

Practical Collisions for EnRUPT

Sebastiaan Indestege Bart Preneel

COSIC, ESAT, K.U. Leuven, Belgium


Fast Software Encryption 2009



- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of EnRUPT
- 3 Attacking EnRUPT
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of EnRUPT
- 3 Attacking EnRUPT
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

Cryptographic Hash Functions




$$h : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^w$$

Desired properties

- Collision resistance, (Second) preimage resistance, ...
- Efficiently computable, *i.e.*, fast!

Cryptographic Hash Functions

Collision Resistance



- “Hard” to find $m \neq m'$ s.t. $h(m) = h(m')$.
- Birthday paradox $\mathcal{O}(2^{n/2})$

EnRUPT

- SHA-3 round 1 candidate
- Sean O'Neil, Karsten Nohl, Luca Henzen [ONH08]
- Many parameters, **7 concrete proposals**

This talk

None of the 7 proposed EnRUPT variants is collision resistant

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of EnRUPT**
- 3 Attacking EnRUPT
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

Description of EnRUPT

EnRUPT	digest	word	parallelisation	security	number of
variant	length	size	level	parameter	state words
	h	w	P	s	H
EnRUPT-128	128 bits	32 bits	2	4	8
EnRUPT-160	160 bits	32 bits	2	4	10
EnRUPT-192	192 bits	32 bits	2	4	12
EnRUPT-224	224 bits	64 bits	2	4	8
EnRUPT-256	256 bits	64 bits	2	4	8
EnRUPT-384	384 bits	64 bits	2	4	12
EnRUPT-512	512 bits	64 bits	2	4	16

Description of EnRUPT

① Initialisation

- Set internal state $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$

② Message Processing

- Process each or w -bit message word just once
- No message expansion, message block schedule, ...
- Uses the **round function**

③ Finalisation

- Generate message digest from internal state

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:  end for
12:   $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:   $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:  return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```


Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $\mathbf{d}_{P-1} \leftarrow \mathbf{d}_{P-1} \oplus \mathbf{m}$ 
13:    $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{P}$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Round Function

```
1: function round ( $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle, m$ )
2:   for  $i = 0$  to  $s \cdot P - 1$  do
3:      $\alpha \leftarrow r + (i + 1 \bmod P) \bmod H$ 
4:      $\beta \leftarrow r + i + 2P \bmod H$ 
5:      $\gamma \leftarrow r + i + P \bmod H$ 
6:      $\xi \leftarrow r + i \bmod H$ 
7:      $e \leftarrow ((x[\alpha] \lll 1) \oplus x[\beta] \oplus d[i \bmod P] \oplus \text{uint}_w(r + i)) \ggg w/4$ 
8:      $f \leftarrow (e \lll 3) \boxplus e$ 
9:      $x_\gamma \leftarrow x_\gamma \oplus f$ 
10:     $d[i \bmod P] \leftarrow d[i \bmod P] \oplus x[\xi] \oplus f$ 
11:   end for
12:    $d_{P-1} \leftarrow d_{P-1} \oplus m$ 
13:    $r \leftarrow r + s \cdot P$ 
14:   return  $\langle d[P], x[H], r \rangle$ 
15: end function
```

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of EnRUPT
- 3 Attacking EnRUPT**
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

Attacking EnRUPT

Observation

- EnRUPT is **GF(2)-linear** except $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} f \leftarrow e \boxplus (e \lll 3) \\ \text{or} \\ f \leftarrow e \times 9 \end{array} \right.$

Attack strategy

- 1 Find a **linear approximation**
- 2 Find a **differential characteristic**
- 3 Find a **conforming pair**

Similar to [CJ98] on SHA-0 and [RO05, PRR05] on SHA-1

Linear Approximation of EnRUPT

EnRUPT- \mathcal{L}

- Replace all non-linear \boxplus by linear \oplus
 - i.e., ignore the carries
- Restrict to some fixed message length $t \cdot w$

$$\text{EnRUPT-}\mathcal{L}(m) = [o]_{1 \times h} = [m]_{1 \times tw} \cdot [\mathbf{O}]_{tw \times h}$$

- Differentials?

$$[\Delta o]_{1 \times h} = [\Delta m]_{1 \times tw} \cdot [\mathbf{O}]_{tw \times h}$$


“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. I

- What is a “good” differential characteristic?
- Let’s skip this for now. . .

Round	Step	Δe	\rightarrow	Δf
inject message word difference $\Delta m_{-1} = 0000000008000000_x$				
0	0	0000000000000000_x	\rightarrow	0000000000000000_x
	1	0000000000000800_x	\rightarrow	0000000000004800_x
	2	9000000000000000_x	\rightarrow	1000000000000000_x
	3	4800000000000800_x	\rightarrow	0800000000004800_x
	4	9000000000000000_x	\rightarrow	1000000000000000_x
	5	4800280000000800_x	\rightarrow	0801680000004800_x
	6	90000002d0000000_x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000_x
	7	0000280168000800_x	\rightarrow	0001680a28004800_x
inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 0000002280000000_x$				
1	0	90000002d0000000_x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000_x
	1	0000280168000000_x	\rightarrow	0001680a28000000_x
	2	90000002d0000000_x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000_x

Finding a Conforming Pair

Observation




Observation

- Each message word is used only once
- New freedom in every round
- Search **round per round**

Finding a Conforming Pair

Finding it Faster




Message modification

- First step of a round **for free!**

Finding a Conforming Pair

Finding it Faster



Message modification

- First step of a round **for free!**

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

Need to estimate/compute $DP^{\times 9}$

First Attempt

- $x \times 9 = x \boxplus (x \lll 3)$
- Could use [LM01] to estimate $DP^{\times 9}$:


$$DP^{\times 9}(\Delta) \approx 2^{-\text{wt}\left(\left(\Delta \vee (\Delta \lll 3)\right) \wedge \text{bin } 01\dots 1000\right)}$$

(after simplification)

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

- Compact representation of $x + (x \ll 3)$ and $x' + (x' \ll 3)$ where $x' = x \oplus \Delta$ in a **trellis**
- 2^5 nodes per segment ($c_i, c'_i, x_{i-2}, x_{i-1}, x_i$)




- Can quickly count paths, and thus compute $\mathbf{DP}^{\times 9}$ **exactly** using the Viterbi algorithm (modified)

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

- Compact representation of $x + (x \ll 3)$ and $x' + (x' \ll 3)$ where $x' = x \oplus \Delta$ in a **trellis**
- 2^5 nodes per segment ($c_i, c'_i, x_{i-2}, x_{i-1}, x_i$)




- Can quickly count paths, and thus compute $\mathbf{DP}^{\times 9}$ **exactly** using the Viterbi algorithm (modified)

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

- Compact representation of $x + (x \ll 3)$ and $x' + (x' \ll 3)$ where $x' = x \oplus \Delta$ in a **trellis**
- 2^5 nodes per segment ($c_i, c'_i, x_{i-2}, x_{i-1}, x_i$)




- Can quickly count paths, and thus compute $\mathbf{DP}^{\times 9}$ **exactly** using the Viterbi algorithm (modified)

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

- Compact representation of $x + (x \ll 3)$ and $x' + (x' \ll 3)$ where $x' = x \oplus \Delta$ in a **trellis**
- 2^5 nodes per segment ($c_i, c'_i, x_{i-2}, x_{i-1}, x_i$)




- Can quickly count paths, and thus compute $\mathbf{DP}^{\times 9}$ **exactly** using the Viterbi algorithm (modified)

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

- Compact representation of $x + (x \ll 3)$ and $x' + (x' \ll 3)$ where $x' = x \oplus \Delta$ in a **trellis**
- 2^5 nodes per segment ($c_i, c'_i, x_{i-2}, x_{i-1}, x_i$)




- Can quickly count paths, and thus compute $\mathbf{DP}^{\times 9}$ **exactly** using the Viterbi algorithm (modified)

Finding a Conforming Pair

Round Complexities?

- Compact representation of $x + (x \ll 3)$ and $x' + (x' \ll 3)$ where $x' = x \oplus \Delta$ in a **trellis**
- 2^5 nodes per segment ($c_i, c'_i, x_{i-2}, x_{i-1}, x_i$)



- Can quickly count paths, and thus compute $\mathbf{DP}^{\times 9}$ **exactly** using the Viterbi algorithm (modified)

“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

Let's Summarise

- Low Hamming weight in Δe is good
- Can easily compute attack complexity, incl. *tricks*

A Different View: Coding Theory


- All linearised differentials are **codewords** of a linear code.

$$\mathbf{G} = \left[\mathbf{I}_{tw \times tw} \mid \mathbf{E}_{tw \times tsPw} \mid \mathbf{O}_{tw \times h} \right]$$

- Low weight codewords [RO05, PRR05]


“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:




“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:




“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:




“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:




“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



“Good” Differential Characteristic, pt. II

- But low weight is just a **heuristic**
- Use the **actual attack complexity** in an algorithm for finding low weight codewords (similar to [CC98])
- Simplified:



Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of EnRUPT
- 3 Attacking EnRUPT
- 4 Results**
- 5 Conclusion

Results

variant	time complexity	message length
EnRUPT-128	$2^{36.04}$	6
EnRUPT-160	$2^{37.78}$	7
EnRUPT-192	$2^{38.33}$	8
EnRUPT-224	$2^{37.02}$	6
EnRUPT-256	$2^{37.02}$	6
EnRUPT-384	$2^{39.63}$	8
EnRUPT-512	$2^{38.46}$	10

Example: EnRUPT-256

Round	Step	Δe	\rightarrow	Δf	DP ^{×9}	totals
inject message word difference $\Delta m_{-1} = 000000008000000_x$						
0	0	0000000000000000 _x	\rightarrow	0000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.00}$	$2^{-0.00}$
	1	0000000000000800 _x	\rightarrow	0000000000004800 _x	*	
	2	9000000000000000 _x	\rightarrow	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	
	3	4800000000000800 _x	\rightarrow	0800000000004800 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	4	9000000000000000 _x	\rightarrow	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	
	5	4800280000000800 _x	\rightarrow	0801680000004800 _x	$2^{-7.28}$	
	6	90000002d0000000 _x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	7	0000280168000800 _x	\rightarrow	0001680a28004800 _x	$2^{-11.02}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 0000002280000000_x$						
1	0	90000002d0000000 _x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	$2^{-36.56}$
	1	0000280168000000 _x	\rightarrow	0001680a28000000 _x	*	
	2	90000002d0000000 _x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	3	4800280000000000 _x	\rightarrow	0801680000000000 _x	$2^{-5.43}$	
	4	90000002d0000000 _x	\rightarrow	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	5	0000080000000000 _x	\rightarrow	0000480000000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$	

Example: EnRUPT-256

inject message word difference $\Delta m_{-1} = 000000008000000_x$					
0	0	0000000000000000_x	→	0000000000000000_x	$2^{-0.00}$ $2^{-0.00}$
	1	000000000000800_x	→	000000000004800_x	*
	2	900000000000000_x	→	100000000000000_x	$2^{-0.85}$
	3	480000000000800_x	→	080000000004800_x	$2^{-3.70}$
	4	900000000000000_x	→	100000000000000_x	$2^{-0.85}$
	5	480028000000800_x	→	080168000004800_x	$2^{-7.28}$
	6	90000002d000000_x	→	100000145000000_x	$2^{-6.43}$
	7	0000280168000800_x	→	0001680a28004800_x	$2^{-11.02}$
inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 0000002280000000_x$					
1	0	90000002d000000_x	→	100000145000000_x	$2^{-6.43}$ $2^{-36.56}$
	1	0000280168000000_x	→	0001680a28000000_x	*
	2	90000002d000000_x	→	100000145000000_x	$2^{-6.43}$
	3	4800280000000000_x	→	0801680000000000_x	$2^{-5.43}$
	4	90000002d000000_x	→	100000145000000_x	$2^{-6.43}$
	5	0000080000000000_x	→	0000480000000000_x	$2^{-1.85}$
	6	9000000240000000_x	→	1000001040000000_x	$2^{-3.70}$
	7	4800080120000000_x	→	0800480820000000_x	$2^{-6.54}$

Example: EnRUPT-256

	1	0000000000000800 _x	→	0000000000004800 _x	*	
	2	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	
	3	4800000000000800 _x	→	0800000000004800 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	4	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	
	5	4800280000000800 _x	→	0801680000004800 _x	$2^{-7.28}$	
	6	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	7	0000280168000800 _x	→	0001680a28004800 _x	$2^{-11.02}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 000002280000000_x$						
1	0	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	$2^{-36.56}$
	1	0000280168000000 _x	→	0001680a28000000 _x	*	
	2	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	3	4800280000000000 _x	→	0801680000000000 _x	$2^{-5.43}$	
	4	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	5	0000080000000000 _x	→	0000480000000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$	
	6	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	$2^{-6.54}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 000002288000000_x$						
2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	$2^{-34.08}$

Example: EnRUPT-256

	3	4800000000000000 _x	→	0800000000004800 _x	2 ⁻⁴	
	4	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	
	5	48002800000000800 _x	→	0801680000004800 _x	2 ^{-7.28}	
	6	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	7	00002801680000800 _x	→	0001680a28004800 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 0000002280000000_x$						
1	0	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	2^{-36.56}
	1	0000280168000000 _x	→	0001680a28000000 _x	*	
	2	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	3	4800280000000000 _x	→	0801680000000000 _x	2 ^{-5.43}	
	4	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	5	0000080000000000 _x	→	0000480000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	2 ^{-6.54}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000_x$						
2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.08}
	1	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	

Example: EnRUPT-256

	6	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	7	0000280168000800 _x	→	0001680a28004800 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 0000002280000000x$						
1	0	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	2^{-36.56}
	1	0000280168000000 _x	→	0001680a28000000 _x	*	
	2	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	3	4800280000000000 _x	→	0801680000000000 _x	2 ^{-5.43}	
	4	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	5	0000080000000000 _x	→	0000480000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	2 ^{-6.54}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000x$						
2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.08}
	1	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	2 ^{-9.28}	
	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	

Example: EnRUPT-256

inject message word difference $\Delta m_0 = 0000002280000000_x$				
1	0	90000002d0000000 _x → 1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	$2^{-36.56}$
	1	0000280168000000 _x → 0001680a28000000 _x	*	
	2	90000002d0000000 _x → 1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	3	4800280000000000 _x → 0801680000000000 _x	$2^{-5.43}$	
	4	90000002d0000000 _x → 1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$	
	5	0000080000000000 _x → 0000480000000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$	
	6	9000000240000000 _x → 1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	7	4800080120000000 _x → 0800480820000000 _x	$2^{-6.54}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000_x$				
2	0	9000000240000000 _x → 1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	$2^{-34.08}$
	1	0000080048000000 _x → 0000480208000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000240000000 _x → 1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	3	4800080168000000 _x → 0800480a28000000 _x	$2^{-9.28}$	
	4	9000000240000000 _x → 1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	5	0000200000000000 _x → 0001200000000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$	
	6	9000000000000000 _x → 1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	

Example: EnRUPT-256

	1	0000280168000000 _x	→	0001680a28000000 _x	*
	2	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$
	3	4800280000000000 _x	→	0801680000000000 _x	$2^{-5.43}$
	4	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	$2^{-6.43}$
	5	0000080000000000 _x	→	0000480000000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$
	6	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$
	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	$2^{-6.54}$
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000_x$					
2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$ $2^{-34.08}$
	1	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*
	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$
	3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	$2^{-9.28}$
	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$
	5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$					

Example: EnRUPT-256

	3	4800280000000000 _x	→	0801680000000000 _x	2 ^{-5.43}	
	4	90000002d0000000 _x	→	1000001450000000 _x	2 ^{-6.43}	
	5	0000080000000000 _x	→	0000480000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	2 ^{-6.54}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000_x$						
	2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70} 2^{-34.08}
		1	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*
		2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}
		3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	2 ^{-9.28}
		4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}
		5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}
		6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}
		7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						
	3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85} 2^{-23.91}
		1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*

Example: EnRUPT-256

	5	0000800000000000 _x	→	0000480000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	2 ^{-6.54}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000_x$						
2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.08}
	1	0000800480000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	2 ^{-9.28}	
	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						
3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	2^{-23.91}
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	

Example: EnRUPT-256

	7	4800080120000000 _x	→	0800480820000000 _x	2 ^{-6.54}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_1 = 0000002288000000_x$						
2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.08}
	1	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	2 ^{-9.28}	
	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						
3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	2^{-23.91}
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	2 ^{-4.70}	
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	

Example: EnRUPT-256

2	0	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2 ^{-34.08}
	1	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	2 ^{-9.28}	
	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						
3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	2 ^{-23.91}
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	2 ^{-4.70}	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						

Example: EnRUPT-256

	2	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800080168000000 _x	→	0800480a28000000 _x	2 ^{-9.28}	
	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	2 ^{-1.85}	
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						
3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	2^{-23.91}
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	2 ^{-4.70}	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.19}
	1	00000800000000800	→	00004800000004800	*	

Example: EnRUPT-256

	4	9000000240000000 _x	→	1000001040000000 _x	$2^{-1.85}$	
	5	0000200000000000 _x	→	0001200000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	
	6	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	$2^{-11.02}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000x$						
3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	$2^{-23.91}$
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	$2^{-11.02}$	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	5	0000800480000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	$2^{-4.70}$	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	7	4800800000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000x$						
4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	$2^{-34.19}$
	1	0000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	*	
	2	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.00}$	
	3	0000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	

Example: EnRUPT-256

	7	4800200000000000 _x	→	0801200000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_2 = 0000000208000000_x$						
3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.85}	2^{-23.91}
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	2 ^{-4.70}	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.19}
	1	0000080000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	*	
	2	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	3	0000080000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	4	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	5	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}	

Example: EnRUPT-256

3	0	9000000000000000 _x	→	1000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.85}$	$2^{-23.91}$
	1	0000280120000000 _x	→	0001680820000000 _x	*	
	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	$2^{-11.02}$	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	5	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	$2^{-4.70}$	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	7	4800080000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000002000000000_x$						
4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	$2^{-34.19}$
	1	00000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	*	
	2	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.00}$	
	3	00000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	$2^{-3.70}$	
	4	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.00}$	
	5	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	$2^{-8.39}$	
	6	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	$2^{-0.00}$	
	7	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	$2^{-8.39}$	

Example: EnRUPT-256

	2	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	3	4800280168000000 _x	→	0801680a28000000 _x	2 ^{-11.02}	
	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	2 ^{-4.70}	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800800000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.19}
	1	0000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	*	
	2	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	3	0000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	4	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	5	480080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}	
	6	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	7	480080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
5	0	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	2^{-20.49}

Example: EnRUPT-256

	4	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	5	0000080048000000 _x	→	0000480208000000 _x	2 ^{-4.70}	
	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
	4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70} 2^{-34.19}
		1	0000080000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	*
		2	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}
		3	0000080000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	2 ^{-3.70}
		4	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}
		5	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}
		6	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}
		7	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
	5	0	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00} 2^{-20.49}
		1	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	*
		⋮	⋮	→	⋮	⋮

Example: EnRUP T-256

	6	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	7	4800080000000000 _x	→	0800480000000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
4	0	9000000090000000 _x	→	1000000410000000 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	2^{-34.19}
	1	00000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	*	
	2	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	3	00000800000000800 _x	→	0000480000004800 _x	2 ^{-3.70}	
	4	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	5	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}	
	6	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	
	7	4800080048000800 _x	→	0800480208004800 _x	2 ^{-8.39}	
inject message word difference $\Delta m_3 = 0000000200000000_x$						
5	0	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	2^{-20.49}
	1	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	*	
	⋮	⋮	→	⋮	⋮	
	7	0000000000000000 _x	→	0000000000000000 _x	2 ^{-0.00}	2^{-0.00}

Collision Example for EnRUPT-256

Example collision pair for EnRUPT-256

2008-11-06, Sebastiaan Indesteege, COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

m1 = 13c84b456270176e04f9317ec36ce7d3e121786a347411197f64a3c940077576a14f9086fdc7334a413a769196062ca1
EnRUPT-256(m1) = bd67517ca6c0412082e03b745ffc4a64e9f092c258c398b8449afecb7fc86f72

m2 = 13c84b456a70176e04f9315c436ce7d3e1217848bc7411197f64a3cb48077576a14f9084fdc7334a413a769396062ca1
EnRUPT-256(m2) = bd67517ca6c0412082e03b745ffc4a64e9f092c258c398b8449afecb7fc86f72

m1 and m2 collide!


- <http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~sindeste/enrupt.html>
(or see SHA-3 Zoo)

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of EnRUPT
- 3 Attacking EnRUPT
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion**

Conclusion

- Collision attacks on EnRUPT
- Breaks **all seven** proposed EnRUPT variants
- **Mitigation:** increase s -parameter to 8 [O'Neil]
(i.e., double # steps per round)



References



Anne Canteaut and Florent Chabaud

A New Algorithm for Finding Minimum-Weight Words in a Linear Code: Application to McEliece's Cryptosystem and to Narrow-Sense BCH Codes of Length 511

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 44, nr. 1, pp. 367–378, 1998.



Florent Chabaud and Antoine Joux

Differential Collisions in SHA-0

In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 1998, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1462, pp. 56–71, Springer, 1998.



Helger Lipmaa and Shiho Moriai

Efficient Algorithms for Computing Differential Properties of Addition

In Fast Software Encryption – FSE 2001, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2355, pp. 336–350, Springer, 2002.



Sean O'Neil, Karsten Nohl and Luca Henzen

EnRUPT Hash Function Specification

Submission to the NIST SHA-3 competition, 2008. Available online at <http://www.enrupt.com/SHA3/>.



Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger and Vincent Rijmen

Exploiting Coding Theory for Collision Attacks on SHA-1

In Cryptography and Coding, 10th IMA International Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3796, pp. 78–95, Springer, 2005.



Vincent Rijmen and Elisabeth Oswald

Update on SHA-1

In Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3376, pp. 58–71, Springer, 2005.