Building Lossy Trapdoor Functions from Lossy Encryption

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Abstract. Injective one-way trapdoor functions are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this work we show how to derandomize lossy encryption (with long messages) to obtain lossy trapdoor functions, and hence injective one-way trapdoor functions.

Bellare, Halevi, Sahai and Vadhan (CRYPTO '98) showed that if Enc is an IND-CPA secure cryptosystem, and H is a random oracle, then $x \mapsto \mathsf{Enc}(x, H(x))$ is an injective trapdoor function. In this work, we show that if Enc is a lossy encryption with messages at least 1-bit longer than randomness, and h is a pairwise independent hash function, then $x \mapsto \mathsf{Enc}(x, h(x))$ is a lossy trapdoor function, and hence also an injective trapdoor function.

The works of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters and Hemenway, Libert, Ostrovsky and Vergnaud showed that statistically-hiding 2-round Oblivious Transfer (OT) is equivalent to Lossy Encryption. In their construction, if the sender randomness is shorter than the message in the OT, it will also be shorter than the message in the lossy encryption. This gives an alternate interpretation of our main result. In this language, we show that *any* 2-message statistically sender-private semi-honest oblivious transfer (OT) for strings longer than the sender randomness implies the existence of *injective* one-way trapdoor functions. This is in contrast to the black box separation of injective trapdoor functions from many common cryptographic protocols, e.g. IND-CCA encryption.

Keywords: public-key cryptography, derandomization, injective trapdoor functions, oblivious transfer, lossy trapdoor functions

1 Introduction

One-way functions are one of the most basic cryptographic primitives, and their existence is necessary for much of modern cryptography. Despite their immense value in cryptography, one-way functions are not sufficient for many useful cryptographic applications [IR89,RTV04], and in many situations a *trapdoor* is needed.

Constructing injective one-way trapdoor functions (a deterministic primitive) from a secure protocol, e.g. public-key encryption or oblivious transfer (randomized primitives) has received much attention over the years with little success. One step in this direction was given by Bellare, Halevi, Sahai and Vadhan [BHSV98], who showed that in the *Random Oracle Model* IND-CPA secure encryption implies injective one-way trapdoor functions. Since it is known ([GKM+00]) 2-message OT implies IND-CPA encryption, the results of Bellare et al. can be viewed as a construction of injective one-way trapdoor functions from 2-message oblivious transfer in the *random oracle model*.

Our main contribution is to give a simple construction of injective trapdoor functions from lossy encryption (with long messages). In contrast to the results of [BHSV98], our results are in the *standard model*, and do not rely on random oracles. Our results can also be viewed as a derandomization of the basic cryptographic primitive Oblivious Transfer (OT) [Rab81,EGL85].

Lossy Encryption [KN08,PVW08,BHY09], is a public-key encryption protocol with two indistinguishable types of public keys, injective keys and lossy keys. Ciphertexts created under injective keys can be decrypted, while ciphertexts created under lossy keys are statistically independent of the underlying plaintext. The security of the encryption is then guaranteed by the indistinguishability of the two types of keys.

Building on the construction of [PW08], in [PVW08], Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters showed that lossy encryption implies statistically sender-private 2-message oblivious transfer. In [HLOV11], Hemenway, Libert, Ostrovsky and Vergnaud showed that the two primitives are, in fact, equivalent.[3] Throughout this work, we will use the terminology of lossy encryption because it makes the constructions more transparent.

If $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is a lossy encryption scheme our construction has a simple description: we choose as our function candidate,

$$F_{pk,h}(x) = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, h(x))$$

where h is some 2-wise independent hash function. Our main theorem says that if messages in $\mathcal{PKE}$ are at least one-bit longer than the encryption randomness, then $F_{pk,h}(\cdot)$ is a family of injective one-way trapdoor functions. In this setting, we are able to prove that this is secure even though the randomness is *dependent on the message*. In [BBO07], Bellare et al. used a similar construction, and they

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[3]   Their construction of lossy encryption from OT also preserves the randomness and message lengths, so if the OT uses sender randomness shorter than the messages so does the lossy encryption.

showed that $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, h(pk||m))$ is one-way (in fact a deterministic encryption) if h is a *Random Oracle*. In their results the random oracle serves to break the dependence between the message and the randomness. In this work, we do not rely on random oracles, instead we use the lossiness of the encryption scheme to break this dependence. This is interesting given how difficult it has been to realize other forms of circular security, e.g. Key Dependent Message (KDM) security [CL01,BRS03,BHHO08].

The primary limitation of our construction is the requirement that the message space be larger than the randomness space. The lossy encryption protocols based on the Paillier cryptosystem [RS08,FGK+10], satisfy this requirement, and in Appendix B we give constructions of lossy encryption with short randomness based on the DDH, DCR and QR assumptions. These do not lead to significantly new constructions of LTDFs, however, as direct constructions of lossy trapdoor functions are already known from these assumptions. It is an intriguing question whether this restriction can be removed. In addition to increasing the applicability of our construction, a removal of the restriction on message length would imply a black-box separation between OT and statistically sender-private OT by the results of [GKM+00].

Although our construction does not provide more efficient ways of constructing lossy trapdoor functions, it provides an interesting theoretical connection between lossy trapdoor functions and lossy encryption. Constructing injective trapdoor functions from randomized primitives such as public-key encryption or oblivious transfer has proven to be an elusive goal, and our results provide one of the few positive examples in this area without relying on random oracles.

The notion of RDM security has also been studied by Birrell, Chung, Pass and Telang [BCPT13], who show that full RDM security (where the message can be an arbitrary function of the randomness) is not possible. Birrell et al. go on to show that any encryption scheme where the randomness is longer than the message can be transformed into a bounded-RDM secure cryptosystem. Their work, which requires the message to be shorter than the encryption randomness, nicely complements this work where we insist the opposite, that the message is longer than the encryption randomness.[4] While Birrell et al. focus on the goal of building RDM secure encryption for general circuits, in this work, we use RDM encryption as a stepping stone for building injective trapdoor functions from lossy encryption. Birrell et al. provide more general constructions of RDM encryption than we do, but their constructions do not immediately imply injective trapdoor functions.

1.1 Previous Work

Injective one-way trapdoor functions were one of the first abstract cryptographic primitives to be defined, and their value is well recognized. In [Yao82], Yao showed that injective trapdoor functions imply IND-CPA secure encryption,

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[4] We also require the initial cryptosystem to be lossy, while their construction works with any semantically secure cryptosystem with short messages.

and Gertner, Malkin and Reingold [GMR01] showed a black-box separation between injective (also poly-to-one) trapdoor functions and public-key encryption schemes. Gertner, Kannan, Malkin, Reingold, and Viswanathan [GKM+00] showed a black-box separation between 2-message oblivious transfer (OT) and injective trapdoor functions, in both directions.

In this work, we show that statistically sender-private OT for long strings implies injective one-way trapdoor functions. Combining our results with the separation results of [GKM+00] gives a separation between standard OT and statistically sender-private OT for long strings.

This work actually constructs lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs), a stronger primitive than injective one-way trapdoor functions. Peikert and Waters introduced LTDFs in [PW08]. Lossy trapdoor functions imply injective trapdoor functions [PW08,MY10], but appear to be a strictly stronger primitive, as they cannot be constructed in a black-box manner from even one-way trapdoor permutations as shown by Rosen and Segev [RS09]. This separation was later extended by Vahlis in [Vah10]. A family of lossy trapdoor functions contains two computationally indistinguishable types of functions: injective functions with a trapdoor, and lossy functions, which are functions that statistically lose information about their input. The indistinguishability of the two types of functions shows that the injective functions are, in fact, one-way.

A similar property can be defined for cryptosystems [GOS06,PVW08,KN08,BHY09]. A cryptosystem is called lossy encryption, if there are two indistinguishable types of public keys, injective keys which behave normally, and lossy keys, which have the property that ciphertexts created under a lossy key are statistically independent of the plaintext. It was shown in Bellare, Hofheinz and Yilek [BHY09] that just as injective trapdoor functions imply IND-CPA secure encryption, LTDFs imply lossy encryption. One interpretation of our main theorem is as a partial converse of that result.

Although LTDFs immediately imply injective one-way trapdoor functions, Rosen and Segev [RS09] showed that LTDFs cannot be constructed from one-way trapdoor permutations in a black-box manner, and currently the only known generic construction of LTDFs is from homomorphic smooth hash proof systems [HO12]. In this work, we construct lossy trapdoor functions, and hence injective one-way trapdoor functions from lossy encryption with long plaintexts.

While lossy trapdoor functions were created as a building block for IND-CCA secure encryption, lossy encryption was initially created to help prove security against an active adversary in the Multiparty Computation Setting. Lossy encryption has gone by many names. Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai called it "parameter-switching" in the context of perfect non-interactive zero knowledge proofs [GOS06]. In [KN08], Kol and Naor called it "Meaningful/Meaningless" encryption, in [PVW08], Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters called it "Dual-Mode Encryption", and in [BHY09] Bellare, Hofheinz and Yilek called it "Lossy Encryption". In this work, we use the name Lossy Encryption to highlight its connection to Lossy Trapdoor Functions.. Despite the apparent utility of lossy encryption, it has proven rather easy to construct, and in [HLOV11], Hemen-

way, Libert, Ostrovsky and Vergnaud give constructions of lossy encryption from, rerandomizable encryption, statistically-hiding oblivious transfer, universal hash proofs, private information retrieval schemes and homomorphic encryption. Combining the results of [PVW08] and [HLOV11], shows that lossy encryption with short randomness can be viewed exactly as a statistically sender private $\binom{2}{1}$-oblivious transfer with short randomness. Thus, throughout this work, we will use the terminology of lossy encryption because it preserves the intuition of our construction, but it should be noted that lossy encryption can be substituted throughout the paper by 2-message statistically sender-private $\binom{2}{1}$-oblivious transfer and all of our results remain valid.

1.2 Our Contributions

One of the most fundamental techniques in modern cryptography is the use of randomization in protocols to achieve higher levels of security. On the other hand, because deterministic protocols are more versatile, a significant body of research has explored the question of where deterministic primitives can be created from their randomized counterparts. One (negative) example of this type was the results of Gertner, Malkin and Reingold showing that IND-CPA secure encryption cannot be used in a black-box way to construct injective one-way trapdoor functions. Our work is perhaps best viewed in this light. We show that lossy encryption, a randomized primitive, which is a strengthening of the standard IND-CPA secure encryption, can be used to construct lossy trapdoor functions, a deterministic primitive, which is the analogous strengthening of injective one-way trapdoor functions. Since we construct a deterministic primitive from the analogous randomized one, it is natural to think of these results as a "derandomization" of lossy encryption[5].

Our main result is to give a black-box construction of LTDFs (and hence injective one-way trapdoor functions, and IND-CCA secure encryption) from any lossy encryption over a plaintext space which is (at least 1-bit) larger than its randomness space. This is an interesting connection because many generic constructions of lossy encryption exist, while injective one-way trapdoor functions have proven difficult to construct and are black-box separated from many common primitives ([Rud89,IR89,GKM^{+}00,GMR01]).

Main Theorem. Suppose $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is a lossy encryption scheme over message space $\mathcal{M}$, randomness space $\mathcal{R}$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. If $|\mathcal{M}| > 2|\mathcal{R}|$, i.e. messages are at least one bit longer than the randomness, and $\mathcal{H}$ is a 2-wise independent hash family, with $h : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{R}$, for $h \in \mathcal{H}$, then the function

$$F_{pk,h} : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{C}$$
$$x \mapsto \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, h(x))$$

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[5] It is important to note, however, that any notion of one-wayness depends inherently on the fact that the inputs are randomized. While one-way functions must have "random" inputs to provide any one-wayness guarantees they do not require auxiliary random inputs as public-key encryption does.

is a slightly lossy trapdoor function.

While these functions are fairly simple to describe, the circular nature of the construction makes the proof very delicate. Applying the results of Mol and Yilek [MY10], we have the following corollaries:

Corollary. *If there exists a lossy encryption scheme with messages at least one bit longer than the encryption randomness, then there exist Correlated Product secure functions.*

Corollary. *If there exists a lossy encryption scheme with messages at least one bit longer than the encryption randomness, then there exists IND-CCA secure encryption.*

Applying the recent results of Kiltz, Mohassel and O'Neill [KMO10], we have

Corollary. *If there exists a lossy encryption scheme with messages at least one bit longer than the encryption randomness, then there exist adaptive trapdoor functions.*

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

If $f : X \to Y$ is a function, for any $Z \subset X$, we let $f(Z) = \{f(x) : x \in Z\}$. If A is a PPT machine, then we use $a \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} A$ to denote running the machine A and obtaining an output, where a is distributed according to the internal randomness of A. If R is a set, and no distribution is specified, we use $r \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} R$ to denote sampling from the uniform distribution on R.

If X and Y are families of distributions indexed by a security parameter λ, we say that X is statistically close to Y, (written $X \approx_s Y$) to mean that for all polynomials p and sufficiently large λ, we have $\sum_x |\Pr[X = x] - \Pr[Y = x]| < \frac{1}{p(\lambda)}$.

We say that X and Y are computationally close (written $X \approx_c Y$) to mean that for all PPT adversaries A, for all polynomials p, and for all sufficiently large λ, we have $|\Pr[A^X = 1] - \Pr[A^Y = 1]| < 1/p(\lambda)$.

2.2 Lossy Trapdoor Functions

We briefly review the notion of *Lossy Trapdoor Functions* (LTDFs) as described in [PW08]. Intuitively, a family of Lossy Trapdoor Functions is a family of functions which have two modes, or branches, injective mode, which has a trapdoor, and lossy mode which is guaranteed to have a small image size. This implies that with high probability the preimage of an element in the image will be a large set. Formally we have:

Definition 1. *A tuple $(S_{ltdf}, F_{\mathrm{ltdf}}, F_{\mathrm{ltdf}}^{-1})$ of PPT algorithms is called a family of (n, k)-Lossy Trapdoor Functions if the following properties hold:*

- **Sampling Injective Functions:** $S_{ltdf}(1^\lambda, 1)$ outputs s, t where s is a function index, and t its trapdoor. We require that $F_{\text{ltdf}}(s, \cdot)$ is an injective deterministic function on $\{0, 1\}^n$, and $F_{\text{ltdf}}^{-1}(t, F_{\text{ltdf}}(s, x)) = x$ for all x.
- **Sampling Lossy Functions:** $S_{ltdf}(1^\lambda, 0)$ outputs $(s, \perp)$ where s is a function index and $F_{\text{ltdf}}(s, \cdot)$ is a function on $\{0, 1\}^n$, where the image of $F_{\text{ltdf}}(s, \cdot)$ has size at most 2^{n-k}.
- **Indistinguishability:** The first outputs of $S_{ltdf}(1^\lambda, 0)$ and $S_{ltdf}(1^\lambda, 1)$ are computationally indistinguishable.

We recall a basic result about Lossy Trapdoor Functions from [PW08].

Lemma 1. *(From [PW08]) Let λ be a security parameter. If $(S_{ltdf}, F_{\text{ltdf}}, F_{\text{ltdf}}^{-1})$ is a family of (n, k) Lossy Trapdoor Functions, and $k = \omega(\log(\lambda))$, then the injective branches form a family of injective one-way trapdoor functions.*

In [MY10], Mol and Yilek observed that if f is an (n, k)-LTDF, then defining $\boldsymbol{f}(x_1, \ldots, x_t) = (f(x_1), \ldots, f(x_t))$, is a (tn, tk)-LTDF. Thus if $k > 1/\text{poly}$, t can be chosen such that $tk = \omega(\log(\lambda))$, and hence $\boldsymbol{f}$ is a injective one-way trapdoor function by Lemma 1. Mol and Yilek went on to show how to construct correlated product secure functions, and hence IND-CCA secure cryptosystems from these *slightly lossy trapdoor functions.*

2.3 Lossy Encryption

Peikert and Waters introduced LTDFs as a means of constructing IND-CCA secure cryptosystems. In their original work, however, they also observed that LTDFs can be used to create a simple IND-CPA secure cryptosystem, $\text{Enc}(m, r) = (F_{\text{ltdf}}(r), h(r) + m)$. This simple cryptosystem has powerful lossiness properties. The lossiness of this cryptosystem was further developed and explored in [PVW08] where Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters defined Dual-Mode Encryption, as a means of constructing efficient and composable oblivious transfer. Dual-Mode encryption is a type of cryptosystem with two types public-keys, injective keys on which the cryptosystem behaves normally and "lossy" or "messy" keys on which the system loses information about the plaintext. In particular they require that the encryptions of any two plaintexts under a lossy key yield distributions that are statistically close, yet injective and lossy keys remain computationally indistinguishable. Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06] previously used a similar notion in the context of non-interactive zero knowledge. With the goal of creating selective opening secure cryptosystems, in [BHY09] Bellare, Hofheinz and Yilek defined *Lossy Encryption*, extending the definitions of Dual-Mode Encryption in [PVW08], Meaningful/Meaningless Encryption in [KN08] and Parameter-Switching [GOS06]. We review the definition of Lossy Encryption here:

Definition 2. *Formally, a* lossy public-key encryption scheme *is a tuple $\mathcal{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ of polynomial-time algorithms such that*

- $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, inj)$ *outputs keys* (pk, sk), *keys generated by* $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, inj)$ *are called injective keys.*
- $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, lossy)$ *outputs keys* $(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, \bot)$, *keys generated by* $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, lossy)$ *are called* lossy *keys.*
- $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, \cdot, \cdot) : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{R} \to \mathcal{C}$.

Additionally, the algorithms must satisfy the following properties:

1. Correctness on injective keys. *For all* $x \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Pr\left[(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, inj); r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Dec}(sk, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, r)) = x\right] = 1.$$

2. Indistinguishability of keys. *We require that the public key,* pk, *in lossy mode and injective mode are computationally indistinguishable. Specifically, if* $\mathrm{proj} : (pk, sk) \mapsto pk$ *is the projection map,*

$$\{\mathrm{proj}(\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, inj))\} \approx_c \{\mathrm{proj}(\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, lossy))\}$$

3. Lossiness of lossy keys. *For all* $(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, sk_{\mathsf{lossy}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, lossy)$, *and all* $x_0, x_1 \in \mathcal{M}$, *the two distributions* $\{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : (pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, \mathsf{Enc}(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, x_0, r))\}$ *and* $\{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : (pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, \mathsf{Enc}(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, x_1, r))\}$ *are statistically close, i.e. the statistical distance is negligible in* λ.

We call a cryptosystem ν-lossy if for all $(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, sk_{\mathsf{lossy}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, lossy)$ we have

$$\max_{x_0, x_1 \in \mathcal{M}} \Delta(\{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : (pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, \mathsf{Enc}(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, x_0, r))\}, \{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : (pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, \mathsf{Enc}(pk_{\mathsf{lossy}}, x_1, r))\}) < \nu.$$

We call a cryptosystem *perfectly lossy* if the distributions are identical. The works of [PW08,PVW08,HLOV11], show that lossy encryption is identical to statistically sender private $\binom{2}{1}$-OT.

3 Constructing Slightly Lossy Trapdoor Functions

In this section we describe our main result: a generic construction of a slightly lossy trapdoor functions from lossy encryption. Let $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a Lossy Encryption, with $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, \cdot, \cdot) : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{R} \to \mathcal{C}_{pk}$. Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a family of pairwise independent hash functions, with $h : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{R}$, for all $h \in \mathcal{H}$. The construction is described in Figure 1.

The injectivity, and correctness of inversion of the functions described in Figure 1 is clear, it remains only to show that the lossy branch of $F_{pk,h}$ is slightly lossy.

Fig. 1. Slightly Lossy Trapdoor Functions from Lossy Encryption

4 Proof of Security

In this section we prove that the function family defined in Figure 1 is slightly lossy. To build intuition, we begin by considering the case when the encryption scheme $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is *perfectly* lossy, i.e. for a lossy key pk, the distributions $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, x)$ and $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, y)$ are identical for any $x, y \in \mathcal{M}$.

4.1 The Perfectly Lossy Case

Lemma 2. *If $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, be a* perfectly *lossy encryption scheme, then for all $pk \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, lossy)$, the sets $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{R})$ and $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, \mathcal{R})$ are equal.*

Proof. The perfect lossiness property says that

$$\Pr[r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x) = c] = \Pr[r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, y) = c],$$

for all $x, y \in \mathcal{M}$ and all $c \in \mathcal{C}$, thus we have that *as sets* $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, \mathcal{R}) = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, y, \mathcal{R})$. Since $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{R}) = \bigcup_{x \in \mathcal{M}} \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, \mathcal{R})$, the claim follows.

Lemma 3. *If $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, is a* perfectly *lossy encryption scheme, and h is* any *function from $\mathcal{M}$ to $\mathcal{R}$, then the function defined in Figure 1 is a $(\log |\mathcal{M}|, \log |\mathcal{M}| - \log |\mathcal{R}|)$-LTDF.*

Proof. The indistinguishability of injective and lossy modes follows from the indistinguishability of injective and lossy keys for $\mathcal{PKE}$. The trapdoor follows from the correctness of decryption for $\mathcal{PKE}$.

Notice that for any function h, the image of $F_{pk,h}$ is a subset of the ciphertext space $\mathcal{C} = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{R})$. In lossy mode, from Lemma 2 we have that the set $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{R})$ is equal to the set $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, \mathcal{R})$, but $|\mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, \mathcal{R})| \leq |\mathcal{R}|$, so if pk is a lossy key, the image size of $F_{pk,h}$ is at most $|\mathcal{R}|$, and the result follows.

Notice that the specific form of the function h was never used in the proof of Lemma 3. For example, we could choose h to be a constant function, and

the result would still hold! In particular, if the hypotheses of Lemma 3 hold and $|\mathcal{M}| > |\mathcal{R}|$, the function $F_{pk,h}(x) = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, 0)$ is one-way. It is instructive to examine this a little further. For most ordinary encryption schemes, the function $F_{pk,h}(x) = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, 0)$, i.e. encrypting the message x using some fixed randomness (in this case the zero string), will not be a one-way function. To see this, we can take any IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and modify it so that if the zero string is used for the randomness, the encryption algorithm simply outputs the message in the clear. This will not affect the CPA security of the encryption scheme, but it will mean the function $F_{pk,h}$ defined in this way will be the identity function, and hence trivially invertible. On the other hand, if $\mathcal{PKE}$ is a perfectly lossy encryption, and $|\mathcal{M}| > |\mathcal{R}|$, then this modification will break the perfect lossiness of $\mathcal{PKE}$.

It is tempting to conclude that if $\mathcal{PKE}$ were only statistically lossy, then Lemma 3 would still hold. To see that this is not the case, notice that the counterexample given in the previous paragraph applies even when $\mathcal{PKE}$ is statistically lossy. In the next section, we will construct a lossy trapdoor function from statistically lossy encryption, but significantly more machinery is needed.

As remarked above, one reason why this argument *does not* trivially extend to the statistically-lossy case is that although the distributions $\{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, r)\}$ and $\{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, y, r)\}$, will be statistically close for any $x, y \in \mathcal{M}$, we are not choosing the randomness uniformly. In our situation, the randomness is uniquely defined by the message, so new techniques are needed. See Appendix C for further discussion.

4.2 The Statistically Lossy Case

In the preceding section, we examined the perfectly lossy case. There, we were free to choose the function h arbitrarily, even a constant function sufficed to prove security! In the statistical setting the proofs are significantly more delicate, and we will need to make use of the fact that h is a pairwise independent hash function.

For the following, consider a fixed (lossy) public key pk. Let C_0 be the set of encryptions of 0, i.e. $C_0 = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, \mathcal{R})$. This immediately implies that $|C_0| \leq |\mathcal{R}|$. For $x \in \mathcal{M}$, define A_x to be the event (over the random choice of $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$) that $F_{pk,h}(x) \notin C_0$. Let $d_x = \Pr[A_x] = \mathbb{E}(1_{A_x})$. Let $d = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} d_x$. Thus Cauchy-Schwarz says that $\sum_{x \in X} d_x^2 \geq |\mathcal{M}| d^2$. Let Z be the random variable denoting the number of elements in the domain that map outside of C_0, so $Z = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} 1_{A_x} = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} 1_{F_{pk,h}(x) \notin C_0}$. Thus the image of $F_{pk,h}$ has size bounded by $|C_0| + Z$.

To show that $F_{pk,h}$ is a lossy trapdoor function, we must show that with high probability (over the choice of h), the image of $F_{pk,h}$ is small (relative to the domain $\mathcal{M}$). We begin with the easy observation:

$$\mathbb{E}(Z) = \mathbb{E}\left(\sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} 1_{A_x}\right) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} d_x = |\mathcal{M}| d. \tag{1}$$

Notice as well, that since h pairwise independent, it is 1-universal and hence $\Pr[h \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H} : F_{pk,h}(x) = c] = \Pr[r \leftarrow \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, r) = c]$ for all $x \in \mathcal{M}$, $c \in \mathcal{C}$. We will use this fact to show that d is small. In fact, it's not hard to see that d is bounded by the lossiness of $\mathcal{PKE}$.

This shows that the expected image size is small, but we wish to show that with high probability the image size of $F_{pk,h}$ is small. To do this we examine the variance of Z. Since $Z = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} 1_{A_x}$, where the variables 1_{A_x} are bernoulli random variables with parameter d_x. The variables 1_{A_x} are pairwise independent (because h is pairwise independent), thus we have

$$\mathrm{Var}(Z) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} \mathrm{Var}(1_{A_x}) = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} d_x(1 - d_x) = |\mathcal{M}|d - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} d_x^2$$

Thus by Cauchy-Schwarz, we arrive at the upper bound

$$\mathrm{Var}(Z) \leq |\mathcal{M}|d - |\mathcal{M}|d^2 = |\mathcal{M}|(d - d^2). \tag{2}$$

On the other hand, we have

$$\mathrm{Var}(Z) = \sum_{z=0}^{|\mathcal{M}|}(z - \mathbb{E}(Z))^2 \Pr[Z = z] = \sum_{z=0}^{|\mathcal{M}|}(z - |\mathcal{M}|d)^2 \Pr[Z = z]$$

$$\geq \sum_{z=(1-\epsilon)|\mathcal{M}|}^{|\mathcal{M}|} (z - |\mathcal{M}|d)^2 \Pr[Z = z] \geq \sum_{z=(1-\epsilon)|\mathcal{M}|}^{|\mathcal{M}|} ((1-\epsilon)|\mathcal{M}| - |\mathcal{M}|d)^2 \Pr[Z = z]$$

$$= (1 - \epsilon - d)^2 |\mathcal{M}|^2 \sum_{z=(1-\epsilon)|\mathcal{M}|}^{|\mathcal{M}|} \Pr[Z = z]$$

For any ϵ with $0 < \epsilon < 1$, and $1 - \epsilon > d$. Since the parameter ϵ is under our control, we can always ensure that this is the case. This will not be a stringent restriction, however, since d (the proportion of inputs that map outside of C_0) will always negligible by the statistical lossiness of $\mathcal{PKE}$. In the proof of the following, we will find another restriction on ϵ, namely to achieve a useful degree of lossiness, ϵ must be chosen so that $\epsilon > \frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{|\mathcal{M}|}$.

Rearranging, we have

$$\sum_{z=(1-\epsilon)|\mathcal{M}|}^{|\mathcal{M}|} \Pr[Z = z] \leq \frac{\mathrm{Var}(Z)}{(1 - \epsilon - d)^2 |\mathcal{M}|^2}.$$

Applying the bound on the variance obtained in Equation 2, we have

$$\sum_{z=(1-\epsilon)|\mathcal{M}|}^{|\mathcal{M}|} \Pr[Z = z] \leq \frac{|\mathcal{M}|(d - d^2)}{(1 - \epsilon - d)^2 |\mathcal{M}|^2} \leq \frac{d(1 - d)}{(1 - \epsilon - d)^2 |\mathcal{M}|}. \tag{3}$$

This upper bound on the probability that Z is large can be extended to show:

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Lemma 4. *If $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is a ν-lossy encryption, and if $|\mathcal{M}| = t|\mathcal{R}|$, for some $t > 1$, then for any $0 < \epsilon < 1$ such that $1 - \epsilon$ is noticeable, and $\epsilon > \frac{1}{t}$, with all but negligible probability over the choice of h, the function $F_{pk,h}$ is a $(\log|\mathcal{M}|, -\log(1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t}))$-LTDF family.*

Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{PKE}$ is ν-Lossy, i.e. $\Delta(\{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, r)\}, \{r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R} : \mathsf{Enc}(pk, y, r)\}) < \nu$. Then by the pairwise independence of h, $\Delta(\{h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H} : F_{pk,h}(0)\}, \{h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H} : F_{pk,h}(x)\}) < \nu$ for all $x \in \mathcal{M}$. In particular, $d_x = \Pr(A_x) < \nu$ for all d_x, so $d = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{M}} d_x < \nu$. Because the random variable Z represents the number of $x \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $F_{pk,h}(x) \notin C_0$, we have $|F_{pk,h}(\mathcal{M})| \leq |C_0| + Z$. Since $|C_0| \leq |\mathcal{R}| = \frac{1}{t}|\mathcal{M}|$, by Equation 3, we have

$$\Pr[|F_{pk,h}(\mathcal{M})| > (1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t})|\mathcal{M}|] < \frac{(\nu - \nu^2)}{(1 - \epsilon - \nu)^2 |\mathcal{M}|}.$$

We would like to choose ϵ as close to 1 as possible but subject to the constraint that $\frac{\nu - \nu^2}{(1 - \epsilon - \nu)^2 |\mathcal{M}|}$ is negligible. Since ν is negligible, and $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}$ is negligible, the right hand side will certainly be negligible if $1 - \epsilon - \nu$ is non-negligible. But this holds because ν is negligible, and $1 - \epsilon$ is non-negligible. Thus with all but negligible probability, the residual leakage is $\log((1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t})|\mathcal{M}|)$, so the lossiness is $\log(|\mathcal{M}|) - \log((1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t})|\mathcal{M}|) = -\log(1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t})$.

From Lemma 4, we see that if $1 - \frac{1}{t}$ is non-negligible, such an ϵ will exist. This immediately implies the result:

Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). *If $\mathcal{PKE}$ is a ν-Lossy Encryption with $|\mathcal{M}| = t|\mathcal{R}|$, for some $t > 1$ with $1 - \frac{1}{t}$ non-negligible, then the functions described in Figure 1 form a family of lossy trapdoor functions.*

Proof. From the proof of Lemma 4, it suffices to find an ϵ such that $1 - \epsilon$ is noticeable, and $\epsilon - \frac{1}{t}$ is noticeable.

In this case, we can take $\epsilon = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2t}$. In this case $1 - \epsilon = \epsilon - \frac{1}{t} = \frac{1 - \frac{1}{t}}{2}$ which is noticeable since $1 - \frac{1}{t}$ was assumed to be noticeable. In this case, the lossiness of the function will be $-\log(1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t}) = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{(\epsilon - \frac{1}{t})^j}{j} \geq \epsilon - \frac{1}{t} = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \frac{1}{t})$, which is noticeable.

Taking $t = 2$, and applying the results of [MY10], we have

Corollary 1. *If there exists Lossy Encryption with $|\mathcal{M}| > 2|\mathcal{R}|$, and there is an efficiently computable family of 2-wise independent hash functions from $\mathcal{M}$ to $\mathcal{R}$, then there exist injective one-way trapdoor functions, Correlated Product secure functions and IND-CCA2 secure encryption.*

Although Theorem 1 provides lossy trapdoor functions and hence IND-CCA secure encryption [MY10], we would like to see exactly how lossy the functions can be. This is captured in Corollary 2.

Corollary 2. *If $|\mathcal{M}| = t|\mathcal{R}|$, and $\frac{1}{t}$ is negligible, i.e. the messages are $\omega(\log \lambda)$ bits longer than the randomness, then the functions described in Figure 1 form a family of injective one-way trapdoor functions.*

Proof. From Equation 3, we have

$$\Pr[|F_{pk,h}(\mathcal{M})| > (1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t})|\mathcal{M}|] < \frac{(\nu - \nu^2)}{(1 - \epsilon - \nu)^2 |\mathcal{M}|}.$$

If we set $\epsilon = 1 - \nu - \frac{1}{\sqrt{|\mathcal{M}|}}$, then the right hand side becomes $\nu - \nu^2$, which is negligible. The lossiness is then $-\log\left(1 - \epsilon + \frac{1}{t}\right) = -\log\left(\nu + \frac{1}{t} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{|\mathcal{M}|}}\right) > -\log(\nu + \frac{1}{t} + |\mathcal{M}|^{-1/2})$. Since both ν and $\frac{1}{t}$ were assumed to be negligible, and since $|\mathcal{M}| > |\mathcal{R}|$, the sum $\nu + \frac{1}{t} + |\mathcal{M}|^{-1/2}$ is also negligible. But this means that $-\log(\nu + \frac{1}{t} + |\mathcal{M}|^{-1/2}) \in \omega(\log \lambda)$. Thus we can apply Lemma 1 to conclude that $F_{pk,h}$ is a family of injective one-way trapdoor functions.

Finally, we observe that applying the results of [KMO10], we can construct adaptive trapdoor functions from lossy encryption with messages one bit longer than the randomness.

Corollary 3. *If there exists lossy encryption with messages at least one bit longer than the encryption randomness then there exist adaptive trapdoor functions.*

5 Conclusion

The results of Gertner, Malkin and Reingold [GMR01] show that injective one-way trapdoor functions cannot be constructed in a black-box manner from IND-CPA secure encryption. Our results show that when the cryptosystem is indistinguishable from a one which loses information about the plaintext (i.e. lossy encryption), then we can construct injective trapdoor functions from it which are indistinguishable from functions that statistically lose information about their inputs (i.e. lossy trapdoor functions). The only requirement we have is that the plaintext space of the cryptosystem be larger than its randomness space.

An interesting feature of this result is that it does not parallel the standard (non-lossy) case. This result somewhat surprising as well given the number of generic primitives that imply lossy encryption, and the lack of constructions of injective one-way trapdoor functions from general assumptions. Our proof relies crucially on showing that lossy encryption with long plaintexts remains one-way even when encrypting with *randomness that is dependent on the message*. The notion of security in the presence of randomness dependent messages is an interesting one, and we hope it will prove useful in other constructions.

Applying the results of [MY10] to our constructions immediately gives a construction of IND-CCA secure encryption from lossy encryption with long plaintexts. Applying the results of [KMO10] to our constructions gives a construction of adaptive trapdoor functions from lossy encryption with long plaintexts.

The primary limitation of our results is the requirement that the message space be larger than the randomness space. Whether this restriction can be removed is an important open question.

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Appendix

A Randomness Dependent Message (RDM) Security

It is well-established that the semantic security of a public-key cryptosystem may not hold when the messages being encrypted cannot be efficiently computed by an adversary given access to the public key alone. Previous work has explored the notion of security when the plaintext is allowed to depend on the secret key (dubbed key dependent message (KDM) security) [BRS03,BHHO08,HU08,ACPS09]. In this work we consider new notions of security when the plaintext may depend on the encryption randomness. While the need for KDM security arises naturally in practical applications, the notion of Randomness Dependent Message (RDM) security arises naturally in cryptographic *constructions*.

Definition 3 (Strong RDM Security). *We consider two experiments:*

RDM (Real)	RDM (Ideal)
$pk \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$	$pk \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
$\boldsymbol{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_n) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{coins}(\mathsf{Enc})$	$\boldsymbol{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_n) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{coins}(\mathsf{Enc})$
$(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}_1(pk)$	$(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}_1(pk))$
$\boldsymbol{c} = (\mathsf{Enc}(pk, f_1(\boldsymbol{r}), r_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, f_n(\boldsymbol{r}), r_n))$	$\boldsymbol{c} = (\mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, r_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, r_n))$
$b \leftarrow A_2(\boldsymbol{c})$	$b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} A_2(\boldsymbol{c}).$

Fig. 2. RDM security

A cryptosystem $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is called* Strongly RDM Secure *with respect to $\mathcal{F}$ if for all polynomials $n = n(\lambda)$, and all PPT adversaries $A = (A_1, A_2)$ for which A_1 only outputs $f_i \in \mathcal{F}$, we have*

$$\left| \Pr[A^{RDM_{\mathsf{real}}} = 1] - \Pr[A^{RDM_{\mathsf{ideal}}} = 1] \right| < \nu$$

for some negligible function $\nu = \nu(\lambda)$.

It is natural as well to consider a weakened notion of RDM security, called RDM One-wayness.

Definition 4 (RDM One-Way). *Let $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a public key cryptosystem. Consider the following experiment*

A cryptosystem $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is called* RDM One-Way *with respect to family $\mathcal{F}$ if for all polynomials $n = n(\lambda)$, and all PPT adversaries $A = (A_1, A_2)$ for which A_1 only outputs $f_i \in \mathcal{F}$, we have $\Pr[\boldsymbol{r} = \boldsymbol{r}'] < \nu$ for some negligible function $\nu = \nu(\lambda)$.*

A special case of RDM one-wayness, is the encryption of a randomness cycle. As before we can consider both the decision and the search variants.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ RDM One-Way                                               │
│   $pk \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$            │
│   $\boldsymbol{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}$ │
│   $(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}_1(pk)$  │
│   $\boldsymbol{c} = (\mathsf{Enc}(pk, f_1(\boldsymbol{r}), r_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, f_n(\boldsymbol{r}), r_n))$ │
│   $\boldsymbol{r}' \leftarrow A_2(\boldsymbol{c})$        │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Fig. 3. RDM One-Way

Definition 5 (RCIRC Security). *A cryptosystem* $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *will be called* randomness circular secure *(RCIRC secure) if we have*

$$\{pk, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, r_2, r_1), \mathsf{Enc}(pk, r_3, r_2), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, r_n, r_{n-1}), \mathsf{Enc}(pk, r_1, r_n)\} \approx_c$$

$$\{pk, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, r_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, 0, r_n)\},$$

where $pk \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$*, and* $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{coins}(\mathsf{Enc})$ *for* $i = 1, \ldots, n$*.*

When using a cryptosystem as a building block in a more complicated protocol, it is sometimes desirable to encrypt messages that are correlated with the randomness. Similar to the notion of circular security ([CL01,BRS03,BHHO08]), which talks about security when encrypting *key cycles*, we define a notion of security related to encrypting *randomness cycles*. We call this property RCIRC One-Wayness.

Definition 6 (RCIRC One-wayness). *We say that a cryptosystem is RCIRC One-Way if the family of functions, parametrized by pk*

$$F_{pk} : \mathsf{coins}(\mathsf{Enc})^n \to \mathcal{C}^n$$
$$(r_1, \ldots, r_n) \mapsto (\mathsf{Enc}(pk, r_2, r_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, r_1, r_n)),$$

is one-way.

It is not hard to see that a cryptosystem that is RCIRC One-Way gives rise to an injective one-way trapdoor function.

An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that if the functions described in Figure 1 are a family of injective one-way trapdoor functions, that means that the underlying cryptosystem, is RCIRC One-Way

Corollary 4. *If* $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is a lossy encryption, and if* $|\mathcal{M}| = t|\mathcal{R}|$*, and* $\frac{1}{t}$ *is negligible, if we define* $\widetilde{\mathcal{PKE}} = (\widetilde{\mathsf{Gen}}, \widetilde{\mathsf{Enc}}, \widetilde{\mathsf{Dec}})$*, with*

- $\widetilde{\mathsf{Gen}}(1^\lambda)$*, generates* $(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$*, and* $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$ *and sets* $\tilde{pk} = (pk, h)$*,* $\tilde{sk} = sk$*.*
- $\widetilde{\mathsf{Enc}}(\tilde{pk}, m, r) = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, m, h(r))$*.*
- $\widetilde{\mathsf{Dec}}(\tilde{sk}, c) = \mathsf{Dec}(sk, c)$*.*

Then $\widetilde{\mathcal{PKE}}$ is RCIRC One-Way.

We remark that the construction outlined above is RCIRC-OW for one input. A straightforward modification of the above arguments shows that if h is a $2k$-wise independent hash family, then $\widetilde{\mathcal{PKE}}$ is RCIRC-OW for k inputs.

B   Constructing Lossy Encryption With Long Plaintexts

In [HLOV11], Hemenway et al. showed that lossy encryption can be constructed from statistically rerandomizable encryption and from statistically sender private $\binom{2}{1}$-oblivious transfer. This immediately yields constructions of lossy encryption from homomorphic encryption and smooth universal hash proof systems. Using the generic transformation from re-randomizable encryption to lossy encryption given in [HLOV11], we have efficient Lossy Encryption from the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem.

Recall, that with a standard IND-CPA secure cryptosystem $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ we can arbitrarily extend the plaintext space by expanding the randomness with a pseudorandom generator. Specifically, if PRG is pseudorandom generator, such that $\mathsf{PRG} : \mathcal{R} \to \mathcal{R}^k$, we can define a new cryptosystem, with encryption of $(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$ under randomness r given by setting $r_1, \ldots, r_k = \mathsf{PRG}(r)$, and setting the ciphertext as $\mathsf{Enc}(m_1, r_1), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(m_k, r_k)$. It is important to notice that applying this construction to a lossy encryption scheme, will yield an IND-CPA secure scheme, but not necessarily a lossy encryption scheme.

Below, we describe lossy encryption protocols that have plaintexts that can be made much longer than the encryption randomness. These schemes are based on the Extended Decisional Diffie Hellman (EDDH) assumption. The EDDH assumption is a slight generalization of the DDH assumption. The EDDH assumption has semantics that are very similar to the DDH assumption but the EDDH assumption is implied by the DCR, DDH and QR assumptions, so by framing our cryptosystems in this language we achieve unified constructions based on different hardness assumptions.

B.1   The EDDH Assumption

Hemenway and Ostrovsky [HO12] introduced the Extended Decisional Diffie-Hellman (EDDH) assumption

Definition 7 (The EDDH Assumption). *For a group $\mathbb{G}$, and a (samplable) subgroup $\mathbb{H} \lhd \mathbb{G}$, with samplable subsets $G \subset \mathbb{G}$, and $K \subset \mathbb{Z}$ the extended decisional diffie hellman (EDDH) assumption posits that the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:*

$$\{(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) : g \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G, a, b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} K\} \approx_c \{(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}h) : g \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G, a, b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} K, h \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{H}\}$$

It follows immediately that if $K = \{1, \ldots, |\mathbb{G}|\}$, and $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{G}$, then the EDDH assumption is just the DDH assumption in the group $\mathbb{G}$. A straightforward argument shows:

Lemma 5. *If the EDDH assumption holds in a group $\mathbb{G}$, then for any fixed $h^* \in \mathbb{H}$, the distributions*

$$\{(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) : g \xleftarrow{\$} G, a, b \xleftarrow{\$} K\} \approx_c \{(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}h^*) : g \xleftarrow{\$} G, a, b \xleftarrow{\$} K\}$$

are computationally indistinguishable.

Lemma 6. *If the EDDH assumption holds in a group $\mathbb{G}$, then for any $m \in \{0,1\}^n$, and any $h \in \mathbb{H}$, the distributions*

$$\Lambda = \{(h, g, g^a, g^{b_1}, \ldots, g^{b_n}, g^{ab_1}, \ldots, g^{ab_n}) : g \xleftarrow{\$} G, a, b_1, \ldots, b_n \xleftarrow{\$} K\},$$

$$\Lambda_m = \{(h, g, g^a, g^{b_1}, \ldots, g^{b_n}, g^{ab_1}h^{m_1}, \ldots, g^{ab_n}h^{m_n}) : g \xleftarrow{\$} G, a, b_1, \ldots, b_n \xleftarrow{\$} K, h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{H}\}$$

are computationally indistinguishable.

Proof. Let e_i denote the ith standard basis vector, i.e. e_i has a one in the ith position and zeros elsewhere. By a standard hybrid argument, it is enough to show that the distributions $\Lambda_m \approx \Lambda_{m+e_i}$.

Given an EDDH challenge $(g, g_1, g_2, g_3) = (g, g^a, g^b, g_3)$, we sample $b_1, \ldots, b_{i-1}, b_{i+1}, \ldots, b_n \xleftarrow{\$} K$ and create the vector

$$v = (h, g, g_1, g^{b_1}, \ldots, g^{b_{i-1}}, g_2, g^{b_{i+1}}, \ldots, g^{b_n}, g_1^{b_1}h^{m_1}, \ldots, g_1^{b_{i-1}}h^{m_{i-1}}, g_3, g_1^{b_{i+1}}h^{m_{i+1}}, \ldots, g_1^{b_n}h^{m_n})$$

The vector v will be in Λ_m or Λ_{m+e_i} depending on whether $g_3 = g^{ab}h$ or $g_3 = g^{ab}$.

B.2 Lossy Encryption from EDDH

In this section, we describe a simple lossy encryption scheme based on the EDDH assumption.

- **Public Parameters:**
  A group $\mathbb{G}$ under which the EDDH assumption holds. A generator $g \xleftarrow{\$} G$, an element $1 \neq h \in \mathbb{H}$.
- **Lossy Key Generation:**
  Sample $a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_n, b_1, \ldots, b_n \xleftarrow{\$} K$. Set $\mathbf{v} = (g^{a_0 b_1}, \ldots, g^{a_0 b_n})$

$$\mathbf{v}_1 = (g^{a_1 b_1}h, g^{a_1 b_2}, \ldots, g^{a_1 b_n})$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\mathbf{v}_n = (g^{a_n b_1}, g^{a_n b_2}, \ldots, g^{a_n b_{n-1}}, g^{a_n b_n}h)$$

  and set $g_i = g^{a_i}$ for $i = 0, \ldots, n$. The public key will be $(g_0, \ldots, g_n, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{v}_n)$. The secret key will be $b_1, \ldots, b_n$.

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– **Injective Key Generation:**

Sample $a, a_1, \ldots, a_n, b_1, \ldots, b_n \xleftarrow{\$} K$. Set $\mathbf{v} = (g^{ab_1}, \ldots, g^{ab_n})$

$$\mathbf{v}_1 = (g^{a_1 b_1}, g^{a_1 b_2}, \ldots, g^{a_1 b_n})$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\mathbf{v}_n = (g^{a_n b_1}, g^{a_n b_2}, \ldots, g^{a_n b_{n-1}}, g^{a_n b_n})$$

and set $g_i = g^{a_i}$ for $i = 0, \ldots, n$. The public key will be $(g_0, \ldots, g_n, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{v}_n)$.

– **Encryption:**

To encrypt a message $\mathbf{m} \in \{0, 1\}^n$, choose an element $r \xleftarrow{\$} K$, and set

$$\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{v}^r \mathbf{v}_1^{m_1} \cdots \mathbf{v}^{m_n} \in \mathbb{G}^n$$

where all the operations are done coordinate-wise (the natural group action in the cartesian product group). and $c_0 = g_0^r \prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{m_i}$.

– **Decryption:**

Given $(c_0, \mathbf{c})$, calculate $(\mathbf{c}_1 c_0^{-b_1}, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_n c_0^{-b_n}) = (h^{m_1}, \ldots, h^{m_n})$ and the m_i can be recovered by inspection.

The injective and lossy modes are indistinguishable by Lemma 6. In lossy mode, the ciphertext space has size bounded by the order of g. By choosing n large enough so that 2^n is much greater than the order of g we can achieve any degree of lossiness. The encryption randomness is a single element $r \xleftarrow{\$} K$, so choosing $n > K$, makes the plaintexts longer than the encryption randomness.

C Perfectly Lossy Encryption

The perfect lossiness property discussed in Section 4.1 is so strong that we can actually extend Lemma 3.

Lemma 7. *If* $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, *is a* perfectly *lossy encryption scheme,* $0 < t \in \mathbb{Z}$, *and* $h_1, \ldots, h_t$ *are any functions from* $\mathcal{M}^t$ *to* $\mathcal{R}$, *then the function*

$$F_{pk,h} : \mathcal{M}^t \to \mathcal{C}^t$$
$$(x_1, \ldots, x_t) \mapsto (\mathsf{Enc}(pk, x_1, h_1(x_1, \ldots, x_t)), \ldots, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x_t, h_t(x_1, \ldots, x_t))),$$

is a $(t \log |\mathcal{M}|, t(\log |\mathcal{M}| - \log |\mathcal{R}|))$-*LTDF.*

The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Lemma 3. One simple consequence of Lemma 7 is

Lemma 8. *If* $\mathcal{PKE} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, *is a* perfectly *lossy encryption scheme,* $0 < t \in \mathbb{Z}$, *and* $\log(|\mathcal{M}|/|\mathcal{R}|) = \omega(\log(\lambda))$, *then for any map* $h : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{R}$, *the encryption* $\widehat{\mathsf{Enc}}(pk, x, y) = \mathsf{Enc}(pk, x, h(y))$ *is strongly* t-*RCIRC-One Way.*