The Security of Ciphertext Stealing

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March 20, 2012

Outline

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Ciphertext stealing



Suppose we have a message to encrypt. We might choose ciphertext block chaining.

Ciphertext stealing



We choose a random initialization vector.

Ciphertext stealing



We whiten the first plaintext block by XORing with the IV.

Ciphertext stealing



We feed the whitened plaintext through the blockcipher.

Ciphertext stealing



This gives us a ciphertext block.

Ciphertext stealing



We whiten the next plaintext block using that ciphertext block, apply the blockcipher, and get a new ciphertext block.

Ciphertext stealing



We repeat this for all of the plaintext blocks.

Ciphertext stealing



But wait: what if the plaintext isn't a whole number of blocks? There'll be an odd bit left over.

Ciphertext stealing



We pad the partial block with zero bits.

Ciphertext stealing



And then whiten using the previous ciphertext block, as usual.

Ciphertext stealing



This leaves us with the whitened odd bit of plaintext, and a *copy* of the rest of the previous ciphertext block.

Ciphertext stealing



It's the right width, so we can feed it through the blockcipher and get a ciphertext block.

Ciphertext stealing



If we decrypt that last ciphertext, we get the end of the penultimate ciphertext block back. So we don't need to transmit that part!

Ciphertext stealing



Addendum to NIST SP800–38A describes three variants differing in ciphertext ordering.

Ciphertext stealing



CBC-CS1 preserves *ordering*;

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

CBC-CS1 preserves *ordering*; CBC-CS3 preserves *alignment* by swapping;

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

CBC-CS1 preserves *ordering*; CBC-CS3 preserves *alignment* by swapping; CBC-CS2 swaps only when necessary, for compatibility.

Ciphertext stealing: history

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- All three standardized in addendum to NIST SP800–38A (2010).

Definitions: symmetric encryption

Symmetric encryption syntax

We take a functional view of symmetric encryption schemes.

$$\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{IV} \times \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{P}$$

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$$\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{IV} \times \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{P}$$

- $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ is a finite *key space*;
- $\mathcal{IV} = \{0,1\}^v$ is an *IV space*;
- $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ is the *message space*.
- Require $\mathcal{E}_K^{IV}(\cdot)$ to be a length-preserving permutation on $\mathcal{P}$.

Definitions: symmetric encryption

Symmetric encryption security: ind$

We capture an adversary and play one of two games...

Definitions: symmetric encryption

Symmetric encryption security: ind$

$$IV \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV} \qquad \xleftarrow{\quad m \in \mathcal{P} \quad}$$
$$c \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{IV}(m) \qquad \xrightarrow{\quad IV \parallel c \quad}$$

The real game: adversary chooses plaintexts m: we give back ciphertexts with fresh random IVs and a consistent random key.

Definitions: symmetric encryption

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$$\xrightarrow{m \in \mathcal{P}} \quad IV \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV}$$

$$\xleftarrow{IV \,\|\, c} \quad c \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|m|}$$

The fake game: adversary chooses plaintexts m: we give back fresh random IVs and random fake ciphertexts.

Definitions: symmetric encryption

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$$IV \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV} \qquad c \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{IV}(m) \qquad \xleftarrow{m \in \mathcal{P}} \qquad \xrightarrow{IV \,\|\, c} \qquad \xrightarrow{m \in \mathcal{P}} \qquad \xleftarrow{IV \,\|\, c} \qquad IV \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV} \qquad c \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|m|}$$

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind\$}}(A) = \Pr[A^{\text{Real}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^{\text{Fake}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1]$$

The adversary's *advantage* measures how well he can distinguish between these games.

Security of ciphertext stealing

Theorem

Let $\mathcal{E}$ be any of CBC-CS1[Perm(b)], CBC-CS2[Perm(b)], *or* CBC-CS3[Perm(b)] *and suppose adversary A asks queries totalling at most σ blocks. Then*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{ind\$}}_{\mathcal{E}}(A) \leq \sigma^2/2^b$$

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Proof idea

- Factor

$$\text{CBC-CS}n^{IV}_K(m) = \text{POST}_n\big(|m|, \text{CBC}^{IV}_K(\text{PRE}(m))\big)$$

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- Observe that POST_n preserves uniform distribution.
- Show reduction from CBC security. □

Insecurity of the Meyer–Matyas scheme



The NIST CBC ciphertext stealing schemes, for comparison.

Insecurity of the Meyer–Matyas scheme



The Meyer–Matyas ciphertext stealing scheme. There's no chaining into the final partial block.

Insecurity of the Meyer–Matyas scheme



Start with a message m which is 1 bit short of two whole blocks.

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

The first block is whitened with a fresh random IV and fed through the blockcipher.

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

The second block is padded by prefixing with the final bit r of the previous ciphertext.

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

And then fed through the blockcipher.

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

But there are only two possible values for r. If we do this twice, we expect the C_2 values to be equal with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

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

Our adversary starts with such a message.

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

And asks its encryption oracle to encrypt it, getting a ciphertext c.

Insecurity of the Meyer–Matyas scheme



Then it asks to encrypt the same message again, getting a new ciphertext c'.

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

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{ind\$}}_{\text{CBC-CSX}}(A) = \Pr[A^{\mathrm{Real}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^{\mathrm{Fake}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1]$$

The adversary declares ‘real’ if the last b bits of c and c' are equal.

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

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{ind\$}}_{\text{CBC-CSX}}(A) \geq \frac{1}{2} - \Pr[A^{\mathrm{Fake}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1]$$

If this is indeed the real game, we've just seen that they're equal with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

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

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{ind\$}}_{\text{CBC-CSX}}(A) \geq \frac{1}{2} - \Pr[A^{\mathrm{Fake}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1]$$

If this is the fake game, then the ciphertexts are simply random strings.

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

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{ind\$}}_{\text{CBC-CSX}}(A) \geq \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2^b}$$

So they're equal with probability exactly $1/2^b$.

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History

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- We should have definitions which capture this behaviour so that we can analyse the security of schemes.

History

- Blockwise-adaptive attacks: [Bellare, Kohno, Namprempre 2002], [Joux, Martinet, Valette 2002], [Fouque, Martinet, Poupard 2003], [Fouque, Joux, Poupard 2004], [Bard 2007].

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- Our stream-based approach from [Gennaro, Rohatgi 1997].

How it looks



Suppose we have a plaintext message P. Maybe we don't even know all of it yet.

How it looks

Split it into chunks $P_1, P_2, \ldots$ of arbitrary sizes.

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

Sample an initial state ('initialization vector') V_0 appropriate for the encryption scheme.

How it looks



Feed the first plaintext chunk to the encryption scheme. It gives us a ciphertext chunk C_1. In general, C_1 might not be the same length as P_1.

How it looks



It also gives us a *state* V_1.

How it looks



We can feed the next plaintext P_2 to the encryption scheme, along with the previous state V_1. We get a ciphertext chunk C_2 and a new state V_2.

How it looks



And so on... Indicate to the encryption scheme when there are no more chunks to process.

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- Indeed, we don't assume there's a blockcipher involved at all.
- Security is defined in terms of indistinguishability from random strings of appropriate lengths.

Definitions: online encryption

Online encryption syntax

We define online encryption schemes as functions:

$$\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{V} \times \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^* \times \mathcal{V} \qquad (C_i, V_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{V_{i-1},\delta}(P_i)$$

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- $\delta \in \{0,1\}$ is the *end-of-message indicator*: 0 means more chunks are coming; 1 means this is the last one.
- Also a *message space* $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ and *IV space* $\mathcal{IV} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$.

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Lengths The lengths of ciphertext chunks depend only on the history of plaintext lengths.

Online encryption security: IND$

Initialization:
$V \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV}$

$(c, V) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{V,\delta}(m)$ $\overset{m,\delta}{\underset{c}{\longleftrightarrow}}$

Adversary submits message chunks and a ‘done’ flag to an oracle, which returns ciphertext chunks.

Online encryption security: IND$

Initialization:
$V \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV}$

$m, \delta \longrightarrow$ $(c, V) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{V,\delta}(m)$

$\longleftarrow c'$ $c' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|c|}$

. . . or maybe it just returns random strings of the right length.

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$V \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV}$

$(c, V) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{V,\delta}(m)$ $\xleftarrow{m,\delta}$ $\xrightarrow{c}$

$\xrightarrow{m,\delta}$ $\xleftarrow{c'}$ $(c, V) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_K^{V,\delta}(m)$
$c' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{|c|}$

We'd like these to be hard to distinguish.

Online encryption security: IND$

Initialization:
$V_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{IV}$ for $i \in \mathbb{N}$

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... even when the adversary can contribute to multiple messages concurrently.

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$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\mathrm{IND\$}}(A) = \Pr[A^{\mathrm{Real}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^{\mathrm{Fake}(\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1]$$

The adversary's advantage measures how well he can distinguish between these two games.

CBC online – wrong version



We're given a plaintext chunk.

CBC online – wrong version



In general, we have a partial plaintext left over from the previous call. Tack this on the front.

CBC online – wrong version



And split the plaintext into blocks. There'll be a bit left over.

CBC online – wrong version



Encrypt the whole blocks using CBC mode, using an IV maintained in the state.

CBC online – wrong version



The new state is the last ciphertext block, and the leftover bit of plaintext.

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- Of course, this is insecure. The adversary learns the IV to be used to encrypt the next plaintext chunk as part of this ciphertext.

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- It's sufficient to hold one block back [FMP03]. Intuition: CBC output is indistinguishable from random data, so the last block should be unpredictable, which is sufficient for security.

Delayed CBC [FMP03]





The state looks the same: previous ciphertext, and leftover plaintext.

Delayed CBC [FMP03]



Prefix the leftover plaintext to the new chunk, split into blocks, and encrypt.

Delayed CBC [FMP03]



We must output the previous-ciphertext block. We shouldn't output the last new ciphertext block, just store it for later.

Delayed CBC [FMP03]



And we keep the leftover piece of plaintext.

Delayed CBC with ciphertext stealing



So, we've got to the end of a message, and we've not filled up the last block.

Delayed CBC with ciphertext stealing



So we pad it with zero bits.

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

The recipient can recover the tail of the next-to-last ciphertext block by decrypting the final one.

Delayed CBC with ciphertext stealing



Again, there are variants which differ in how they order the last two ciphertext blocks.

Delayed CBC with ciphertext stealing

- Actually the natural implementation. You have to hold back the last ciphertext block anyway, because you might have to truncate it. Indeed, for DCBC-CS3, you sometimes have to hold back *two* ciphertexts blocks.

Security of delayed CBC with ciphertext stealing

Theorem

Let $\mathcal{E}$ *be any of* DCBC-CS1$[\mathrm{Perm}(b)]$, DCBC-CS2$[\mathrm{Perm}(b)]$, *or* DCBC-CS3$[\mathrm{Perm}(b)]$ *and suppose adversary* A *asks queries totalling at most* σ *blocks. Then*

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- Show reduction from DCBC security. □

The end