.

Acknowledgments

We thank Vanishree Rao for collaboration during the early stages of this work.

References

1. Coron, J.S., Holenstein, T., Künzler, R., Jacques Patarin, Y.S., Tessaro, S.: How to build an ideal cipher: The indiffereniability of the Feistel construction. *Journal of Cryptology* (2014)
2. Coron, J.S., Patarin, J., Seurin, Y.: The random oracle model and the ideal cipher model are equivalent. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) *CRYPTO 2008*. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 1–20. Springer (2008)
3. Dachman-Soled, D., Katz, J., Thiruvengadam, A.: 10-round Feistel is indiffereniability from an ideal cipher (2015), available at <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/876>
4. Dai, Y., Steinberger, J.P.: Indiffereniability of 10-round Feistel networks (2015), available at <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/874>
5. Dai, Y., Steinberger, J.P.: Indiffereniability of 8-round Feistel networks (2015), available at <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1069>
6. Dodis, Y., Puniya, P.: On the relation between the ideal cipher and the random oracle models. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) *TCC 2006*. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 184–206. Springer (Mar 2006)
7. Dodis, Y., Puniya, P.: Feistel networks made public, and applications. In: Naor, M. (ed.) *EUROCRYPT 2007*. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 534–554. Springer (May 2007)
8. Even, S., Mansour, Y.: A construction of a cipher from a single pseudorandom permutation. In: Imai, H., Rivest, R.L., Matsumoto, T. (eds.) *ASIACRYPT'91*. LNCS, vol. 739, pp. 210–224. Springer (Nov 1993)
9. Feistel, H.: Cryptography and computer privacy. *Scientific American* 228(5), 15–23 (1973)
10. Gentry, C., Ramzan, Z.: Eliminating random permutation oracles in the Even-Mansour cipher. In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) *ASIACRYPT 2004*. LNCS, vol. 3329, pp. 32–47. Springer (Dec 2004)
11. Holenstein, T., Künzler, R., Tessaro, S.: The equivalence of the random oracle model and the ideal cipher model, revisited. In: Fortnow, L., Vadhan, S.P. (eds.) *43rd ACM STOC*. pp. 89–98. ACM Press (Jun 2011)
12. Luby, M., Rackoff, C.: How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions. *SIAM Journal on Computing* 17(2), 373–386 (1988)
13. Mandal, A., Patarin, J., Seurin, Y.: On the public indiffereniability and correlation intractability of the 6-round Feistel construction. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) *TCC 2012*. LNCS, vol. 7194, pp. 285–302. Springer (Mar 2012)
14. Maurer, U.M., Renner, R., Holenstein, C.: Indiffereniability, impossibility results on reductions, and applications to the random oracle methodology. In: Naor, M. (ed.) *TCC 2004*. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 21–39. Springer (Feb 2004)
15. Ramzan, Z., Reyzin, L.: On the round security of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) *CRYPTO 2000*. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 376–393. Springer (2000)
16. Seurin, Y.: *Primitives et Protocoles Cryptographiques à Sécurité Prouvée*. Ph.D. thesis, Versailles University (2009)
17. Seurin, Y.: A note on the indiffereniability of the 10-round Feistel construction (2011), available at <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/903>
18. Yoneyama, K., Miyagawa, S., Ohta, K.: Leaky random oracle. In: Baek, J., Bao, F., Chen, K., Lai, X. (eds.) *ProvSec 2008*. LNCS, vol. 5324, pp. 226–240. Springer (2008)