

Fault Attacks on RSA Signatures with Partially Unknown Messages

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Abstract. Fault attacks exploit hardware malfunctions to recover secrets from embedded electronic devices. In the late 90's, Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] introduced fault-based attacks on CRT-RSA. These attacks factor the signer's modulus when the message padding function is deterministic. However, the attack does not apply when the message is partially unknown, for example when it contains some randomness which is recovered only when verifying a *correct* signature.

In this paper we successfully extends RSA fault attacks to a large class of partially known message configurations. The new attacks rely on Coppersmith's algorithm for finding small roots of multivariate polynomial equations. We illustrate the approach by successfully attacking several randomized versions of the ISO/IEC 9796-2 encoding standard. Practical experiments show that a 2048-bit modulus can be factored in less than a minute given one faulty signature containing 160 random bits and an unknown 160-bit message digest.

Keywords: Fault attacks, digital signatures, RSA, Coppersmith's theorem, ISO/IEC 9796-2.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

RSA [21] is undoubtedly the most common digital signature scheme used in embedded security tokens. To sign a message m with RSA, the signer

applies an encoding (padding) function μ to m , and then computes the signature $\sigma = \mu(m)^d \bmod N$. To verify the signature, the receiver checks that $\sigma^e = \mu(m) \bmod N$. As shown by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] and others (e.g. [18]), RSA implementations can be vulnerable to fault attacks, especially when the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used; in this case the device computes $\sigma_p = \mu(m)^d \bmod p$ and $\sigma_q = \mu(m)^d \bmod q$ and the signature σ is computed from σ_p and σ_q by Chinese Remaindering.

Assuming that the attacker is able to induce a fault when σ_q is computed while keeping the computation of σ_p correct, one gets $\sigma_p = \mu(m)^d \bmod p$ and $\sigma_q \neq \mu(m)^d \bmod q$ and the resulting (faulty) signature σ satisfies

$$\sigma^e = \mu(m) \bmod p, \quad \sigma^e \neq \mu(m) \bmod q.$$

Therefore, given one faulty σ , the attacker can factor N by computing

$$\gcd(\sigma^e - \mu(m) \bmod N, N) = p. \tag{1}$$

Boneh *et al.*'s fault attack is easily extended to any deterministic RSA encoding, e.g. the Full Domain Hash (FDH) [5] encoding where $\sigma = H(m)^d \bmod N$ and $H : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_N$ is a hash function. The attack is also applicable to probabilistic signature schemes where the randomizer used to generate the signature is sent along with the signature, e.g. as in the Probabilistic Full Domain Hash (PFDH) encoding [11] where the signature is $\sigma \| r$ with $\sigma = H(m \| r)^d \bmod N$. In that case, given the faulty value of σ and knowing r , the attacker can still factor N by computing $\gcd(\sigma^e - H(m \| r) \bmod N, N) = p$.

1.2 Partially-Known Messages: The Fault-Attacker's Deadlock

However, if the message is not entirely given to the attacker the attack is thwarted, e.g. this may occur when the signature has the form $\sigma = (m \| r)^d \bmod N$ where r is a random nonce. Here the verifier can recover r only after completing the verification process; however r can only be recovered when verifying a *correct* signature. Given a faulty signature, the attacker cannot retrieve r nor infer $(m \| r)$ which would be necessary to compute $\gcd(\sigma^e - (m \| r) \bmod N, N) = p$.

In other words, the attacker faces an apparent deadlock: recovering the r used in the faulty signature σ seems to require that σ is a correctly verifiable signature. Yet, obviously, a correct signature does not factor N . These conflicting constraints cannot be conciliated unless r is short

enough to be guessed by exhaustive search. Inducing faults in many signatures does not help either since different r values are used in successive signatures (even if m remains invariant). As a result, randomized RSA encoding schemes are usually considered to be inherently immune against fault attacks.

1.3 The New Result

We overcome the deadlock by showing how to extract *in some cases* the unknown message part (UMP) involved in the generation of faulty RSA signatures. We develop several techniques that extend Boneh *et al.*'s attack to a large class of partially known message configurations. We nonetheless assume that certain conditions on the unknown parts of the encoded message are met; these conditions may depend on the encoding function itself and on the hash functions used. To illustrate our attacks, we have chosen to consider the ISO/IEC 9796-2 standard [16]. ISO/IEC 9796-2 is originally a deterministic encoding scheme often used in combination with message randomization (e.g. in EMV [13]). The encoded message has the form:

$$\mu(m) = 6A_{16} \parallel m[1] \parallel H(m) \parallel BC_{16}$$

where $m = m[1] \parallel m[2]$ is split into two parts. We show that if the unknown part of $m[1]$ is not too large (e.g. less than 160 bits for a 2048-bit RSA modulus), then a single faulty signature allows to factor N as in [6]¹. The new method is based on a result by Herrmann and May [12] for finding small roots of linear equations modulo an unknown factor p of N ; [12] is itself based on Coppersmith's technique [7] for finding small roots of polynomial equations using the LLL algorithm [19]. We also show how to extend our attack to multiple UMPs and to *scenarii* where more faulty signatures can be obtained from the device.

1.4 The ISO/IEC 9796-2 Standard

ISO/IEC 9796-2 is an encoding standard allowing partial or total message recovery [16, 17]. The encoding can be used with hash functions $H(m)$ of diverse digest sizes k_h . For the sake of simplicity we assume that k_h , the size of m and the size of N (denoted k) are all multiples of 8. The ISO/IEC 9796-2 encoding of a message $m = m[1] \parallel m[2]$ is

$$\mu(m) = 6A_{16} \parallel m[1] \parallel H(m) \parallel BC_{16}$$

¹ In our attack, it does not matter how large the unknown part of $m[2]$ is.

where $m[1]$ consists of the $k - k_h - 16$ leftmost bits of m and $m[2]$ represents the remaining bits of m . Therefore the size of $\mu(m)$ is always $k - 1$ bits. Note that the original version of the standard recommended $128 \leq k_h \leq 160$ for partial message recovery (see [16], §5, note 4). In [9], Coron, Naccache and Stern introduced an attack against ISO/IEC 9796-2; the authors estimated that attacking $k_h = 128$ and $k_h = 160$ would require respectively 2^{54} and 2^{61} operations. After Coron *et al.*'s publication, ISO/IEC 9796-2 was amended and the current official requirement (see [17]) is now $k_h \geq 160$. In a recent work Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi and Weinmann successfully attack the currently valid version of ISO/IEC 9796-2 [10].

To illustrate our purpose, we consider a message $m = m[1] \parallel m[2]$ of the form

$$m[1] = \alpha \parallel r \parallel \alpha', \quad m[2] = \text{DATA}$$

where r is a message part unknown to the adversary, α and α' are strings known to the adversary and DATA is some known or unknown string². The size of r is denoted k_r and the size of $m[1]$ is $k - k_h - 16$ as required in ISO/IEC 9796-2. The encoded message is then

$$\mu(m) = 6A_{16} \parallel \alpha \parallel r \parallel \alpha' \parallel H(\alpha \parallel r \parallel \alpha' \parallel \text{DATA}) \parallel BC_{16} \quad (2)$$

Therefore the total number of unknown bits in $\mu(m)$ is $k_r + k_h$.

2 Fault Attack on Partially-Known Message ISO/IEC 9796-2

This section extends [6] to signatures of partially known messages encoded as described previously. We assume that after injecting a fault the opponent is in possession of a faulty signature σ such that:

$$\sigma^e = \mu(m) \pmod{p}, \quad \sigma^e \neq \mu(m) \pmod{q}. \quad (3)$$

From (2) we can write

$$\mu(m) = t + r \cdot 2^{n_r} + H(m) \cdot 2^8 \quad (4)$$

where t is a known value. Note that both r and $H(m)$ are unknown to the adversary. From (3) we obtain:

$$\sigma^e = t + r \cdot 2^{n_r} + H(m) \cdot 2^8 \pmod{p}.$$

² The attack will work equally well in both cases.

This shows that $(r, H(m))$ must be a solution of the equation

$$a + b \cdot x + c \cdot y = 0 \pmod{p} \quad (5)$$

where $a := t - \sigma^e \pmod{N}$, $b := 2^{n_r}$ and $c := 2^8$ are known. Therefore we are left with solving equation (5) which is linear in the two variables x, y and admits a small root $(x_0, y_0) = (r, H(m))$. However the equation holds modulo an unknown divisor p of N and not modulo N . Such equations were already exploited by Herrmann and May [12] to factor an RSA modulus $N = pq$ when some blocks of p are known. Their method is based on Coppersmith's technique for finding small roots of polynomial equations [7]. Coppersmith's technique uses LLL to obtain two polynomials $h_1(x, y)$ and $h_2(x, y)$ such that

$$h_1(x_0, y_0) = h_2(x_0, y_0) = 0$$

holds over the integers. Then one computes the resultant between h_1 and h_2 to recover the common root (x_0, y_0) . To that end, we must assume that h_1 and h_2 are algebraically independent. This *ad hoc* assumption makes the method heuristic; nonetheless it turns out to work quite well in practice. Then, given the root (x_0, y_0) one recovers the randomized encoded message $\mu(m)$ and factors N by GCD.

Theorem 1 (Herrmann-May [12]). *Let N be a sufficiently large composite integer with a divisor $p \geq N^\beta$. Let $f(x, y) = a + b \cdot x + c \cdot y \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]$ be a bivariate linear polynomial. Assume that $f(x_0, y_0) = 0 \pmod{p}$ for some (x_0, y_0) such that $|x_0| \leq N^\gamma$ and $|y_0| \leq N^\delta$. Then for any $\varepsilon > 0$, under the condition*

$$\gamma + \delta \leq 3\beta - 2 + 2(1 - \beta)^{3/2} - \varepsilon \quad (6)$$

one can find $h_1(x, y), h_2(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]$ such that $h_1(x_0, y_0) = h_2(x_0, y_0) = 0$ over \mathbb{Z} , in time polynomial in $\log N$ and ε^{-1} .

We only sketch the proof and refer the reader to [12] and [8] for more details. Assume that $b = 1$ in the polynomial f (otherwise multiply f by $b^{-1} \pmod{N}$) and consider the polynomial

$$f(x, y) = a + x + c \cdot y$$

We look for (x_0, y_0) such that $f(x_0, y_0) = 0 \pmod{p}$. The basic idea consists in generating a family \mathcal{G} of polynomials admitting (x_0, y_0) as a root modulo p^t for some large enough integer t . Any linear combination

of these polynomials will also be a polynomial admitting (x_0, y_0) as a root modulo p^t . We will use LLL to find such polynomials with small coefficients. To do so, we view any polynomial $h(x, y) = \sum h_{i,j} x^i y^j$ as the vector of coefficients $(h_{i,j} X^i Y^j)_{i,j}$ and denote by $\|h(xX, yY)\|$ this vector's Euclidean norm. Performing linear combinations on polynomials is equivalent to performing linear operations on their vectorial representation, so that applying LLL to the lattice spanned by the vectors in \mathcal{G} will provide short vectors representing polynomials with root $(x_0, y_0) \bmod p^t$.

We now define the family \mathcal{G} of polynomials as

$$g_{k,i}(x, y) := y^i \cdot f^k(x, y) \cdot N^{\max(t-k, 0)}$$

for $0 \leq k \leq m$, $0 \leq i \leq m - k$ and integer parameters t and m . For all values of indices k, i , it holds that $g_{k,i}(x_0, y_0) = 0 \bmod p^t$. We first sort the polynomials $g_{k,i}$ by increasing k values and then by increasing i values. Denoting $X = N^\gamma$ and $Y = N^\delta$, we write the coefficients of the polynomial $g_{k,i}(xX, yY)$ in the basis $x^{k'} \cdot y^{i'}$ for $0 \leq k' \leq m$ and $0 \leq i' \leq m - k'$. Let L be the corresponding lattice; L 's dimension is

$$\omega = \dim(L) = \frac{m^2 + 3m + 2}{2} = \frac{(m+1)(m+2)}{2}$$

and we have

$$\det L = X^{s_x} Y^{s_y} N^{s_N}$$

where

$$s_x = s_y = \sum_{k=0}^m \sum_{i=0}^{m-k} i = \frac{m(m+1)(m+2)}{6}$$

and

$$s_N = \sum_{i=0}^t (m+1-i) \cdot (t-i).$$

We now apply LLL to the lattice L to find two polynomials $h_1(x, y)$ and $h_2(x, y)$ with small coefficients.

Theorem 2 (LLL [19]). *Let L be a lattice spanned by (u_1, \dots, u_ω) . Given the vectors (u_1, \dots, u_ω) , the LLL algorithm finds in polynomial time two linearly independent vectors b_1, b_2 such that*

$$\|b_1\|, \|b_2\| \leq 2^{\omega/4} (\det L)^{1/(\omega-1)}.$$

Therefore using LLL we can get two polynomials $h_1(x, y)$ and $h_2(x, y)$ such that

$$\|h_1(xX, yY)\|, \|h_2(xX, yY)\| \leq 2^{\omega/4} \cdot (\det L)^{1/(\omega-1)}. \quad (7)$$

Using Howgrave-Graham's lemma (below), we can determine the required bound on the norms of h_1 and h_2 to ensure that (x_0, y_0) is a root of both h_1 and h_2 over the integers:

Lemma 1 (Howgrave-Graham [14]). *Assume that $h(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]$ is a sum of at most ω monomials and assume further that $h(x_0, y_0) = 0 \pmod{B}$ where $|x_0| \leq X$ and $|y_0| \leq Y$ and $\|h(xX, yY)\| < B/\sqrt{\omega}$. Then $h(x_0, y_0) = 0$ holds over the integers.*

Proof. We have

$$\begin{aligned} |h(x_0, y_0)| &= \left| \sum h_{ij} x_0^i y_0^j \right| = \left| \sum h_{ij} X^i Y^j \left(\frac{x_0}{X}\right)^i \left(\frac{y_0}{Y}\right)^j \right| \\ &\leq \sum \left| h_{ij} X^i Y^j \left(\frac{x_0}{X}\right)^i \left(\frac{y_0}{Y}\right)^j \right| \leq \sum |h_{ij} X^i Y^j| \\ &\leq \sqrt{\omega} \|h(xX, yY)\| < B \end{aligned}$$

Since $h(x_0, y_0) = 0 \pmod{B}$, this implies that $h(x_0, y_0) = 0$ over the integers. \square

We apply Lemma 1 with $B := p^t$. Using (7) this gives the condition:

$$2^{\omega/4} \cdot (\det L)^{1/(\omega-1)} \leq \frac{N^{\beta t}}{\sqrt{\omega}}. \quad (8)$$

[12] shows that by letting $t = \tau \cdot m$ with $\tau = 1 - \sqrt{1 - \beta}$, we get the condition:

$$\gamma + \delta \leq 3\beta - 2 + 2(1 - \beta)^{3/2} - \frac{3\beta(1 + \sqrt{1 - \beta})}{m}$$

Therefore we obtain as in [12] the following condition for m :

$$m \geq \frac{3\beta(1 + \sqrt{1 - \beta})}{\varepsilon}.$$

Since LLL runs in time polynomial in the lattice's dimension and coefficients, the running time is polynomial in $\log N$ and $1/\varepsilon$.

2.1 Discussion

For a balanced RSA modulus ($\beta = 1/2$) we get the condition:

$$\gamma + \delta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{2} \cong 0.207 \quad (9)$$

This means that for a 1024-bit RSA modulus N , the total size of the unknowns x_0 and y_0 can be at most 212 bits. Applied to our context, this implies that for ISO/IEC 9796-2 with $k_h = 160$, the size of the UMP r can be as large as 52 bits. Section 3 reports practical experiments confirming this prediction. In [8] we provide a Python code for computing the bound on the size of the unknown values ($k_r + k_h$) as a function of the modulus size.

2.2 Extension to Several Unknown Bits Blocks

Assume that the UMP used in ISO/IEC 9796-2 is split into n different blocks, namely

$$\mu(m) = \mathbf{6A}_{16} \parallel \alpha_1 \parallel r_1 \parallel \alpha_2 \parallel r_2 \parallel \dots \parallel \alpha_n \parallel r_n \parallel \alpha_{n+1} \parallel H(m) \parallel \mathbf{BC}_{16} \quad (10)$$

where the UMPs r_1, \dots, r_n are all part of the message m . The α_i blocks are known. In [8], we show how to recover p from one faulty signature, using the extended result of Herrmann and May [12]. It appears that if the total number of unknown bits plus the message digest is less than 15.3% of the size of N , then the UMPs can be fully recovered from the faulty signature and Boneh *et al.*'s attack will apply again. However the number of blocks cannot be too large because the attack's runtime increases exponentially with n .

2.3 Extension to Two Faults Modulo Different Factors

Assume that we can get two faulty signatures, one incorrect modulo p and the other incorrect modulo q . This gives the two equations

$$\begin{aligned} a_0 + b_0 \cdot x_0 + c_0 \cdot y_0 &= 0 \pmod{p} \\ a_1 + b_1 \cdot x_1 + c_1 \cdot y_1 &= 0 \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

with small unknowns x_0, y_0, x_1, y_1 . We show in [8] that by multiplying the two equations, we get a quadri-variate equation modulo N which can be solved by linearization under the following bound:

$$\gamma + \delta \leq \frac{1}{6} \cong 0.167 .$$

This remains weaker than condition (9). However the attack is significantly faster because it works over a lattice of constant dimension 9. Moreover, the 16.7% bound is likely to lend itself to further improvements using Coppersmith's technique instead of plain linearization.

2.4 Extension to Several Faults Modulo the Same Factor

To exploit single faults, we have shown how to use lattice-based techniques to recover p given N and a bivariate linear equation $f(x, y)$ admitting a small root (x_0, y_0) modulo p . In this context, we have used Theorem 1 which is based on approximate GCD techniques from [15]. In the present section we would like to generalize this to use ℓ different polynomials of the same form, each having a small root modulo p . More precisely, let ℓ be a fixed parameter and assume that as the result of ℓ successive faults, we are given ℓ different polynomials

$$f_u(x_u, y_u) = a_u + x_u + c_u y_u \quad (11)$$

where each polynomial f_u has a small root (ξ_u, ν_u) modulo p with $|\xi_u| \leq X$ and $|\nu_u| \leq Y$. Note that, as in the basic case, we re-normalized each polynomial f_u to ensure that the coefficient of x_u in f_u is equal to one. To avoid double subscripts, we hereafter use the Greek letters ξ and ν to represent the root values. We would like to use a lattice approach to construct new multivariate polynomials in the variables $(x_1, \dots, x_\ell, y_1, \dots, y_\ell)$ with the root $R = (\xi_1, \dots, \xi_\ell, \nu_1, \dots, \nu_\ell)$. To that end we fix two parameters m and t and build a lattice on a family of polynomials \mathcal{G} of degree at most m with root R modulo $B = p^t$. This family is composed of all polynomials of the form

$$y_1^{i_1} y_2^{i_2} \dots y_\ell^{i_\ell} f_1(x_1, y_1)^{j_1} f_2(x_2, y_2)^{j_2} \dots f_\ell(x_\ell, y_\ell)^{j_\ell} N^{\max(t-j, 0)},$$

where each i_u, j_u is non-negative, $i = \sum_{u=1}^{\ell} i_u$, $j = \sum_{u=1}^{\ell} j_u$ and $0 \leq i + j \leq m$. Once again, let L be the corresponding lattice. Its dimension ω is equal to the number of monomials of degree at most m in 2ℓ unknowns, i.e.

$$\omega = \binom{m + 2\ell}{2\ell}.$$

Since we have a common upper bound X for all values $|\xi_u|$ and a common bound for all $|\nu_u|$ we can compute the lattice's determinant as

$$\det(L) = X^{s_x} Y^{s_y} N^{s_N},$$

where s_x is the sum of the exponents of all unknowns x_u in all occurring monomials, s_y is the sum of the exponents of the y_u and s_N is the sum of the exponents of N in all occurring polynomials. For obvious symmetry reasons, we have $s_x = s_y$ and noting that the number of polynomials of degree exactly d in ℓ unknowns is $\binom{d+\ell-1}{\ell-1}$ we find

$$s_x = s_y = \sum_{d=0}^m d \binom{d+\ell-1}{\ell-1} \binom{m-d+\ell}{\ell}.$$

Likewise, summing on polynomials with a non-zero exponent v for N , where the sum of the j_u is $t - v$ we obtain

$$s_N = \sum_{v=1}^t v \binom{t-v+\ell-1}{\ell-1} \binom{m-t+v+\ell}{\ell}.$$

As usual, assuming that $p = N^\beta$ we can find a polynomial with the correct root over the integers under the condition of formula (8).

Concrete Bounds: Using the notation of Theorem 1, we compute effective bounds on $\gamma + \delta = \log(XY)/\log(N)$ from the logarithm of condition (8), dropping the terms $\sqrt{\omega}$ and $2^{\omega/4}$ which become negligible as N grows. For concrete values of N , bounds are slightly smaller. Dividing by $\log(N)$, we find

$$s_x \cdot (\gamma + \delta) + s_N \leq \beta t \omega.$$

Thus, given k , t and m , we can achieve at best

$$\gamma + \delta \leq \frac{\beta t \omega - s_N}{s_x}.$$

In [8], we provide the achievable values of $\gamma + \delta$ for $\beta = 1/2$, for various parameters and for lattice dimensions $10 \leq \omega \leq 1001$.

Recovering the Root: With 2ℓ unknowns instead of two, applying usual heuristics and hoping that lattice reduction directly outputs 2ℓ algebraically independent polynomials with the prescribed root over the integers becomes a wishful hope. Luckily, a milder heuristic assumption suffices to make the attack work. The idea is to start with K equations instead of ℓ and iterate the lattice reduction attack for several subsets of ℓ equations chosen amongst the K available equations. Potentially, we can perform $\binom{K}{\ell}$ such lattice reductions. Clearly, since each equation involves

a different subset of unknowns, they are all different. Note that this does not suffice to guarantee algebraic independence; in particular, if we generate more than K equations they cannot be algebraically independent. However, we only need to ascertain that the root R can be extracted from the available set of equations. This can be done, using Gröbner basis techniques, under the heuristic assumption that the set of equations spans a multivariate ideal of dimension zero *i.e.* that the number of solutions is finite.

Note that we need to choose reasonably small values of ℓ and K to be able to use this approach in practice. Indeed, the lattice that we consider should not become too large and, in addition, it should be possible to solve the resulting system of equations using either resultants or Buchberger’s algorithm which means that neither the degree nor the number of unknowns should increase too much.

Asymptotic Bounds: Despite the fact that we cannot hope to run the multi-polynomial variant of our attack when parameters become too large, it is interesting to determine the theoretical limit of the achievable value of $\gamma + \delta$ as the number of faults ℓ increases. To that end, we assume as previously that $\beta = 1/2$, let $t = \tau m$ and replace ω , s_x and s_N by the following approximations:

$$\omega \cong \frac{m^{2\ell}}{(2\ell)!}, \quad s_x \cong \sum_{d=0}^m \frac{d^\ell (m-d)^\ell}{(\ell-1)! \ell!}, \quad s_N \cong \sum_{v=1}^t v \frac{(t-v)^{\ell-1} (m-t+v)^\ell}{(\ell-1)! \ell!}.$$

For small ℓ values we provide in Table 1 the corresponding bounds on $\gamma + \delta$. Although we do not provide further details here due to lack of space, one can show that the bound $\gamma + \delta$ tends to $1/2$ as the number of faults ℓ tends to infinity and that all $\gamma + \delta$ values are algebraic numbers.

ℓ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$\gamma + \delta$	0.207	0.293	0.332	0.356	0.371	0.383	0.391	0.399	0.405	0.410

Table 1. Bound for the relative size $\gamma + \delta$ of the unknowns as a function of the number of faults ℓ .

3 Simulation Results

Assuming that fault injection can be performed on unprotected devices (see Section 4), we simulated the attack. In the experiment we generated

faulty signatures (using the factors p and q) and applied to them the attack’s mathematical analysis developed in the previous sections to factor N . For our experimental results of physical fault injection see Section 4.

3.1 Single-Fault Attack Simulations

We first consider a single-UMP, single-fault attack when $H = \text{SHA-1}$ *i.e.* $k_h = 160$. Using the SAGE library LLL implementation, computations were executed on a 2GHz Intel notebook.

modulus size k	UMP size k_r	m	t	lattice dim. ω	runtime
1024	6	10	3	66	4 minutes
1024	13	13	4	105	51 minutes
1536	70	8	2	45	39 seconds
1536	90	10	3	66	9 minutes
2048	158	8	2	45	55 seconds

Table 2. Single fault, single UMP 160-bit digests ($k_h = 160$). LLL runtime for different parameter combinations.

Experimental results are summarized in Table 2. We see that for 1024-bit RSA, the randomizer size k_r must be quite small and the attack is less efficient than exhaustive search³. However for larger moduli, the attack becomes more efficient. Typically, using a single fault and a 158-bit UMP, a 2048-bit RSA modulus was factored in less than a minute.

3.2 Multiple-Fault Simulations

To test the practicality of the approach presented in Section 2.4, we have set $(\ell, t, m) = (3, 1, 3)$ *i.e.* three faulty signatures. This leads to a lattice of dimension 84 and a bound $\gamma + \delta \leq 0.204$. Experiments were carried out with 1024, 1536 and 2048 bit RSA moduli. This implementation also relied on the SAGE library [20] running on a single PC. Quite surprisingly, we observed a very large number of polynomials with the expected root over the integers. The test was run for three random instances corresponding to the parameters in Table 3.

Three faults turn-out to be more efficient than single-fault attacks (Table 3 vs. Table 2). In particular for a 1024-bit RSA modulus, the three-

³ Exhausting a 13-bit randomizer took 0.13 seconds.

modulus size k	UMP size k_r	runtime
1024	40	49 seconds
1536	150	74 seconds
2048	250	111 seconds

Table 3. Three faults, single UMP, 160-bit digests ($k_h = 160$). LLL runtime for different parameter combinations.

fault attack recovered a 40-bit UMP r in 49 seconds⁴, whereas the single-fault attack only recovered a 13-bit UMP in 51 minutes.

4 Physical Fault Injection Experiments

We performed fault injection on an unprotected device to demonstrate the entire attack flow. We obtain a faulty signature from a general-purpose 8-bit microcontroller running an RSA implementation and factor N using the mathematical attack of Section 2.

Our target device is an Atmel ATmega128 [3], a very popular RISC microcontroller (μC) with an 8-bit AVR core. The μC was running an RSA-CRT implementation developed in C using the BigDigits multiple-precision arithmetic library [4]. The μC was clocked at 7.3728 MHz using a quartz crystal and powered from a 5V source.

We induced faults using voltage spikes (*cf.* to [1] and [2] for such attacks on similar μC s). Namely, we caused brief power cut-offs (spikes) by grounding the chip’s V_{cc} input for short time periods. Spikes were produced by an FPGA-based board counting the μC ’s clock transitions and generating the spike at a precise moment. The cut-off duration was variable with 10ns granularity and the spike temporal position could be fine-tuned with the same granularity. The fault was heuristically positioned to obtain the stable fault injection in one of the RSA-CRT branches (computing σ_p or σ_q). A 40ns spike is presented in Figure 1. Larger spike durations caused a μC ’s reset.

[8] provides more details on a 1536-bit RSA signature experiment conducted using our setup.

5 Conclusion

The paper introduced a new breed of partially-known message fault attacks against RSA signatures. These attacks allow to factor the modulus N

⁴ We estimate that exhaustive search on a 40-bit UMP would take roughly a year on the same single PC.




Fig. 1. Spike captured with a DSO: control signal from FPGA, power supply cut-off, and induced glitch in the clock signal.

given a single faulty signature. Although the attack is heuristic, it works well in practice and paradoxically becomes more efficient as the modulus size increases. As several faulty signatures are given longer UMPs and longer digests become vulnerable.

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