

Simple and Efficient KDM-CCA Secure Public Key Encryption

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Abstract. We propose two efficient public key encryption (PKE) schemes satisfying key dependent message security against chosen ciphertext attacks (KDM-CCA security). The first one is KDM-CCA secure with respect to affine functions. The other one is KDM-CCA secure with respect to polynomial functions. Both of our schemes are based on the KDM-CPA secure PKE schemes proposed by Malkin, Teranishi, and Yung (EUROCRYPT 2011). Although our schemes satisfy KDM-CCA security, their efficiency overheads compared to Malkin et al.’s schemes are very small. Thus, efficiency of our schemes is drastically improved compared to the existing KDM-CCA secure schemes.

We achieve our results by extending the construction technique by Kitagawa and Tanaka (ASIACRYPT 2018). Our schemes are obtained via semi-generic constructions using an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme as a building block. We prove the KDM-CCA security of our schemes based on the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption and the IND-CCA security of the building block PKE scheme.

Moreover, our security proofs are *tight* if the IND-CCA security of the building block PKE scheme is tightly reduced to its underlying computational assumption. By instantiating our schemes using existing tightly IND-CCA secure PKE schemes, we obtain the first tightly KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes whose ciphertext consists only of a constant number of group elements.

Keywords: key dependent message security, chosen ciphertext security

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Key dependent message (KDM) security, introduced by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [3], guarantees confidentiality of communication even if an adversary can get a ciphertext of secret keys. KDM security is defined with respect to a function family \mathcal{F} . Informally, a public key encryption (PKE) scheme is said to be

\mathcal{F} -KDM secure if confidentiality of messages is protected even when an adversary can see a ciphertext of $f(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_\ell)$ under the k -th public key for any $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and $k \in \{1, \dots, \ell\}$, where ℓ denotes the number of keys. KDM security is useful for many practical applications including anonymous credential systems [8] and hard disk encryption systems (e.g., BitLocker [5]).

In this paper, we focus on constructing *efficient* PKE schemes that satisfy KDM security against chosen ciphertext attacks, namely *KDM-CCA* security, in the standard model. As pointed out by Camenisch, Chandran, and Shoup [7] who proposed the first KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme, KDM-CCA security is well motivated since it resolves key wrapping problems that arise in many practical applications. Moreover, in some applications of KDM secure schemes such as anonymous credential systems, we should consider active adversaries and need KDM-CCA security.

The first attempt to construct an efficient KDM secure PKE scheme was made by Applebaum, Cash, Peikert, and Sahai [1]. They proposed a PKE scheme that is KDM-CPA secure with respect to affine functions (\mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CPA secure) under a lattice assumption. Their scheme is as efficient as IND-CPA secure schemes based on essentially the same assumption.

Malkin, Teranishi, and Yung [23] later proposed a more efficient KDM-CPA secure PKE scheme under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption [25,10]. Moreover, their scheme is KDM-CPA secure with respect to polynomial functions ($\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CPA secure), which is much richer than affine functions. A ciphertext of their scheme contains $d + 1$ group elements, where d is the maximum degree of polynomial functions with respect to which their scheme is KDM-CPA secure. As a special case of $d = 1$, their scheme is an \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CPA secure PKE scheme whose ciphertext consists of only two group elements.

Due to these works, we now have efficient KDM-CPA secure PKE schemes. As we can see, the above \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CPA secure schemes are as efficient as PKE schemes that are IND-CPA secure under the same assumptions. However, the situation is somewhat unsatisfactory when considering KDM-CCA secure PKE.

Camenisch et al. [7] proposed the first KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme based on the Naor-Yung paradigm [24]. They showed that for any function class \mathcal{F} , an \mathcal{F} -KDM-CPA secure PKE scheme can be transformed into an \mathcal{F} -KDM-CCA secure one assuming a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof system. They also showed a concrete instantiation based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption on bilinear groups. A ciphertext of their scheme contains $O(\lambda)$ group elements, where λ is the security parameter. Subsequently, Hofheinz [13] showed a more efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme. His scheme is circular-CCA secure, relying on both the DCR and DDH assumptions, and decisional linear (DLIN) assumption on bilinear groups. A ciphertext of his scheme contains more than 50 group elements. Recently, Libert and Qian [21] improved the construction of Hofheinz based on the 3-party DDH (D3DH) assumption on bilinear groups, and shortened the ciphertext size by about 20 group elements.

The first KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme using neither NIZK proofs nor bilinear maps was proposed by Lu, Li, and Jia [22]. They claimed their scheme is

\mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure based on both the DCR and DDH assumptions. However, a flaw in their security proof was later pointed out by Han, Liu, and Lyu [12]. Han et al. also showed a new \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure scheme based on Lu et al.’s construction methodology, and furthermore constructed a $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme. Their schemes rely on both the DCR and DDH assumptions. A ciphertext of their \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure scheme contains around 20 group elements. A ciphertext of their $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure scheme contains $O(d^9)$ group elements, where d is the maximum degree of polynomial functions.

Recently, Kitagawa and Tanaka [19] showed a new framework for constructing KDM-CCA secure schemes, and they constructed an \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme based solely on the DDH assumption (without bilinear maps). However, their scheme is somewhat inefficient and its ciphertext consists of $O(\lambda)$ group elements.

The currently most efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme is that of Han et al.. Their schemes are much efficient compared to other KDM-CCA secure schemes. However, there are still a large overhead compared to efficient KDM-CPA secure schemes. Especially, its overhead compared to Malkin et al.’s scheme is large even though Han et al.’s schemes are based on both the DDH and DCR assumptions while Malkin et al.’s scheme is based only on the DCR assumption.

In order to use a KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme in practical applications, we need a more efficient scheme.

1.2 Our Results

We propose two efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes. The first one is \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure, and the other one is $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure. Both of our schemes are based on the KDM-CPA secure scheme proposed by Malkin et al. [23]. Although our schemes satisfy KDM-CCA security, its efficiency overheads compared to Malkin et al.’s schemes are very small. Thus, efficiency of our schemes is drastically improved compared to the previous KDM-CCA secure schemes.

We achieve our results by extending the construction technique by Kitagawa and Tanaka [19]. Our schemes are obtained via semi-generic constructions using an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme as a building block. By instantiating the underlying IND-CCA secure PKE scheme with the factoring-based scheme by Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] (and with some optimization techniques), we obtain KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes (with respect to affine functions and with respect to polynomials) such that the overhead of the ciphertext size of our schemes compared to Malkin et al.’s KDM-CPA secure scheme can be less than a single DCR-group element. (See Figures 1 and 2.)

Moreover, our security proofs are *tight* if the IND-CCA security of the building block PKE scheme is tightly reduced to its underlying computational assumption. By instantiating our schemes using existing tightly IND-CCA secure PKE schemes [14,11], we obtain the first tightly KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes whose ciphertext consists only of a constant number of group elements. To the best of our knowledge, prior to our work, the only way to construct a tightly KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme is to instantiate the construction proposed by

Camenisch et al. [7] using a tightly secure NIZK proof system such as the one proposed by Hofheinz and Jager [15]. A ciphertext of such schemes consists of $O(\lambda)$ group elements, where λ is the security parameter.

For a comparison of efficiency between our schemes and existing schemes, see Figures 1 and 2. In the figures, for reference, we include [23] on which our schemes are based but which is not KDM-CCA secure. In the figures, we also show concrete instantiations of our constructions. The details of these instantiations are explained in Section 7.

We note that the plaintext space of the schemes listed in Figures 1 and 2 except for our schemes and Malkin et al.’s [23], is smaller than the secret key space, and some modifications are needed for encrypting a whole secret key, which will result in a larger ciphertext size in the resulting PKE schemes. On the other hand, our and Malkin et al.’s schemes can encrypt a whole secret key without any modification by setting $s \geq 3$. (We provide a more detailed explanation on the plaintext space of our scheme in Section 5.1.)

Organization. In Section 2, we give a technical overview behind our proposed PKE schemes. In Section 3, we review definitions of cryptographic primitives and assumptions. In Section 4, we introduce a new primitive that we call symmetric key encapsulation mechanism (SKEM) and provide concrete instantiations. In Section 5, we present our KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme with respect to affine functions, and in Section 6, we present our KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme with respect to polynomials. Finally, in Section 7, we give instantiation examples of KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes.

2 Technical Overview

We provide an overview of our construction. Our starting point is the construction of KDM-CPA secure PKE proposed by Malkin et al. [23]. Their scheme is highly efficient, but only KDM-CPA secure. Our basic idea is to construct KDM-CCA secure PKE by adopting a construction technique used in the recent work by Kitagawa and Tanaka [19] into Malkin et al.’s scheme. However, since a simple combination of them does not work, we introduce a new primitive that ties them together. We first review Malkin et al.’s scheme. Below, we explain the overview by focusing on constructing a PKE scheme that is \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure. The actual Malkin et al.’s scheme is $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CPA secure, and we can construct a $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure scheme analogously.

2.1 KDM-CPA Secure Scheme by Malkin et al.

Malkin et al.’s scheme is secure under the DCR assumption and all procedures of their scheme are performed on $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$, where $N = PQ$ is an RSA modulus with safe primes P and Q of the same length, and $s \geq 2$ is an integer. Below, let $n = \frac{\phi(N)}{4}$. We can decompose $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ as the internal direct product $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_n \otimes G_2$, where $\langle -1 \rangle$ is the subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ generated by $-1 \bmod N^s$, and $G_{N^{s-1}}$, G_n ,

Scheme	Assumption	Ciphertext size	Tight?
[23] (not CCA)	DCR	$2 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} $	
[7] with [15, § 4]	DLIN	$O(\lambda) \mathbb{G}_{\text{bi}} $	✓
[13] (Circular)	DCR+DDH ^(†) & DLIN	$6 \mathbb{Z}_{N^3} + 50 \mathbb{G}_{\text{bi}} + \text{OH}_{\text{ch\&sig}}$	
[21] (Circular)	DCR+DDH ^(†) & D3DH	$6 \mathbb{Z}_{N^3} + 31 \mathbb{G}_{\text{bi}} + \text{OH}_{\text{ch\&sig}}$	
[12]	DCR+DDH ^(‡)	$9 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 9 \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} + 2 \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}} + \mathbb{Z}_N + \text{OH}_{\text{ae}}$	
[19]	DDH	$O(\lambda) \mathbb{G}_{\text{ddh}} $	
Ours (§ 5)	DCR & CCAPKE	$2 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + \pi_{\text{phf}} + \text{OH}_{\text{cca}}$	
with [17]+CRHF	DCR	$2 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 2 \mathbb{Z}_{N'} + \text{len}_{\text{crhf}}$	
with [14]	DCR	$3 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 28 \mathbb{Z}_{N'^2} + \text{OH}_{\text{ae}}$	✓
with [11]	DCR & DDH	$3 \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 3 \mathbb{G}_{\text{ddh}} + \text{OH}_{\text{ae}}$	✓

Fig. 1. Comparison of KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes with respect to affine functions. The last three rows are instantiation examples of our scheme. In the ‘‘Ciphertext size’’ column, we use the following notations: N and N' are RSA moduli, and $s \geq 2$ is the exponent of N in the DCR setting; $\bar{N} = 2N + 1$; For a group G , $|G|$ denotes the size of an element in G ; \mathbb{G}_{bi} denotes a group equipped with a bilinear map, and \mathbb{G}_{ddh} denotes a DDH-hard group (without bilinear maps); $|\pi_{\text{phf}}|$ denotes the output size of the underlying projective hash function; OH_{cca} (resp. OH_{ae}) denotes the ciphertext overhead of the underlying IND-CCA secure PKE (resp. authenticated encryption) scheme; $\text{OH}_{\text{ch\&sig}}$ denotes an overhead caused by the underlying chameleon hash function and one-time signature scheme; len_{crhf} denotes the output size of a collision resistant hash function; For λ -bit security, $\text{OH}_{\text{ae}} = \lambda$, $\text{len}_{\text{crhf}} = 2\lambda$, and $\text{OH}_{\text{ch\&sig}}$ can be smaller than $|\mathbb{Z}_N|$.
 (†) DDH in the order- $\frac{\phi(N)}{4}$ subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_{N^3}^*$. (‡) DDH in $\mathbb{QR}_{\bar{N}} := \{a^2 \bmod \bar{N} | a \in \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}}^*\}$.

Scheme	Assumption	Ciphertext size	Tight?
[23] (not CCA)	DCR	$(d+1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} $	
[12]	DCR+DDH ^(†)	$(8d^9+1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 9 \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} + 2 \mathbb{Z}_{\bar{N}} + \mathbb{Z}_N + \text{OH}_{\text{ae}}$	
Ours (§ 6)	DCR & CCAPKE	$(d+1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + \pi_{\text{phf}} + \text{OH}_{\text{cca}}$	
with [17]+CRHF	DCR	$(d+1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 2 \mathbb{Z}_{N'} + \text{len}_{\text{crhf}}$	
with [14]	DCR	$(2d+1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 28 \mathbb{Z}_{N'^2} + \text{OH}_{\text{ae}}$	✓
with [11]	DCR & DDH	$(2d+1) \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} + 3 \mathbb{G}_{\text{ddh}} + \text{OH}_{\text{ae}}$	✓

Fig. 2. Comparison of KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes with respect to degree- d polynomial functions. We use the same notation as in Figure 1.

and G_2 are cyclic groups of order N^{s-1} , n , and 2, respectively. Note that $T := 1+N \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ has order N^{s-1} and it generates $G_{N^{s-1}}$. Moreover, we can efficiently compute discrete logarithms on $G_{N^{s-1}}$. In addition, we can generate a random generator of G_n .⁴

We can describe Malkin et al.’s scheme by using generators T and g of $G_{N^{s-1}}$ and G_n , respectively, and for simplicity we consider the single user setting for now. Below, all computations are done mod N^s unless stated otherwise, and we omit to write mod N^s . When generating a key pair, we sample⁵ a secret key

⁴ This is done by generating $\mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ and setting $g := \mu^{2N^{s-1}} \bmod N^s$. Then, g is a generator of G_n with overwhelming probability.

⁵ In the actual scheme, we sample a secret key from $[\frac{N-1}{4}]$. We ignore this issue in this overview.




Fig. 3. The triple mode proof. “XX Mode: YY” indicates that in XX Mode, the challenger returns YY as the answer to a KDM query from an adversary.

as $x \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_n$ and compute a public key as $h = g^x$. When encrypting a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$, we first sample $r \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_n$ and set a ciphertext as $(g^r, T^m \cdot h^r)$. If we have the secret key x , we can decrypt the ciphertext by computing the discrete logarithm of $(T^m \cdot h^r) \cdot (g^r)^{-x} = T^m$.

Triple mode proof framework. We say that a PKE scheme is KDM secure if an encryption of $f(\text{sk})$ is indistinguishable from that of some constant message such as 0, where sk is a secret key and f is a function. Malkin et al. showed the \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CPA security of their scheme based on the DCR assumption via the proof strategy that they call the *triple mode proof*.

In the triple mode proof framework, we prove KDM security using three main hybrid games. We let f be a function queried by an adversary as a KDM query. In the first hybrid called Standard Mode, the challenger returns an encryption of $f(\text{sk})$. In the second hybrid called Fake Mode, the challenger returns a simulated ciphertext from f and the public key corresponding to sk . In the final hybrid called Hide Mode, the challenger returns an encryption of 0. See Figure 3.

If we can prove that the behavior of the adversary does not change between Standard Mode and Hide Mode, we see that the scheme is KDM secure. However, it is difficult to prove it directly by relying on the secrecy of the secret key. This is because a reduction algorithm needs the secret key to simulate answers to KDM queries in Standard Mode. Then, we consider the intermediate hybrid, Fake Mode, and we try to prove the indistinguishability between Standard Mode and Fake Mode based on the secrecy of encryption randomness. We call this part Step (1). If we can do that, by showing the indistinguishability between Fake Mode and Hide Mode based on the secrecy of the secret key, we can complete the proof. We call this part Step (2). Note that a reduction for Step (2) does not need the secret key to simulate answers to KDM queries.

Using this framework, we can prove the KDM-CPA security of Malkin et al.’s scheme as follows. Let $f(x) = ax + b \pmod{N^{s-1}}$ be an affine function queried by an adversary, where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$. In Standard Mode, the adversary is given $(g^r, T^{ax+b} \cdot h^r)$. In Fake Mode, the adversary is given $(T^{-a} \cdot g^r, T^b \cdot h^r)$. We can prove the indistinguishability of these two hybrids using the indistinguishability of g^r and $T^{-a} \cdot g^r$. Namely, we use the DCR assumption and the secrecy of encryption randomness r in this step. Then, in Hide Mode, the adversary is given

(g^r, h^r) that is an encryption of 0. We can prove the indistinguishability between Fake Mode and Hide Mode based on the interactive vector (IV) lemma [6] that is in turn based on the DCR assumption. The IV lemma says that for every constant $c_1, c_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s-1}$, $(T^{c_1} \cdot g^r, T^{c_2} \cdot h^r)$ is indistinguishable from (g^r, h^r) if in addition to r , x satisfying $h = g^x$ is hidden from the view of an adversary. This completes the proof of Malkin et al.’s scheme.

2.2 Problem When Proving KDM-CCA Security

Malkin et al.’s scheme is malleable thus is not KDM-CCA secure. In terms of the proof, Step (2) of the triple mode proof does not go through when considering KDM-CCA security. In Step (2), a reduction does not know the secret key and thus the reduction cannot simulate answers to decryption queries correctly.

On the other hand, we see that Step (1) of the triple mode proof goes through also when proving KDM-CCA security since a reduction algorithm knows the secret key in this step. Thus, to construct a KDM-CCA secure scheme based on Malkin et al.’s scheme, all we need is a mechanism that enables us to complete Step (2) of the triple mode proof.

2.3 The Technique by Kitagawa and Tanaka

To solve the above problem, we adopt the technique used by Kitagawa and Tanaka [19]. They constructed a KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme Π_{kdm} by combining projective hash functions PHF and PHF’ and an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme Π_{cca} . Their construction is a double layered construction. Namely, when encrypting a message by their scheme, we first encrypt the message by the inner scheme constructed from PHF and PHF’, and then encrypt the ciphertext again by Π_{cca} . The inner scheme is the same as the IND-CCA secure PKE scheme based on projective hash functions proposed by Cramer and Shoup [9] except that PHF used to mask a message is required to be *homomorphic* and on the other hand PHF’ is required to be only universal (not 2-universal).

The security proof for this scheme can be captured by the triple mode proof framework. We first perform Step (1) of the triple mode proof based on the homomorphism of PHF and the hardness of a subset membership problem on the group behind projective hash functions. Then, we perform Step (2) of the triple mode proof using the IND-CCA security of Π_{cca} . In this step, a reduction algorithm can simulate answers to decryption queries. This is because the reduction algorithm can generate secret keys for PHF and PHF’ by itself and access to the decryption oracle for Π_{cca} . When proving the CCA security of a PKE scheme based on projective hash functions, at some step in the proof, we need to estimate the probability that an adversary makes an “illegal” decryption query. In the proof of the scheme by Kitagawa and Tanaka, this estimation can be done in Hide Mode of the triple mode proof. Due to this, the underlying PHF’ needs to be only universal.

If the secret key csk of Π_{cca} is included as a part of the secret key of Π_{kdm} , to complete the proof, we need to change the security game so that csk is not

needed to simulate answers to KDM queries in Step (1). It seems difficult unless we require an additional property for secret keys of Π_{cca} such as homomorphism. Instead, Kitagawa and Tanaka designed their scheme so that csk is included in the public key of Π_{kdm} after encrypting it by PHF. Then, by eliminating this encrypted csk from an adversary’s view by using the security of PHF before Step (2) of the triple mode proof, the entire proof goes through. Note that, similarly to the proof for the construction by Cramer and Shoup [9], a reduction algorithm attacking the security of PHF can simulate answers to decryption queries due to the fact that the security property of PHF is statistical and an adversary for Π_{kdm} is required to make a proof that the query is “legal” using PHF’.

2.4 Adopting the Technique by Kitagawa and Tanaka

We now consider adopting the technique by Kitagawa and Tanaka into Malkin et al.’s scheme. Namely, we add a projective hash function for proving that an inner layer ciphertext of Malkin et al.’s scheme is well-formed, and also add an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme Π_{cca} as the outer layer. In order to prove the KDM-CCA security of this construction, we need to make the secret key csk of Π_{cca} as part of the public key of the resulting scheme after encrypting it somehow. Moreover, we have to eliminate this encrypted csk before Step (2) of the triple mode proof. However, this is not straightforward.

One naive way to do this is encrypting csk by the inner scheme based on the DCR assumption, but this idea does not work. Since the security of the inner scheme is computational unlike a projective hash function, a reduction algorithm attacking the inner scheme cannot simulate answers to decryption queries. One might think the problem is solved by modifying the scheme so that the security property of the inner scheme becomes statistical as a projective hash function, but this modification causes another problem. In order to do this, similarly to the DCR-based projective hash function by Cramer and Shoup [9], a secret key of the inner scheme needs to be sampled from a space whose size is as large as the order of $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$ (that is, $N^{s-1} \cdot n$). However, the message space of this scheme is $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$, and thus we cannot encrypt such a large secret key by this scheme. The problem is more complicated when considering KDM-CCA security in the multi-user setting. Therefore, we need another solution to hide the secret key csk of Π_{cca} .

2.5 Solution: Symmetric Key Encapsulation Mechanism (SKEM)

To solve the above problem, we introduce a new primitive we call symmetric key encapsulation mechanism (SKEM). It is a key encapsulation mechanism in which we can use the same key for both the encapsulation algorithm Encap and decapsulation algorithm Decap . Moreover, it satisfies the following properties.

Encap can take an arbitrary integer $x \in \mathbb{Z}$ as an input secret key, but its computation is done by $x \bmod z$, where z is an integer determined in the setup. Then, for correctness, we require $\text{Decap}(x \bmod z, \text{ct}) = \text{K}$, where $(\text{ct}, \text{K}) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(x)$.

Moreover, for security, the pseudorandomness of the session-time key K is required to hold as long as $x \bmod z$ is hidden from an adversary even if any other information of x is revealed.

Using SKEM ($\text{Encap}, \text{Decap}$) in addition to an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme Π_{cca} and a projective hash function PHF, we can construct a KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme based on Malkin et al.’s scheme as follows. When generating a key pair, we first sample $x \xleftarrow{r} [n \cdot z]$ and compute $h \leftarrow g^x$, where z is an integer that is co-prime to n and satisfies $n \cdot z \leq N^{s-1}$. Then, we generate a key pair (ppk, psk) of PHF and (cpk, csk) of Π_{cca} , and $(\text{ct}, K) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(x)$, and encrypt psk and csk to ct_{sk} using the one-time key K . The resulting secret key is just x and public key is $h, \text{psk}, \text{cpk}$, and $(\text{ct}, \text{ct}_{\text{sk}})$.⁶ When encrypting a message m , we encrypt it in the same way as the Malkin et al.’s scheme and prove that those ciphertext components are included in G_n by using PHF. Then, we encrypt them by Π_{cca} . When decrypting the ciphertext, we first retrieve csk and psk from $(\text{ct}, \text{ct}_{\text{sk}})$ and x using Decap , and decrypt the ciphertext using x, psk , and csk .

We can prove the \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA security of this scheme basically based on the triple mode proof framework. By doing the same process as Step (1) of the triple mode proof for Malkin et al.’s scheme, we can change the security game so that we can simulate answers to KDM queries using only $x \bmod n$. Moreover, due to the use of the projective hash function PHF, we can change the security game so that we can reply to decryption queries using only $x \bmod n$. Therefore, at this point, we do not need $x \bmod z$ to simulate the security game, and thus we can use the security of the SKEM. We now delete csk and psk from ct_{sk} using the security of the SKEM. Then, by using the security of Π_{cca} , we can accomplish Step (2) of the triple mode proof. Note that, similarly to the proof by Kitagawa and Tanaka [19], we estimate the probability that an adversary makes an “illegal” decryption query after Step (2) using the security of PHF.

2.6 Extension to the Multi-user Setting Using RKA Secure SKEM

The above overview of the proof considers KDM-CCA security in the single user setting. We can extend it to the multi-user setting. When considering KDM-CCA security in the multi-user setting, we modify the scheme so that we sample a secret key x from $[n \cdot z \cdot 2^\xi]$ such that $n \cdot z \cdot 2^\xi \leq N^{s-1}$. In the security proof, we sample a single x from $[n \cdot z]$ and generate the secret key x_i of the i -th user by sampling $\Delta_i \xleftarrow{r} [n \cdot z \cdot 2^\xi]$ and setting $x_i = x + \Delta_i$, where the addition is done over \mathbb{Z} . In this case, an affine function f of $x_1 \dots, x_\ell$ is also an affine function of only x whose coefficients are determined by those of f and $\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_\ell$. Moreover, the statistical distance between a secret key generated in this way and that generated honestly is at most $2^{-\xi}$. Then, we can proceed the security proof in the same way as above, except for the part using the security of the SKEM.

The secret key x_i of the i -th user is now generated as $x + \Delta_i$ by using a single source x . Thus, each user’s one-time key K_i used to hide the user’s (psk, csk) is

⁶ In the actual construction, we derive key pairs (csk, cpk) and (ppk, psk) using K as a random coin. This modification reduces the size of a public key.

derived from a single source x and a “shift” value Δ_i . Standard security notations do not capture such a situation.

To address this problem, we require a *security property against related key attacks (RKA security)* for SKEM. However, a very weak form of RKA security is sufficient to complete the proof. We show that such an RKA secure SKEM can be constructed based only on the DCR assumption. Therefore, we can prove the KDM-CCA security in the multi-user setting of our scheme based only on the DCR assumption and the IND-CCA security of the underlying PKE scheme.

2.7 Differences in Usage of RKA Secure Primitive with Han et al.

We note that the previous most efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes of Han et al. [12] (and the scheme of Lu et al. [22] on which the constructions of [12] are based), also use a “symmetric key” primitive that is “RKA secure”. Specifically, Han et al. use a primitive called *authenticated encryption with auxiliary-input* (AIAE, for short), for which they define confidentiality and integrity properties both under some appropriate forms of affine-RKA. Here, we highlight the differences between our proposed schemes and the schemes by Han et al. regarding the usage of a symmetric primitive with RKA security.

In our schemes, an RKA secure SKEM is used to derive the secret keys (psk, csk) of the underlying projective hash function and IND-CCA secure PKE scheme, and an SKEM ciphertext is put as part of a public key of the resulting scheme. In a modified security game considered in our security proofs, a KDM-CCA adversary sees multiple SKEM ciphertexts $\{\text{ct}_i\}$ (contained in the public keys initially given to the adversary), where each ct_i is computed by using $x + \Delta_i \bmod z$ as a secret key, where $\Delta_i \in [n \cdot z \cdot 2^\ell]$ is chosen uniformly at random. Consequently, an SKEM used as a building block in our proposed schemes needs to be secure only against “passive” addition-RKA, in which the shift values $\{\Delta_i\}$ are chosen randomly by the challenger (rather than by an RKA adversary). Such an SKEM is easy to construct, and we will show several simple and efficient instantiations based on the DCR assumption, the DDH assumption, and hash functions with some appropriate form of “correlation-robustness” [18,2].

On the contrary, in the Han et al.’s schemes, an AIAE ciphertext is directly contained as part of a ciphertext of the resulting scheme, and thus AIAE ciphertexts are exposed to a CCA. This is a main reason of the necessity of the integrity property for AIAE. Furthermore, in a modified security game considered in the security proofs of their schemes, a KDM-CCA adversary is able to observe multiple AIAE ciphertexts that are computed under secret keys that are derived via (some restricted from of) an affine function of a single (four-dimensional) vector of elements in \mathbb{Z}_N through affine/poly-KDM queries, and thus their AIAE scheme needs to be secure under standard “active” affine-RKA (where key derivation functions are chosen by an RKA adversary, rather than the challenger). Han et al.’s instantiation of AIAE is essentially the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme [20] used as a symmetric encryption scheme, which is why they require the DDH assumption in addition to the DCR assumption.

2.8 Tightness of Our Construction

Our construction can be tightly instantiated by using a tightly IND-CCA secure PKE scheme as a building block. In our security proof, we can accomplish Step (1) of the triple mode proof by applying the DCR assumption only once via the IV lemma [6]. In Step (2), we need only a single application of the IND-CCA security of the outer scheme by requiring IND-CCA security in the multi-challenge multi-user setting. Thus, if the underlying IND-CCA secure scheme satisfies tight security in the setting, this step is also tight. In the estimation of the probability of “illegal” decryption queries, we only use a statistical property, and thus we do not lose any factor to the underlying assumption. The remaining part of our proof is eliminating secret keys of projective hash function and IND-CCA secure PKE encrypted by SKEM from an adversary’s view. To make the entire proof tight, we have to accomplish this step tightly.

To achieve this, we show the RKA security of our SKEM can be tightly reduced to the underlying assumptions. Especially, in the proof of the DCR based construction, we show this using the IV lemma that is different from that we use in Step (1) of the triple mode proof. Namely, in this work, we use two flavors of the IV lemmas to make the security proof for the DCR-based instantiation tight.

To the best of our knowledge, prior to our work, the only way to construct tightly KDM-CCA secure PKE is instantiating the construction proposed by Camenisch et al. [7] using a tightly secure NIZK proof system such as that proposed by Hofheinz and Jager [15]. Schemes instantiated in such a way are not so practical and a ciphertext of them consists of $O(\lambda)$ group elements, where λ is the security parameter. We observe that the DDH-based construction of Kitagawa and Tanaka [19] can be tightly instantiated by using a tightly IND-CCA secure PKE scheme as a building block, though they did not state that explicitly. However, its ciphertext also consists of $O(\lambda)$ group elements. Thus, our schemes are the first tightly KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme whose ciphertext consists of a constant number of group elements.

3 Preliminaries

Here, we review basic notations, cryptographic primitives, and assumptions.

Notations. In this paper, $x \xleftarrow{r} X$ denotes choosing an element from a finite set X uniformly at random, and $y \leftarrow A(x)$ denotes assigning to y the output of an algorithm A on an input x . For an integer $\ell > 0$, $[\ell]$ denote the set of integers $\{1, \dots, \ell\}$. For a function f , $\text{Sup}(f)$ denotes the support of f . For a finite set S , $|S|$ denotes its cardinality, and \mathcal{U}_S denotes the uniform distribution over S .

λ denotes a security parameter. PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. A function $f(\lambda)$ is a negligible function if $f(\lambda)$ tends to 0 faster than $\frac{1}{\lambda^c}$ for every constant $c > 0$. We write $f(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ to denote $f(\lambda)$ being a negligible function.

Let X and Y be distributions over a set S . The *min-entropy* of X , denoted by $\mathbf{H}_\infty(X)$, is defined by $\mathbf{H}_\infty(X) := -\log_2 \max_{z \in S} \Pr[X = z]$. The *statistical distance* between X and Y , denoted by $\mathbf{SD}(X, Y)$, is defined by $\mathbf{SD}(X, Y) := \frac{1}{2} \sum_{z \in S} |\Pr[X = z] - \Pr[Y = z]|$. X and Y are said to be ϵ -close if $\mathbf{SD}(X, Y) \leq \epsilon$.

3.1 Assumptions

We review the algebraic structure and assumptions used in this paper.

Let $N = PQ$ be an RSA modulus with len -bit safe primes $P = 2p + 1$ and $Q = 2q + 1$ where p and q are also primes. Let $n = pq$. Throughout the paper, we assume $\text{len} \geq \lambda$, and we will frequently use the fact that $\mathbf{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[n]}, \mathbf{U}_{[\frac{N-1}{4}]}) = \frac{P+Q-2}{N-1} = O(2^{-\text{len}})$.

Let $s \geq 2$ be an integer and $T := 1 + N$. We can decompose $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ as the internal direct product $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_n \otimes G_2$, where $\langle -1 \rangle$ is the subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ generated by $-1 \bmod N^s$, and $G_{N^{s-1}}$, G_n , and G_2 are cyclic groups of order N^{s-1} , n , and 2, respectively. Note that $T = 1 + N \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ has order N^{s-1} and it generates $G_{N^{s-1}}$. In addition, we can generate a random generator of G_n by generating $\mu \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*$ and setting $g := \mu^{2N^{s-1}} \bmod N^s$. Then, g is a generator of G_n with overwhelming probability. We also note that the discrete logarithm (base T) is easy to compute in $G_{N^{s-1}}$.

Let $\mathbb{QR}_{N^s} := \{x^2 | x \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}^*\}$. Then, we have $\mathbb{QR}_{N^s} = G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$. We denote $\langle -1 \rangle \otimes \mathbb{QR}_{N^s}$ by \mathbb{J}_{N^s} . We can efficiently check the membership of \mathbb{J}_{N^s} by computing the Jacobi symbol with respect to N , without P and Q .

Let \mathbf{GGen} be an algorithm, which we call the DCR group generator, that given 1^λ and an integer $s \geq 2$, outputs $\text{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g)$, where N, P, Q , and T are defined as above, and g is a random generator of G_n .

We adopt the definition of the DCR assumption [25,10] used by Hofheinz [13].

Definition 1 (DCR assumption). *We say that the DCR assumption holds with respect to \mathbf{GGen} if for any integer $s \geq 2$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have $\text{Adv}_{s, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, g, g^r \bmod N^s) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(N, g, T \cdot g^r \bmod N^s) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, where $(N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \mathbf{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ and $r \xleftarrow{r} [n]$.*

We recall the *interactive vector game* [6].

Definition 2 (Interactive vector game). *Let $s \geq 2$ be an integer and ℓ be a polynomial of λ . We define the following $\text{IV}_{s, \ell}$ game between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} .*

1. *The challenger chooses a challenge bit $b \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$ and generates $(N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \mathbf{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$. If $\ell = 1$, the challenger sends N and $g_1 := g$ to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, the challenger generates $\alpha_i \xleftarrow{r} [\frac{N-1}{4}]$ and computes $g_i \leftarrow g^{\alpha_i} \bmod N^s$ for every $i \in [\ell]$, and sends N, g , and g_1, \dots, g_ℓ to \mathcal{A} .*
2. *\mathcal{A} can adaptively make sample queries.*

Sample queries \mathcal{A} sends $(a_1, \dots, a_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}^\ell$ to the challenger. The challenger generates $r \xleftarrow{r} [\frac{N-1}{4}]$ and computes $e_i \leftarrow T^{b \cdot a_i} \cdot g_i^r \bmod N^s$ for every $i \in [\ell]$. The challenger then returns (e_1, \dots, e_ℓ) to \mathcal{A} .

3. \mathcal{A} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

We say that $\text{IV}_{s,\ell}$ is hard if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have $\text{Adv}_{s,\ell,\mathcal{A}}^{\text{IV}}(\lambda) = 2 \cdot |\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

For any s and ℓ , $\text{IV}_{s,\ell}$ is hard under the DCR assumption [6,23]. We show the following lemmas related to $\text{IV}_{s,\ell}$ that are useful to prove the tight security of our constructions. The proofs of the lemmas are given in the full version.

Lemma 1. *Let $s \geq 2$ be an integer. Let \mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary that plays the $\text{IV}_{s,1}$ game and makes at most q_{iv} queries. Then, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} satisfying $\text{Adv}_{s,1,\mathcal{A}}^{\text{iv}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{s,\mathcal{B}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) + \frac{O(q_{\text{iv}})}{2^{\text{len}}}$.*

Lemma 2. *Let $s \geq 2$ be an integer. Let ℓ be a polynomial of λ . Let \mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary that plays the $\text{IV}_{s,\ell}$ game and makes exactly one sample query. Then, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} satisfying $\text{Adv}_{s,\ell,\mathcal{A}}^{\text{iv}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{s,\mathcal{B}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) + \frac{O(\ell)}{2^{\text{len}}}$.*

3.2 Projective Hash Function

We review the notion of *projective hash functions* (PHF) introduced by Cramer and Shoup [9] (which is also called *hash proof systems* in the literature). In this work, we will use PHFs defined with respect to the DCR group generator GGen .

Definition 3 (Projective hash function family). *A PHF family PHF with respect to GGen consists of a tuple $(\text{Setup}, \Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}, \Lambda, \mu, \text{Pub})$ with the following properties:*

- Setup is a PPT algorithm that takes $\text{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g)$ output by $\text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ (for some $s \geq 2$) as input, and outputs a public parameter pp that parameterizes the remaining components of PHF. (In the following, we always make the existence of pp implicit and suppress it from the notation.)
- $\Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}$, and \mathcal{K} are sets parameterized by pp (and also by param). Π_{yes} and Π_{no} form an NP-language,⁷ where for all $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$, there exists a witness r with which one can efficiently check the fact of $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$. An element in Π_{yes} (resp. Π_{no}) is called an *yes* (resp. *no*) instance. Furthermore, it is required that given pp , one can efficiently sample a uniformly random element from \mathcal{SK} .
- Λ is an efficiently computable (deterministic) hash function that takes a secret key $\text{sk} \in \mathcal{SK}$ and an yes or no instance $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}} \cup \Pi_{\text{no}}$ as input, and outputs a hash value $\pi \in \mathcal{K}$.
- μ is an efficiently computable (deterministic) projection map that takes a secret key $\text{sk} \in \mathcal{SK}$ as input, and outputs a public key $\text{pk} \in \mathcal{PK}$.
- Pub is an efficiently computable algorithm that takes a public key $\text{pk} \in \mathcal{PK}$, an yes instance $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$, and a witness r that $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$ as input, and outputs a hash value $\pi \in \mathcal{K}$.

⁷ Strictly speaking, since Π_{yes} and Π_{no} may not cover the entire input space of the function $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(\cdot)$ introduced below, they form an NP-promise problem.

- *Projective property:* For all $\text{sk} \in \mathcal{SK}$, the action of $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(\cdot)$ for yes instances $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$ is completely determined by $\text{pk} = \mu(\text{sk})$. Furthermore, for all $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$ and a corresponding witness r , it holds that $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c) = \text{Pub}(\mu(\text{sk}), c, r)$.

We next introduce the universal property for a PHF family. In this paper, we consider the statistical and computational variants. Our definition of the computational universal property is based on the “computational universal2” property for a hash proof system introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz [16]. We adapt their definition to the “universal1” case, and also relax the notion so that we only require that guessing a hash value for a no instance is hard, rather than requiring that a hash value of a no instance is pseudorandom.

Definition 4 (Statistical/computational universal). *Let $s \geq 2$, GGen be the DCR group generator, and $\text{PHF} = (\text{Setup}, \Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}, \Lambda, \mu, \text{Pub})$ be a PHF family with respect to GGen . We say that PHF is*

- ϵ -universal if for any param output by $\text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$, any pp output by $\text{Setup}(\text{param})$, any $\text{pk} \in \mathcal{PK}$, any $c \in \Pi_{\text{no}}$, and any $\pi \in \mathcal{K}$, we have

$$\Pr_{\text{sk} \leftarrow \mathcal{SK}} [\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c) = \pi | \mu(\text{sk}) = \text{pk}] \leq \epsilon . \quad (1)$$

Furthermore, we simply say that PHF is universal if it is ϵ -universal for some negligible function $\epsilon = \epsilon(\lambda)$.

- computationally universal if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{PHF}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cu}}(\lambda)$ in the following game played by \mathcal{A} and a challenger is negligible in λ :
 1. First, the challenger executes $\text{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ and $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\text{param})$. The challenger then chooses $\text{sk} \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{SK}$, and computes $\text{pk} \leftarrow \mu(\text{sk})$. Then, the challenger sends $(N, T, g, \text{pp}, \text{pk})$ to \mathcal{A} .
 2. \mathcal{A} can adaptively make evaluation queries.

Evaluation queries \mathcal{A} sends an yes or no instance $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}} \cup \Pi_{\text{no}}$ to the challenger. If $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$, the challenger returns $\pi \leftarrow \Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c)$ to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise (i.e. $c \in \Pi_{\text{no}}$), the challenger returns \perp to \mathcal{A} .
 3. \mathcal{A} outputs a pair $(c^*, \pi^*) \in \Pi_{\text{no}} \times \mathcal{K}$. The advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined by $\text{Adv}_{\text{PHF}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{cu}}(\lambda) := \Pr[\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c^*) = \pi^*]$.

Remark 1 (Statistical implies computational). It is not hard to see that the (statistical) universal property implies the computational one (even against computationally unbounded adversaries). To see this, recall that the projective property ensures that the action of $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(\cdot)$ for yes instances is determined by pk . Thus, the evaluation results $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c)$ for yes instances $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$ do not reveal the information of sk beyond the fact that $\text{pk} = \mu(\text{sk})$. Also, evaluation queries with no instances $c \in \Pi_{\text{no}}$ are answered with \perp . These imply that throughout the game, the information of sk does not leak to an adversary beyond what is already leaked from pk . Thus, at the point of outputting (c^*, π^*) , sk is uniformly distributed over the subset $\mathcal{SK}|_{\text{pk}} := \{\text{sk}' \in \mathcal{SK} | \mu(\text{sk}') = \text{pk}\}$ from an adversary’s viewpoint, which is exactly the distribution of sk in the probability defining the universal property. Hence, if a PHF family is ϵ -universal, the probability that $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c^*) = \pi^*$ occurs is upper bounded by ϵ .

3.3 Public Key Encryption

A public key encryption (PKE) scheme PKE is a four tuple (Setup, KG, Enc, Dec) of PPT algorithms. Let \mathcal{M} be the message space of PKE. The setup algorithm Setup, given a security parameter 1^λ , outputs a public parameter pp . The key generation algorithm KG, given a public parameter pp , outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk . The encryption algorithm Enc, given a public key pk and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, outputs a ciphertext CT. The decryption algorithm Dec, given a public key pk , a secret key sk , and a ciphertext CT, outputs a message $\tilde{m} \in \{\perp\} \cup \mathcal{M}$. As correctness, we require $\text{Dec}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)) = m$ for every $m \in \mathcal{M}$, $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, and $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KG}(\text{pp})$.

Next, we define key dependent message security against chosen ciphertext attacks (KDM-CCA security) for PKE.

Definition 5 (KDM-CCA security). *Let PKE be a PKE scheme, \mathcal{F} function family, and ℓ the number of keys. We define the \mathcal{F} -KDM-CCA game between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows. Let \mathcal{SK} and \mathcal{M} be the secret key space and message space of PKE, respectively.*

1. *The challenger chooses a challenge bit $b \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$ and generates $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and ℓ key pairs $(\text{pk}_k, \text{sk}_k) \leftarrow \text{KG}(\text{pp})$ ($k \in [\ell]$). The challenger sets $\text{sk} := (\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_\ell)$ and sends $(\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_\ell)$ to \mathcal{A} . Finally, the challenger prepares a list L_{kdm} which is initially empty.*
2. *\mathcal{A} may adaptively make the following queries polynomially many times.*

KDM queries \mathcal{A} sends $(j, f^0, f^1) \in [\ell] \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{F}$ to the challenger. We require that f^0 and f^1 be functions such that $f : \mathcal{SK}^\ell \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$. The challenger returns $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, f^b(\text{sk}))$ to \mathcal{A} . Finally, the challenger adds (j, CT) to L_{kdm} .

Decryption queries \mathcal{A} sends (j, CT) to the challenger. If $(j, \text{CT}) \in L_{\text{kdm}}$, the challenger returns \perp to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, the challenger returns $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j, \text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. *\mathcal{A} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.*

We say that PKE is \mathcal{F} -KDM-CCA secure if for any polynomial $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{F}, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{kdmcca}}(\lambda) = 2 \cdot |\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

The above definition is slightly different from the standard definition where an adversary is required to distinguish encryptions of $f(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_\ell)$ from encryptions of some fixed message. However, the two definitions are equivalent if the function class \mathcal{F} contains a constant function, and this is the case for affine functions and polynomials treated in this paper.

The definition of IND-CCA security (in the multi-user/challenge setting) is recovered by restricting the functions used in KDM queries in the KDM-CCA game to constant functions, and thus we omit the description of the security game for it. We denote an adversary \mathcal{A} 's IND-CCA advantage by $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda)$.

4 Symmetric KEM and Passive RKA Security

In our proposed PKE schemes, we will use a secret key variant of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) satisfying a weak form of RKA security with respect to addition, as one of the main building blocks. Since several instantiations for this building block from various assumptions are possible, in this section we formalize it as a stand-alone primitive called *symmetric KEM (SKEM)*, together with its RKA security in the form we use in the security proofs of the proposed PKE schemes.

4.1 Definition

We first give the formal syntax and functional requirements of an SKEM, and then give some remarks.

Definition 6 (Symmetric key encapsulation mechanism). *An SKEM SKEM is a three tuple (Setup, Encap, Decap) of PPT algorithms.*

- The setup algorithm **Setup**, given a security parameter 1^λ , outputs a public parameter \mathbf{pp} and a pair of natural numbers (z, \tilde{z}) , where z represents the size of the secret key space, and the secret key space is $[z]$, and \tilde{z} is an approximation of z . We assume that \tilde{z} (but not necessarily z) can be efficiently derived from \mathbf{pp} . We also assume that \mathbf{pp} specifies the session-key space \mathcal{K} .
- The encapsulation algorithm **Encap**, given a public parameter \mathbf{pp} and a secret key $\mathbf{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}$, outputs a ciphertext \mathbf{ct} and a session-key $\mathbf{K} \in \mathcal{K}$.
- The decapsulation algorithm **Decap**, given a public parameter \mathbf{pp} , a secret key $\mathbf{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}$, and a ciphertext \mathbf{ct} , outputs a session-key $\mathbf{K} \in \mathcal{K}$.

As the functional (syntactical) requirements, we require the following three properties to hold for all $(\mathbf{pp}, z, \tilde{z}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$:

1. (Approximate samplability of secret keys:) $\mathbf{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[z]}, \mathbf{U}_{[\tilde{z}]}) \leq O(2^{-\lambda})$ holds.
2. (Correctness of decapsulation:) $\text{Decap}(\mathbf{pp}, \mathbf{sk} \bmod z, \mathbf{ct}) = \mathbf{K}$ holds for every $\mathbf{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $(\mathbf{ct}, \mathbf{K}) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(\mathbf{pp}, \mathbf{sk})$.
3. (Implicit modular-reduction in encapsulation:) $\text{Encap}(\mathbf{pp}, \mathbf{sk}; r) = \text{Encap}(\mathbf{pp}, \mathbf{sk} \bmod z; r)$ holds for every $\mathbf{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}$ and randomness r for **Encap**.

Remark 2 (On the syntax and functional requirements).

- As mentioned above, when $(\mathbf{pp}, z, \tilde{z})$ is output by **Setup**(1^λ), the secret key space under \mathbf{pp} is $[z]$. For security reasons, however, in some constructions, the exact order z cannot be made public even for an entity executing **Encap** and **Decap**. (In particular, this is the case in our concrete instantiation from the DCR assumption, in which we set $z = \frac{\phi(N)}{4}$ and $\tilde{z} = \frac{N-1}{4}$.) Hence, we instead require its approximation \tilde{z} to be public via \mathbf{pp} .
- We allow **Encap** and **Decap** to take any integer $\mathbf{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}$ (rather than $\mathbf{sk} \in [z]$ or $\mathbf{sk} \in [\tilde{z}]$) as a secret key, but their “correctness guarantees” expressed by the second and third items of the functional requirements, are with respect to the modular-reduced value $\mathbf{sk} \bmod z$. Such flexible interface is convenient when an SKEM is used as a building block in the proposed PKE schemes.

- The third item in the functional requirements ensures that a ciphertext/session-key pair (ct, K) generated by using $\text{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}$ does not leak the information of sk beyond $\text{sk} \bmod z$. This property plays an important role in the security proofs of our proposed PKE schemes.
- Note that an SKEM can satisfy our syntactical and functional requirements even if its ciphertext is empty. (Say , Encap and Decap output some deterministic function of pp and $\text{sk} \bmod \tilde{z}$.)

In the following, we give the formalization of passive RKA security. It is essentially the definition of the same name defined for symmetric encryption by Applebaum, Harnik, and Ishai [2], with the slight difference that we allow an adversary to specify the upper bound B of the interval from which key-shifting values $\{\Delta_k\}$ are chosen randomly by the challenger.

Definition 7 (Passive RKA security). *Let $\text{SKEM} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ be an SKEM, and let ℓ be a natural number. Consider the following game between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} :*

1. *First, the challenger chooses a challenge bit $b \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$ and generates $(\text{pp}, z, \tilde{z}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$. Then, the challenger sends \tilde{z} to \mathcal{A} .*
2. *\mathcal{A} sends an integer $B \geq \tilde{z}$ specifying the upper bound of the interval from which key-shifting values $\{\Delta_k\}_{k \in [\ell]}$ are chosen, to the challenger.*
3. *The challenger samples $\text{sk} \xleftarrow{r} [z]$ and $\Delta_k \xleftarrow{r} [B]$ for every $k \in [\ell]$. Then, the challenger computes $(\text{ct}_k, \text{K}_k^1) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(\text{pp}, \text{sk} + \Delta_k)$ ⁸ and also samples $\text{K}_k^0 \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$ for every $k \in [\ell]$. Finally, the challenger sends pp , $(\Delta_k)_{k \in [\ell]}$, and $(\text{ct}_k, \text{K}_k^b)_{k \in [\ell]}$ to \mathcal{A} .*
4. *\mathcal{A} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.*

We say that SKEM is passively RKA secure, if for any polynomial $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have $\text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) = 2 \cdot |\Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Remark 3 (Stretching a session-key with a pseudorandom generator). From the definition, it is easy to see that a session-key of an SKEM can be stretched by using a pseudorandom generator (PRG) while preserving its passive RKA security. More specifically, let $\text{SKEM} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ be an SKEM with session-key space \mathcal{K} , and let $\text{PRG} : \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}'$ be a PRG such that $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{K}'|$. Let $\text{SKEM}' = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encap}', \text{Decap}')$ be the SKEM with session-key space \mathcal{K}' that is obtained by naturally composing SKEM with PRG, namely, $\text{Encap}'(\text{pp}, \text{sk})$ runs $(\text{ct}, \text{K}) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(\text{pp}, \text{sk})$ and outputs $(\text{ct}, \text{PRG}(\text{K}))$, and $\text{Decap}'(\text{pp}, \text{sk}, \text{ct}) := \text{PRG}(\text{Decap}(\text{pp}, \text{sk}, \text{ct}))$. Then, if SKEM is passively RKA secure and PRG is a secure PRG, then SKEM' is also passively RKA secure. Moreover, if the passive RKA security of SKEM is tightly reduced to some assumption and the multi-instance version of the security of PRG is also tightly reduced to the same assumption, then so is the passive RKA security of SKEM'. (Since the proof is straightforward, we omit a formal proof of this simple fact.) Note that we can easily construct tightly secure PRG based on the DDH or DCR assumption.

⁸ The addition $\text{sk} + \Delta_k$ is done over \mathbb{Z} .

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) :$ $(N', P', Q', T', g') \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ $H \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{H}$ $\text{pp} \leftarrow (N', T', g', H)$ $\text{Return } (\text{pp}, z := \frac{\phi(N')}{4}, \tilde{z} := \frac{N'-1}{4}).$	$\text{Encap}(\text{pp}, \text{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}) :$ $(N', T', g', H) \leftarrow \text{pp}$ $\alpha \xleftarrow{r} [\frac{N'-1}{4}]$ $\text{ct} \leftarrow g'^{\alpha^4} \bmod N'^s$ $\text{K} \leftarrow H(\text{ct}^{\text{sk}} \bmod N'^s)$ $\text{Return } (\text{ct}, \text{K}).$	$\text{Decap}(\text{pp}, \text{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}, \text{ct}) :$ $(N', T', g', H) \leftarrow \text{pp}$ $\text{K} \leftarrow H(\text{ct}^{\text{sk}} \bmod N'^s)$ $\text{Return K}.$
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Fig. 4. The DCR-based instantiation of an SKEM.

4.2 Concrete Instantiations

Our definition of passive RKA security for an SKEM is sufficiently weak so that simple and efficient constructions are possible from the DCR or DDH assumption, which are essentially the symmetric-key version of the ElGamal KEM. We can also realize it from a hash function satisfying an appropriate form of “correlation robustness” [18,2]. We only give a concrete instantiation based on the DCR assumption here. The other instantiations are given in the full version.

Let $s \geq 2$, GGen be the DCR group generator, and $\mathcal{H} = \{H : \{0, 1\}^{2s \cdot \text{len}} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}\}$ be a universal hash family. Then, we can construct an SKEM $\text{SKEM} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ whose session-key space is \mathcal{K} , as described in Figure 4.⁹

It is obvious to see that SKEM satisfies the three functional requirements of SKEM. Specifically, let $(\text{pp}, z, \tilde{z})$ be output by Setup . Then, we have $\text{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[z]}, \mathbf{U}_{[\tilde{z}]}) = \text{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[\frac{\phi(N')}{4}]}, \mathbf{U}_{[\frac{N'-1}{4}]}) = O(2^{-\text{len}}) \leq O(2^{-\lambda})$. The other two properties of the functional requirements are also satisfied due to the fact that in Encap and Decap , a secret key is treated only in the exponent of elements in $G_{n'}$ (where $n' = (P' - 1)(Q' - 1)/4$, and $G_{n'}$ is the subgroup of $Z_{N'^s}^*$ of order n').

The passive RKA security of SKEM is guaranteed by the following lemma, which is proved via Lemma 2 and the leftover hash lemma. We provide the formal proof in the full version.

Lemma 3. *If the DCR assumption holds with respect to GGen , and $\epsilon_{\text{LHL}} := \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{2^{-(s-1) \cdot (2^{\text{len}-1)}} \cdot |\mathcal{K}|} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, then SKEM is passively RKA secure.*

Specifically, for any polynomial $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that attacks the passive RKA security of SKEM, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} such that $\text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{s, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) + \ell \cdot (\epsilon_{\text{LHL}} + O(2^{-\text{len}}))$.

5 KDM-CCA Secure PKE with respect to Affine Functions

In this section, we show a PKE scheme that is KDM-CCA secure with respect to affine functions based on the DCR assumption.

We first specify the *DCR language* with respect to which the underlying PHF family used in our proposed scheme is considered. Then, we give our proposed

⁹ Since the RSA modulus used in the SKEM has to be generated independently of that in the main constructions presented in Sections 5 and 6, here we use characters with a prime (e.g. N') for values in param .

$\text{Setup}_{\text{aff}}(1^\lambda) :$ $\text{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{phf}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{phf}}(\text{param})$ $(\text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, z, \tilde{z}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{skem}}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{cca}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{cca}}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{aff}} \leftarrow (N, T, g, \text{pp}_{\text{phf}}, \text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, \text{pp}_{\text{cca}})$ Return pp_{aff} .	$\text{KG}_{\text{aff}}(\text{pp}_{\text{aff}}) :$ $(N, T, g, \text{pp}_{\text{phf}}, \text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, \text{pp}_{\text{cca}}) \leftarrow \text{pp}_{\text{aff}}$ $x \xleftarrow{r} [\frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \tilde{z} \cdot 2^\xi]$ $(\text{ct}, \text{K}) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(\text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, x)$ Parse K as $(r^{\text{KG}}, \text{psk}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$. $h \leftarrow g^{2x} \bmod N^s$ $\text{ppk} \leftarrow \mu(\text{psk})$ $(\text{cpk}, \text{csk}) \leftarrow \text{KG}_{\text{cca}}(\text{pp}_{\text{cca}}; r^{\text{KG}})$ Return $\text{PK} := (h, \text{ct}, \text{ppk}, \text{cpk})$ and $\text{SK} := x$.
$\text{Enc}_{\text{aff}}(\text{PK}, m \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}) :$ $(h, \text{ct}, \text{ppk}, \text{cpk}) \leftarrow \text{PK}$ $r \xleftarrow{r} [\frac{N-1}{4}]$ $u \leftarrow g^r \bmod N^s$ $v \leftarrow T^m \cdot h^r \bmod N^s$ $\pi \leftarrow \text{Pub}(\text{ppk}, u^2 \bmod N^s, 2r)$ $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}, (u, v, \pi))$ Return CT .	$\text{Dec}_{\text{aff}}(\text{PK}, \text{SK}, \text{CT}) :$ $(h, \text{ct}, \text{ppk}, \text{cpk}) \leftarrow \text{PK}; x \leftarrow \text{SK}$ $\text{K} \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, x, \text{ct})$ Parse K as $(r^{\text{KG}}, \text{psk}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$. $(\text{cpk}, \text{csk}) \leftarrow \text{KG}_{\text{cca}}(\text{pp}_{\text{cca}}; r^{\text{KG}})$ $(u, v, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}, \text{csk}, \text{CT})$ If $(u, v) \notin \mathbb{J}_{N^s}^2$ then return \perp . If $\pi \neq \Lambda_{\text{psk}}(u^2 \bmod N^s)$ then return \perp . Return $m \leftarrow \log_T(v \cdot u^{-2x} \bmod N^s)$.

Fig. 5. The proposed KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme Π_{aff} with respect to affine functions. (The public parameter pp_{aff} is omitted from the inputs to Enc_{aff} and Dec_{aff} .)

PKE scheme in Section 5.1. We also give two instantiations for the underlying PHF family, the first one in Section 5.2 and the second one in Section 5.3.

DCR language. Let $s \geq 2$, GGen be the DCR group generator, and $\text{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$. The set of yes instances Π_{yes} is the subgroup G_n of \mathbb{J}_{N^s} , and the set of no instances Π_{no} is $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n \setminus G_n$. Note that we can represent any yes instance $c \in G_n$ as $c = g^r \bmod N^s$, where $r \in \mathbb{Z}$. Thus, such r works as a witness for $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$.

5.1 Proposed PKE Scheme

Let $s \geq 2$, and GGen be the DCR group generator. Let $\Pi_{\text{cca}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{cca}}, \text{KG}_{\text{cca}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}})$ be a PKE scheme such that the randomness space of KG_{cca} is \mathcal{R}^{KG} . Let $\text{PHF} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{phf}}, \Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}, \Lambda, \mu, \text{Pub})$ be a PHF family with respect to GGen for the DCR language (defined as above). Let $\text{SKEM} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{skem}}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ be an SKEM whose session key space is $\mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$.¹⁰ Finally, let $\xi = \xi(\lambda)$ be any polynomial such that $2^{-\xi} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Using these building blocks, our proposed PKE scheme $\Pi_{\text{aff}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{aff}}, \text{KG}_{\text{aff}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{aff}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{aff}})$ is constructed as described in Figure 5. The plaintext space of Π_{aff} is $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$, where N is the modulus generated in $\text{Setup}_{\text{aff}}$.

The correctness of Π_{aff} follows from that of SKEM and Π_{cca} , and the projective property of PHF.

¹⁰ Strictly speaking, the concrete format of \mathcal{SK} could be dependent on a public parameter pp_{phf} of PHF. However, as noted in Remark 3, the session-key space of an SKEM can be flexibly adjusted by using a pseudorandom generator. Hence, for simplicity we assume that such an adjustment of the spaces is applied.

We note that although our scheme has correctness and can be proved secure for any $s \geq 2$, the plaintext space of our scheme is $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$, and thus if $s = 2$, then the plaintext space \mathbb{Z}_N becomes smaller than the secret key space $[\frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \tilde{z} \cdot 2^\xi]$, in which case KDM security for affine functions does not even capture circular security. (Malkin et al.’s scheme [23] has exactly the same issue.) If $\tilde{z} \cdot 2^\xi$ is smaller than N , then the secret key space can be contained in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2} , in which case $s \geq 3$ is sufficient in practice.¹¹

We also note that even if the building block SKEM SKEM and/or PKE scheme Π_{cca} are instantiated also from the DCR assumption (or any other factoring-related assumption), the DCR groups formed by (N, T, g) in pp_{aff} should not be shared with those used in SKEM and/or Π_{cca} . This is because in our security proof, the reduction algorithms for SKEM and Π_{cca} will use the information of P and Q behind N . (See our security proof below.) We also remark that in our construction, N has to be generated by a trusted party, or by users jointly via some secure computation protocol, so that no user knows its factorization. (The same applies to our DCR-based SKEM.) This is the same setting as in the previous DCR-based (KDM-)CCA secure PKE schemes [23,12,14].

Before proving the KDM-CCA security of Π_{aff} , we also note the difference between the “inner scheme” of Π_{aff} and Malkin et al.’s scheme [23]. Although these schemes are essentially the same, there is a subtle difference. Specifically, when generating h contained in PK of Π_{aff} , we generate it as $h \leftarrow g^{2^x} \bmod N^s$ while it is generated as $h \leftarrow g^x \bmod N^s$ in Malkin et al.’s scheme. Moreover, such additional squarings are performed on u in the decryption procedure of our scheme. By these additional squarings, if it is guaranteed that an element u appearing in the decryption procedure belongs to $\mathbb{J}_{N^s} = G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_n$, it can be converted to an element in $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$. Thus, we can consider a PHF family on $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$ rather than $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_n$, and as a result, we need not worry about a case that an adversary for Π_{aff} may learn $x \bmod 2$ through decryption queries. This helps us to simplify the security proof. Note that we cannot explicitly require that group elements contained in a ciphertext be elements in $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$ since it is not known how to efficiently check the membership in $G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$ without the factorization of N , while we can efficiently check the membership in \mathbb{J}_{N^s} using only N .

KDM-CCA security. Let ℓ be the number of keys in the security game. We will show that Π_{aff} is KDM-CCA secure with respect to the function family \mathcal{F}_{aff} consisting of functions described as

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_\ell) = \sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k x_k + a_0 \bmod N^{s-1} ,$$

where $a_0, \dots, a_\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$. Formally, we prove the following theorem.

¹¹ Actually, if $s = 3$ and our DCR-based instantiation in Section 4.2 is used as the underlying SKEM, then the RSA modulus N generated at the setup of our PKE construction has to be ξ -bit larger than the RSA modulus generated at the setup of SKEM to satisfy $[\frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \tilde{z} \cdot 2^\xi] \subset \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$. We do not need this special treatment if $s \geq 4$.

Theorem 1. *Assume that the DCR assumption holds with respect to GGen, SKEM is passively RKA secure, PHF is computationally universal, and Π_{cca} is IND-CCA secure. Then, Π_{aff} is \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure.*

Specifically, for any polynomial $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that attacks the \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA security of Π_{aff} and makes $q_{\text{kdm}} = q_{\text{kdm}}(\lambda)$ KDM queries and $q_{\text{dec}} = q_{\text{dec}}(\lambda)$ decryption queries, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{dcr} , \mathcal{B}_{rka} , $\mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}$, \mathcal{B}_{cca} , $\mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}$, and \mathcal{B}_{cu} such that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{aff}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{kdmcca}}(\lambda) &\leq 2 \cdot \left(2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{s, \mathcal{B}_{\text{dcr}}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{rka}}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{cca}}, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cca}}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{cca}}, \ell, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda) + \ell \cdot (q_{\text{dec}} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PHF}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cu}}}^{\text{cu}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\xi}) \right) \\ &\quad + O(q_{\text{kdm}} \cdot 2^{-\ell n}) + O(2^{-\lambda}). \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Remark 4 (Tightness of the reduction). Note that our reductions to the DCR assumption and the security of the building blocks are tight, except for the reduction to the computational universal property of the underlying PHF family PHF, which has the factor $\ell \cdot q_{\text{dec}}$. However, if PHF satisfies the *statistical* universal property, the term $\text{Adv}_{\text{PHF}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cu}}}^{\text{cu}}(\lambda)$ can be replaced with a negligible function that is independent of a computational assumption, and thus our reduction becomes fully tight. Hence, if we use an SKEM and an IND-CCA PKE scheme with a tight security reduction to the DCR assumption (or another assumption A), the overall reduction to the DCR(& A) assumption becomes fully tight as well.

Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed the proof via a sequence of games argument using 8 games (Game 0 to Game 7). For every $t \in \{0, \dots, 7\}$, let SUC_t be the event that \mathcal{A} succeeds in guessing the challenge bit b in Game t . Our goal is to upper bound every term appearing in $\text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{aff}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{aff}}, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{kdmcca}}(\lambda) = 2 \cdot |\Pr[\text{SUC}_0] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq 2 \cdot \sum_{t \in \{0, \dots, 6\}} |\Pr[\text{SUC}_t] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_{t+1}]| + 2 \cdot |\Pr[\text{SUC}_7] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

Game 0: This is the original \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA game regarding Π_{aff} .

Game 1: Same as Game 0, except for how KDM queries are replied. When \mathcal{A} makes a KDM query $(j, (a_0^0, \dots, a_\ell^0), (a_0^1, \dots, a_\ell^1))$, the challenger generates v and π respectively by $v \leftarrow T^m \cdot u^{2x_j} \bmod N^s$ and $\pi \leftarrow A_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s)$, instead of $v \leftarrow T^m \cdot h_j^r \bmod N^s$ and $\pi \leftarrow \text{Pub}(\text{ppk}_j, u^2 \bmod N^s, 2r)$, where $r \leftarrow^r \lfloor \frac{N-1}{4} \rfloor$ and $u = g^r \bmod N^s$.

v is generated identically in both games. Moreover, by the projective property of PHF, $A_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s) = \text{Pub}(\text{ppk}_j, u^2 \bmod N^s, 2r)$ holds, and thus π is also generated identically in both games. Hence, we have $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_0] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_1]| = 0$.

Game 2: Same as Game 1, except for how the challenger generates $\{x_k\}_{k \in [\ell]}$.

The challenger first generates $x \leftarrow^r \lfloor \frac{N-1}{4} \rfloor \cdot \tilde{z}$. Then, for every $k \in [\ell]$, the challenger generates $\Delta_k \leftarrow^r \lfloor \frac{N-1}{4} \rfloor \cdot \tilde{z} \cdot 2^\xi$ and computes $x_k \leftarrow x + \Delta_k$, where the addition is done over \mathbb{Z} .

$|\Pr[\text{SUC}_1] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_2]| \leq \ell \cdot 2^{-\xi}$ holds since the distribution of x_k in Game 2 and that in Game 1 are $2^{-\xi}$ -close for every $k \in [\ell]$.

Next, we will change the game so that we can respond to KDM queries made by \mathcal{A} using only $x \bmod n = x \bmod \frac{\phi(N)}{4}$. To this end, we make some preparation. Observe that in Game 2, the answer to a KDM query $(j, (a_0^0, \dots, a_\ell^0), (a_0^1, \dots, a_\ell^1))$ is $\text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, (u, v, \pi))$, where

$$u = g^r \bmod N^s, v = T^{\sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b x_k + a_0^b} \cdot u^{2x_j} \bmod N^s, \pi = \Lambda_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s),$$

and $r \leftarrow \left[\frac{N-1}{4} \right]$. We also have

$$\sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b x_k + a_0^b = \sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b (x + \Delta_k) + a_0^b = \left(\sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b \right) x + \sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b \Delta_k + a_0^b,$$

where the addition is done over \mathbb{Z} . Thus, by defining

$$A^b = \sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b \quad \text{and} \quad B^b = \sum_{k \in [\ell]} a_k^b \Delta_k + a_0^b, \quad (3)$$

we have $v = T^{A^b x + B^b} \cdot u^{2x_j} \bmod N^s = T^{A^b x + B^b} \cdot (g^r)^{2x_j} \bmod N^s$. Note that A^b and B^b are computed only from (a_0^b, \dots, a_ℓ^b) and $\{\Delta_k\}_{k \in [\ell]}$.

Game 3: Same as Game 2, except that for a KDM query $(j, (a_0^0, \dots, a_\ell^0), (a_0^1, \dots, a_\ell^1))$ made by \mathcal{A} , the challenger responds as follows. (The difference from Game 2 is only in Step 3.)

1. Compute A^b and B^b as in Equation 3.
2. Generate $r \leftarrow \left[\frac{N-1}{4} \right]$.
3. Compute $u \leftarrow T^{-\frac{A^b}{2}} \cdot g^r \bmod N^s$.
4. Compute $v \leftarrow T^{A^b x + B^b} \cdot u^{2x_j} \bmod N^s$.
5. Compute $\pi \leftarrow \Lambda_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s)$.
6. Return $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, (u, v, \pi))$ and add (j, CT) to L_{kdm} .

Under the hardness of $\text{IV}_{s,1}$, the distributions of $g^r \bmod N^s$ and $T^{-\frac{A^b}{2}} \cdot g^r \bmod N^s$ are computationally indistinguishable. More specifically, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_v that makes q_{kdm} sample queries in the $\text{IV}_{s,1}$ game and satisfies $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_2] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_3]| = \text{Adv}_{s,1,\mathcal{B}_v}^{\text{iv}}(\lambda)$. Due to Lemma 1, this means that there exists another PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_{dcr} such that $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_2] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_3]| \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{s,\mathcal{B}_{\text{dcr}}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) + O(q_{\text{kdm}} \cdot 2^{-\text{len}})$.

In Game 3, the answer to a KDM query $(j, (a_0^0, \dots, a_\ell^0), (a_0^1, \dots, a_\ell^1))$ is $\text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, (u, v, \pi))$, where

$$\begin{aligned} u &= T^{-\frac{A^b}{2}} \cdot g^r \bmod N^s, \\ v &= T^{A^b x + B^b} \cdot u^{2x_j} \bmod N^s = T^{B^b - A^b \Delta_j} \cdot g^{2r(x \bmod n)} \cdot g^{2r \Delta_j} \bmod N^s, \\ \pi &= \Lambda_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s), \end{aligned}$$

$r \xleftarrow{r} \lceil \frac{N-1}{4} \rceil$, and A^b and B^b are computed as in Equation 3. Thus, we can reply to a KDM query made by \mathcal{A} using only $x \bmod n = x \bmod \frac{\phi(N)}{4}$.

We next change how decryption queries made by \mathcal{A} are replied.

Game 4: Same as Game 3, except for how the challenger responds to decryption queries made by \mathcal{A} . For a decryption query (j, CT) made by \mathcal{A} , the challenger returns \perp to \mathcal{A} if $(j, \text{CT}) \in L_{\text{kdm}}$, and otherwise responds as follows. (The difference from Game 3 is adding Step 2 to the procedure.)

1. Compute $(u, v, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, \text{csk}_j, \text{CT})$. If $(u, v) \notin \mathbb{J}_{N^s}^2$, return \perp . Otherwise, compute as follows.
2. If $u \notin \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_n$, return \perp . Otherwise, compute as follows.
3. Return \perp if $\pi \neq \Lambda_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s)$ and $m \leftarrow \log_T(v \cdot u^{-2x_j} \bmod N^s)$ otherwise.

We define the following event in Game $i \in \{4, 5, 6, 7\}$.

BDQ_i: \mathcal{A} makes a decryption query $(j, \text{CT}) \notin L_{\text{kdm}}$ which satisfies the following conditions, where $(u, v, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, \text{csk}_j, \text{CT})$.

- $(u, v) \in \mathbb{J}_{N^s}^2$.
- $u \notin \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_n$. Note that $\mathbb{J}_{N^s} = \langle -1 \rangle \otimes G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$.
- $\pi = \Lambda_{\text{psk}_j}(u^2 \bmod N^s)$.

We call such a decryption query a “**bad decryption query**”.

Games 3 and 4 are identical unless \mathcal{A} makes a bad decryption query in each game. Therefore, we have $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_3] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_4]| \leq \Pr[\text{BDQ}_4]$. Combining this with the triangle inequality, we will also bound the terms in $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_3] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_4]| \leq \sum_{t \in \{4, 5, 6\}} |\Pr[\text{BDQ}_t] - \Pr[\text{BDQ}_{t+1}]| + \Pr[\text{BDQ}_7]$.

We let (j, CT) be a decryption query made by \mathcal{A} . We also let $(u, v, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, \text{csk}_j, \text{CT})$. If the query is not a bad decryption query and $u \in \mathbb{J}_{N^s}$, then $(u^2 \bmod N^s) \in G_n$. Thus,

$$u^{2x_j} \bmod N^s = (u^2)^{x + \Delta_j} \bmod N^s = (u^2 \bmod N^s)^{(x \bmod n)} \cdot u^{2\Delta_j} \bmod N^s .$$

Thus, if the query is not a bad decryption query, the answer to it can be computed by using only $x \bmod n$.

Furthermore, recall that due to the “implicit modular-reduction in encapsulation” property of SKEM, for every $k \in [\ell]$, the SKEM-ciphertext/session-key pair $(\text{ct}_k, \text{K}_k)$ computed for generating the k -th public key PK_k at the initial phase, can be generated by using only $x_k \bmod z = x + \Delta_k \bmod z$.

Hence, due to the change in Game 4, now we have done the preparation for “decomposing” x into its “mod n ”-component and its “mod z ”-component.

Game 5: Same as Game 4, except that the challenger generates $\hat{x} \xleftarrow{r} [n]$ and $\bar{x} \xleftarrow{r} [z]$ and then uses them for $x \bmod n$ and $x \bmod z$, respectively.

Note that when $x \xleftarrow{r} \lceil \frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \tilde{z} \rceil$, the statistical distance between $(x \bmod n, x \bmod z)$ and $(\hat{x} \bmod n, \bar{x} \bmod z)$ is bounded by $\mathbf{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{\lceil \frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \tilde{z} \rceil}, \mathbf{U}_{[n \cdot z]})$, because

if $x \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} [n \cdot z]$, then the distribution of $(x \bmod n, x \bmod z)$ and that of $(\hat{x} \bmod n, \bar{x} \bmod z)$ are identical due to the Chinese remainder theorem.¹² Note also that $\mathbf{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[\frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \bar{z}]}, \mathbf{U}_{[n \cdot z]}) \leq \mathbf{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[\frac{N-1}{4}], \mathbf{U}_{[n]}) + \mathbf{SD}(\mathbf{U}_{[\bar{z}]}, \mathbf{U}_{[z]})$. Here, the former statistical distance is $\frac{P+Q-2}{N-1} = O(2^{-\text{len}}) \leq O(2^{-\lambda})$, and the latter statistical distance is bounded by $O(2^{-\lambda})$ due to the “approximate samplability of a secret key” property of SKEM. Hence, we have $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_4] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_5]| \leq O(2^{-\lambda})$ and $|\Pr[\text{BDQ}_4] - \Pr[\text{BDQ}_5]| \leq O(2^{-\lambda})$.

Game 6: Same as Game 5, except that for every $k \in [\ell]$, the challenger generates $\mathbf{K}_k \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$ from which $r_k^{\text{KG}} \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}}$ and $\text{psk}_k \in \mathcal{SK}$ are generated, instead of using \mathbf{K}_k associated with ct_k .

By the passive RKA security of SKEM, the view of \mathcal{A} in Game 6 is indistinguishable from that of Game 5. Namely, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{rka} and $\mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}$ that attack the passive RKA security of SKEM so that $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_5] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_6]| = \text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{rka}}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda)$ and $|\Pr[\text{BDQ}_5] - \Pr[\text{BDQ}_6]| = \text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda)$ hold, respectively. We provide the descriptions of them in the full version.

Game 7: Same as Game 6, except that the challenger responds to KDM queries (j, CT) made by \mathcal{A} with $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}_j, (0, 0, 0))$.

We can consider straightforward reductions to the security of the underlying PKE scheme Π_{cca} for bounding $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_6] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_7]|$ and $|\Pr[\text{BDQ}_6] - \Pr[\text{BDQ}_7]|$. Note that the reduction algorithms can check whether \mathcal{A} makes a bad decryption query or not by using decryption queries for Π_{cca} , and $\phi(N)$ and $\{\text{psk}_k\}_{k \in [\ell]}$ that could be generated by the reductions themselves. Thus, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{cca} and $\mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}$ such that $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_6] - \Pr[\text{SUC}_7]| = \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{cca}}, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cca}}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda)$ and $|\Pr[\text{BDQ}_6] - \Pr[\text{BDQ}_7]| = \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{cca}}, \ell, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda)$.

In Game 7, the challenge bit b is information-theoretically hidden from the view of \mathcal{A} . Thus, we have $|\Pr[\text{SUC}_7] - \frac{1}{2}| = 0$.

Finally, $\Pr[\text{BDQ}_7]$ is bounded by the computational universal property of PHF. More specifically, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_{cu} such that $\Pr[\text{BDQ}_7] \leq \ell \cdot q_{\text{dec}} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PHF}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cu}}}^{\text{cu}}(\lambda) + O(2^{-\text{len}})$. We provide the description of \mathcal{B}_{cu} in the full version.

From the above arguments, we conclude that there exist PPT adversaries $\mathcal{B}_{\text{dcr}}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{rka}}, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cca}}, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}$, and \mathcal{B}_{cu} satisfying Equation 2. \square (**Theorem 1**)

5.2 Basic Construction of Projective Hash Function

For the PHF family for the DCR language used in our construction Π_{aff} , we provide two instantiations: the basic construction PHF_{aff} that achieves the statistical universal property in this subsection, and its “space-efficient” variant $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ that achieves only the computational universal property in the next subsection.

¹² Here, we are implicitly assuming that $n = pq$ and z are relatively prime. This occurs with overwhelming probability due to the DCR assumption. We thus ignore the case of n and z are not relatively prime in the proof for simplicity.

Let $s \geq 2$, and GGen be the DCR group generator. The basic construction $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}} = (\text{Setup}, \Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}, \Lambda, \mu, \text{Pub})$ is as follows. (The construction here is basically the universal PHF family for the DCR setting by Cramer and Shoup [9], extended for general $s \geq 2$.) Recall that $\Pi_{\text{yes}} = G_n$ and $\Pi_{\text{no}} = G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n \setminus G_n$ for the DCR language. Given param output from $\text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$, Setup outputs a public parameter pp that concretely specifies $(\mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}, \Lambda, \mu, \text{Pub})$ defined as follows. We define $\mathcal{SK} := [N^{s-1} \cdot \frac{N-1}{4}]$, $\mathcal{PK} := G_n$, and $\mathcal{K} := G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$. For every $\text{sk} \in [N^{s-1} \cdot \frac{N-1}{4}]$ and $c \in G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n$, we also define μ and Λ as $\mu(\text{sk}) := g^{\text{sk}} \bmod N^s$ and $\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c) := c^{\text{sk}} \bmod N^s$.

Projective property. Let $\text{sk} \in [N^{s-1} \cdot \frac{N-1}{4}]$, $\text{pk} = g^{\text{sk}} \bmod N^s$, and $c = g^r \bmod N^s$, where $r \in \mathbb{Z}$ is regarded as a witness for $c \in G_n$. We define the public evaluation algorithm Pub as $\text{Pub}(\text{pk}, c, r) := \text{pk}^r \bmod N^s$. We see that $\text{pk}^r \equiv (g^{\text{sk}})^r \equiv (g^r)^{\text{sk}} \equiv \Lambda_{\text{sk}}(c) \bmod N^s$, and thus PHF_{aff} satisfies the projective property.

Universal property. We can prove that PHF_{aff} satisfies the statistical universal property. The proof is almost the same as that for the statistical universal property of the DCR-based projective hash function by Cramer and Shoup [9]. We provide the formal proof in the full version.

5.3 Space-Efficient Construction of Projective Hash Function

The second instantiation is a “space-efficient” variant of the first construction. Specifically, it is obtained from PHF_{aff} by “compressing” the output of the function Λ in PHF_{aff} with a collision resistant hash function.

More formally, let $\mathcal{H} = \{H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{len}_{\text{crhf}}}\}$ be a collision resistant hash family. Then, consider the “compressed”-version of the PHF family $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}} = (\text{Setup}', \Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}' := \{0, 1\}^{\text{len}_{\text{crhf}}}, \Lambda', \mu, \text{Pub}')$, in which Setup' picks $H \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{H}$ in addition to generating $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}$, Λ' is defined simply by composing Λ and H by $\Lambda'_{\text{sk}}(\cdot) := H(\Lambda_{\text{sk}}(\cdot))$, Pub' is defined similarly by composing Pub and H , and the remaining components are unchanged from PHF_{aff} . $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ preserves the projective property of PHF_{aff} and it is possible to show that the “compressed” construction $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ satisfies the computational universal property.

This “compressing technique” is applicable to not only the specific instantiation PHF_{aff} , but also more general PHF families PHF , so that if the underlying PHF is (statistically) universal and satisfies some additional natural properties (that are satisfied by our instantiation in Section 5.2) and \mathcal{H} is collision resistant, then the resulting “compressed” version PHF^{hash} is computationally universal. In the full version, we formally show the additional natural properties, and the formal statement for the compressing technique as well as its proof.

The obvious merit of using $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ instead of PHF_{aff} is its smaller output size. The disadvantage is that unfortunately, the computational universal property of $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ is only loosely reduced to the collision resistance of \mathcal{H} . Specifically, the advantage of a computational universal adversary is bounded only by the square root of the advantage of the collision resistance adversary (reduction algorithm). For the details, see the full version.

6 KDM-CCA Secure PKE with respect to Polynomials

In this section, we show a PKE scheme that is KDM-CCA secure with respect to polynomials based on the DCR assumption. More specifically, our scheme is KDM-CCA secure with respect to modular arithmetic circuits (MAC) defined by Malkin et al. [23].

Our scheme is based on the *cascaded ElGamal encryption* scheme used by Malkin et al., and uses a PHF family for a language that is associated with it, which we call the *cascaded ElGamal language*. Furthermore, for considering a PHF family for this language, we need to make a small extension to the syntax of the functions μ , and thus we also introduce it here as well.

After introducing the cascaded ElGamal language as well as the extension to a PHF family below, we will show our proposed PKE scheme, and explain the instantiations of the underlying PHF family.

Augmenting the syntax of PHFs. For our construction in this section, we use a PHF family whose syntax is slightly extended from Definition 3. Specifically, we introduce an auxiliary key $\mathbf{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$ that is used as part of a public parameter \mathbf{pp} output by \mathbf{Setup} , where \mathcal{AK} itself could also be parameterized by \mathbf{param} output by \mathbf{GGen} . Then, we allow this \mathbf{ak} to (1) affect the structure of the witnesses for I_{yes} , and (2) be taken as input by the projection map μ so that it takes $\mathbf{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$ and $\mathbf{sk} \in \mathcal{SK}$ as input. We simply refer to a PHF family with such augmentation as an augmented PHF family.

For an augmented PHF family, we have to slightly adapt the definition of the statistical/computational universal property from Definition 4. Specifically,

- for the definition of the ϵ -universal property, in addition to \mathbf{param} , \mathbf{pp} , $\mathbf{pk} \in \mathcal{PK}$, $c \in I_{\text{no}}$, and $\pi \in \mathcal{K}$, we also take the universal quantifier for all $\mathbf{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$ for considering the probability in Equation 1.
- for the definition of the computational universal property, we change the initial phase (Step 1) of the game to allow an adversary to choose $\mathbf{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$ in the following way:
 1. First, the challenger executes $\mathbf{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \mathbf{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$, and sends (N, T, g) to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} sends $\mathbf{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$ to the challenger. The challenger then executes $\mathbf{pp} \leftarrow \mathbf{Setup}(\mathbf{param})$, chooses $\mathbf{sk} \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{SK}$, and computes $\mathbf{pk} \leftarrow \mu(\mathbf{ak}, \mathbf{sk})$. Then, the challenger sends $(\mathbf{pp}, \mathbf{pk})$ to \mathcal{A} .

The remaining description of the game and the definition of the adversary's advantage are unchanged.

We note that the implication of the statistical universal property to the computational one, is also true for an augmented PHF family.

Cascaded ElGamal language. Let $s \geq 2$, \mathbf{GGen} be the DCR group generator, and $\mathbf{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \mathbf{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$. Let $d = d(\lambda)$ be a polynomial. Let the auxiliary key space \mathcal{AK} be defined as G_n , and let $\mathbf{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$ (which will be a public key of the underlying cascaded ElGamal encryption scheme

$\text{Setup}_{\text{poly}}(1^\lambda) :$ $\text{param} = (N, P, Q, T, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{phf}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{phf}}(\text{param})$ $(\text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, z, \tilde{z}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{skem}}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{cca}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{cca}}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{poly}} \leftarrow (N, T, g, \text{pp}_{\text{phf}}, \text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, \text{pp}_{\text{cca}})$ Return pp_{poly} .	$\text{KG}_{\text{poly}}(\text{pp}_{\text{poly}}) :$ $(N, T, g, \text{pp}_{\text{phf}}, \text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, \text{pp}_{\text{cca}}) \leftarrow \text{pp}_{\text{poly}}$ $x \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{N-1}{4} \cdot \tilde{z} \cdot 2^\xi \rfloor$ $(\text{ct}, \text{K}) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(\text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, x)$ Parse K as $(r^{\text{KG}}, \text{psk}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$. $h \leftarrow g^{2x} \bmod N^s$ $\text{ppk} \leftarrow \mu(h, \text{psk})$ // h is used as an aux. key $(\text{cpk}, \text{csk}) \leftarrow \text{KG}_{\text{cca}}(\text{pp}_{\text{cca}}; r^{\text{KG}})$ Return $\text{PK} := (h, \text{ct}, \text{ppk}, \text{cpk})$ and $\text{SK} := x$.
$\text{Enc}_{\text{poly}}(\text{PK}, m \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^s}) :$ $(h, \text{ct}, \text{ppk}, \text{cpk}) \leftarrow \text{PK}$ $\forall i \in [d]: r_i \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{N-1}{4} \rfloor; y_i \leftarrow g^{r_i} \bmod N^s$ $u_d \leftarrow y_d$ $\forall i \in [d-1]: u_i \leftarrow y_i \cdot h^{r_{i+1}} \bmod N^s$ $r \leftarrow (2r_1, \dots, 2r_d)$ $u \leftarrow (u_1^2 \bmod N^s, \dots, u_d^2 \bmod N^s)$ $v \leftarrow T^m \cdot h^{r_1} \bmod N^s$ $\pi \leftarrow \text{Pub}(\text{ppk}, u, r)$ $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}, (\{u_i\}_{i \in [d]}, v, \pi))$ Return CT .	$\text{Dec}_{\text{poly}}(\text{PK}, \text{SK}, \text{CT}) :$ $(h, \text{ct}, \text{ppk}, \text{cpk}) \leftarrow \text{PK}; x \leftarrow \text{SK}$ $\text{K} \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{pp}_{\text{skem}}, x, \text{ct})$ Parse K as $(r^{\text{KG}}, \text{psk}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$. $(\text{cpk}, \text{csk}) \leftarrow \text{KG}_{\text{cca}}(\text{pp}_{\text{cca}}; r^{\text{KG}})$ $(\{u_i\}_{i \in [d]}, v, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}}(\text{cpk}, \text{csk}, \text{CT})$ If $(\{u_i\}_{i \in [d]}, v) \notin \mathbb{J}_{N^s}^{d+1}$ then return \perp . $u \leftarrow (u_1^2 \bmod N^s, \dots, u_d^2 \bmod N^s)$ If $\pi \neq \Lambda_{\text{psk}}(u)$ then return \perp . $y_d \leftarrow u_d$ $\forall i \in [d-1]: y_i \leftarrow u_i \cdot (y_{i+1})^{-2x} \bmod N^s$ Return $m \leftarrow \log_T(v \cdot y_1^{-2x} \bmod N^s)$.

Fig. 6. The proposed KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme Π_{poly} with respect to polynomials. (The public parameter pp_{poly} is omitted from the inputs to Enc_{poly} and Dec_{poly} .)

in our concrete instantiations of PHFs). The set of yes instances Π_{yes} is G_n^d , and the set of no instances is $(G_{N^{s-1}} \otimes G_n)^d \setminus G_n^d$. Any yes instance $c \in G_n^d$ can be expressed in the form $c = (c_1, \dots, c_d)$ such that $c_d = g^{r_d} \bmod N^s$ and $c_i = g^{r_i} \cdot a^{r_{i+1}} \bmod N^s$ for every $i \in [d-1]$, where $r = (r_1, \dots, r_d) \in \mathbb{Z}^d$. Thus, such r works as a witness for $c \in \Pi_{\text{yes}}$ under $\text{ak} \in \mathcal{AK}$.

The proposed PKE scheme. Let $s \geq 2$, and GGen be the DCR group generator. Let $d = d(\lambda)$ be a polynomial. Let $\Pi_{\text{cca}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{cca}}, \text{KG}_{\text{cca}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{cca}})$ be a PKE scheme such that the randomness space of KG_{cca} is \mathcal{R}^{KG} . Let $\text{PHF} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{phf}}, \Pi_{\text{yes}}, \Pi_{\text{no}}, \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{PK}, \mathcal{K}, \mu, \Lambda, \text{Pub})$ be an augmented PHF family with respect to GGen for the cascaded ElGamal language (defined as above). Let $\text{SKEM} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{skem}}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ be an SKEM whose session-key space is $\mathcal{R}^{\text{KG}} \times \mathcal{SK}$.¹³ Finally, let $\xi = \xi(\lambda)$ be any polynomial such that $2^{-\xi} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Our proposed PKE scheme $\Pi_{\text{poly}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{poly}}, \text{KG}_{\text{poly}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{poly}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{poly}})$ is constructed as described in Figure 6. The plaintext space of Π_{poly} is $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$, where N is the RSA modulus generated in $\text{Setup}_{\text{poly}}$.

For the scheme Π_{poly} , the same remarks as those for Π_{aff} apply. Namely, the correctness and the security proof work for any $s \geq 2$, while to capture circular security, we should use $s \geq 3$. Furthermore, if we use a statistically universal PHF family, the KDM-CCA security of Π_{poly} is tightly reduced to the DCR assumption and the security properties of the building blocks Π_{cca} and SKEM .

Π_{poly} is KDM-CCA secure with respect to the class of circuits \mathcal{MAC}_d , consisting of circuits satisfying the following conditions.

¹³ The same format adjustment as in Π_{aff} can be applied. See the footnote in Section 5.1.

- Inputs are variables and constants of $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$.
- Gates are $+$, $-$, or \cdot over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$ and the number of gates is polynomial in λ .
- Each circuit in \mathcal{MAC}_d computes a polynomial whose degree is at most d .
For a circuit $C \in \mathcal{MAC}_d$, we denote the polynomial computing C by f_C .

The formal statement for the security of Π_{poly} is as follows. Its proof goes similarly to that of Theorem 1, and we provide it in the full version.

Theorem 2. *Assume that the DCR assumption holds with respect to GGen, SKEM is passively RKA secure, PHF is computationally universal, and Π_{cca} is IND-CCA secure. Then, Π_{poly} is \mathcal{MAC}_d -KDM-CCA secure.*

Specifically, for any polynomial $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ and PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that attacks the \mathcal{MAC}_d -KDM-CCA security of Π_{poly} and makes $q_{\text{kdm}} = q_{\text{kdm}}(\lambda)$ KDM queries and $q_{\text{dec}} = q_{\text{dec}}(\lambda)$ decryption queries, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{dcr} , \mathcal{B}_{rka} , $\mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}$, \mathcal{B}_{cca} , $\mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}$, and \mathcal{B}_{cu} such that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{poly}}, \mathcal{MAC}_d, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{kdmcca}}(\lambda) &\leq 2 \cdot \left(2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{s, \mathcal{B}_{\text{dcr}}}^{\text{dcr}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{rka}}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{SKEM}, \ell, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{rka}}}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) \right) \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{cca}}, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cca}}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\Pi_{\text{cca}}, \ell, \mathcal{B}'_{\text{cca}}}^{\text{indcca}}(\lambda) + \ell \cdot (q_{\text{dec}} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{PHF}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{cu}}}^{\text{cu}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\xi}) \\ &\quad + O(d \cdot q_{\text{kdm}} \cdot 2^{-\text{len}}) + O(2^{-\lambda}) . \end{aligned}$$

Instantiations of PHF families. We propose two instantiations of an augmented PHF family used in Π_{poly} : The basic construction and its space-efficient variant, which are constructed similarly to those provided in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. We provide the details in the full version.

The basic construction PHF_{poly} is a simple extension of PHF_{aff} , so that they become identical in case $d = 1$. The output size of the function \mathcal{A} in PHF_{poly} consists of d elements of \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} , and its statistical universal property is shown very similarly to that for PHF_{aff} . The space-efficient construction $\text{PHF}_{\text{poly}}^{\text{hash}}$ is the combination of PHF_{poly} and a collision resistant hash function, and is identical to $\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ in case $d = 1$. Although it is only computationally universal, the remarkable advantage of $\text{PHF}_{\text{poly}}^{\text{hash}}$ is that its output size is independent of d .

7 Instantiations

We give some instantiation examples of \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes from our proposed schemes Π_{aff} in Section 5 and Π_{poly} in Section 6. These instantiations are summarized in Figures 1 and 2 in Section 1.2. In all of the following instantiations, the plaintext space of the resulting schemes is $\mathbb{Z}_{N^{s-1}}$, where N is the RSA modulus generated in the setup algorithm and $s \geq 3$, and we assume that the underlying SKEM is instantiated with the one presented in Section 4.2.

The first instantiations are obtained by instantiating the underlying PHF family with the “space-efficient” PHF families ($\text{PHF}_{\text{aff}}^{\text{hash}}$ for Π_{aff} and $\text{PHF}_{\text{poly}}^{\text{hash}}$ for Π_{poly}), and the underlying IND-CCA secure PKE scheme with the scheme based

on the factoring assumption proposed by Hofheinz and Kiltz [17]. The KDM-CCA security of the resulting PKE schemes is not tightly reduced to the DCR assumption, but a ciphertext of the \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure scheme consists of only two elements of \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} , two elements of $\mathbb{Z}_{N'}$ (caused by the Hofheinz-Kiltz scheme), and a hash value output by a collision-resistant hash function, where N' is the RSA modulus generated in the Hofheinz-Kiltz scheme. Note that if $s \geq 3$, the size of two elements of $\mathbb{Z}_{N'}$ plus the size of a hash value is typically (much) smaller than one element of \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} ! Furthermore, the improvement on the ciphertext size of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure scheme from the previous works is much more drastic. For KDM security with respect to degree- d polynomials, a ciphertext of our instantiation consists of $(d+1)$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} , two elements of $\mathbb{Z}_{N'}$, and a hash value, and its size overhead compared to Malkin et al.’s scheme [23] is independent of d . In contrast, the ciphertext size of the previous best construction of Han et al. [12] is $O(d^9)$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} and more (and in addition its security relies on both the DCR and DDH assumptions).

The second instantiations are PKE schemes obtained by instantiating the underlying PHF family with the “basic” PHF families (PHF_{aff} for Π_{aff} and PHF_{poly} for Π_{poly}), and the underlying IND-CCA secure PKE scheme with the scheme proposed by Hofheinz [14]. Hofheinz’ scheme is tightly IND-CCA secure under the DCR assumption, and its ciphertext overhead is 28 group elements plus the ciphertext overhead caused by authenticated encryption. The advantage of the second instantiations is that we obtain the first tightly \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme and a tightly $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA PKE scheme based solely on the DCR assumption. The disadvantage is the relatively large ciphertext size.

The third instantiations are obtained by replacing the underlying PKE scheme in the second ones with the PKE scheme proposed by Gay, Hofheinz, and Kohl [11]. Gay et al.’s scheme is tightly IND-CCA secure under the DDH assumption, and its ciphertext overhead is just three group elements of a DDH-hard group plus the ciphertext overhead caused by authenticated encryption. By the third instantiations, relying on both the DCR and DDH assumptions, we obtain a tightly \mathcal{F}_{aff} -KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme whose ciphertext consists of essentially only three elements of \mathbb{Z}_{N^s} and three elements of the DDH-hard group. We also obtain a tightly $\mathcal{F}_{\text{poly}}$ -KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme with much smaller ciphertexts than our second instantiation achieving the same security.

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