

A Low-Power Design for an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Chip

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
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Motivation

- Public key authentication in resource constrained environments
 - E.g. Battery operated, unattended sensor-based monitoring
 - Low power for signature generation
- Design choices balance between power, size, and speed
- Short signatures (356 bits)
- Low Bandwidth
- Standalone chip, or piece of larger chip
- Bump-in-the-wire option

Application Concept

- Nuclear Material Monitoring & Inventory Application
 - Fiber Optic Tamper Indication
 - Motion, Temperature sensors
 - Two-way wireless communication
 - Message authentication/encryption
 - Battery life in excess of 5 years
 - Reduced size (1.5”x 4.1”x 4.6”)
 - Low cost module (\$550 estimate)



Design Choices

- Elliptic Curve Optimal El Gamal Signatures
 - No modular reciprocals
- Elliptic Curve (EC) uses characteristic 2 field, $GF(2^{178})$
- VHDL for portability
- Designed-in power management

Algorithm Components

- Elliptic Curve operations for signature
 - Point multiplication
 - Halve&Add Method
 - Signed Sliding Window multiplication
 - Pre-compute $3P, 5P, 7P$
- Finite Field Operations
 - Elliptic curve operations are built up from finite field primitives such as multiplication, reciprocal, and solving a quadratic equation

Algorithm Optimizations

- EC Point halving
 - Point-slope form
- Field Towers
- Almost Inverse Algorithm
 - Fast degree comparison, fast shift, fast fix-up
- Quadratic Solve circuit design
- Field multiplication – radix 16
- Trinomial field basis

The Signature Scheme

- Parameters
 - **Public**: Elliptic Curve **E**, Point **G**=(x_G, y_G) of order **r**, Field = **GF**(2^n), Public Key **W** = sG
 - **Private**: long term private key **s**, $0 < s < r$
- Signature: On message, **M**
 - $f = \text{Hash}(M)$.
 - Choose per message random, **v**.
 - Compute $V = vG = (x_V, y_V)$.
 - $c = x_V \pmod{r}$
 - $d = cfs + v \pmod{r}$
 - Signature is (c,d)
- Verification: On received input (M,c,d)
 - If $c \leq 0$ or $c > r-1$, output “reject” and stop
 - $f = \text{Hash}(M)$
 - $h = cf \pmod{r}$
 - $P = dG - hW = (x_P, y_P)$
 - $c' = x_P \pmod{r}$
 - If $c = c'$ then output “accept” else “reject”

Point Halving

- 3 times faster than doubling
- No reciprocals
- E: $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$
- Use point in (x,r) format ($r = y/x$) (point-slope)
- Input $P = (x_P, r_P)$; Output = $Q = (x_Q, r_Q)$ where $2Q=P$
 1. $Mh = Qsolve(x_P+a)$
 2. $T = x_P(r_P+Mh)$
 3. If $parity(tm \& T)=0$ then
 - » $Mh = Mh + 1; T = T + x_P$
 - » tm is a trace mask depending on the field
 4. $x_Q = \sqrt{T}; r_Q = Mh + x_Q + 1$

Field Towers

$$\text{GF}(2^{178}) = \text{GF}(2^{89}) / (V^2 + V + 1)$$

|
2

$$\text{GF}(2^{89}) = \text{GF}(2) / (u^{89} + u^{38} + 1)$$

|
89

$$\text{GF}(2)$$

$$\alpha = a_1 V + a_0 \in \text{GF}(2^{178}); \quad a_i \in \text{GF}(2^{89})$$

Write $\alpha = (a_1, a_0)$

Field Towers

- Arithmetic based in $GF(2^{89})$,
e.g.

$$\alpha + \beta = (a_1 + b_1, a_0 + b_0)$$

- E: $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$
 - Fixed $a = (1,0)$ for simplicity
 - b variable
- Main optimizations done over $GF(2^{89})$
- Order of $G \sim 177$ bits is equivalent to 1500 bit RSA
- Not subject to known field tower attacks

Quadratic Solution

- $\text{Qsolve}(a) = z$ where $z^2 + z = a$
- Qsolve for $\text{GF}(2^{89})$:
 - Input $a = (a_{00}, a_{01}, \dots, a_{88})$, output $z = (z_{00}, \dots, z_{88})$

$$\text{a even bits : } a_{00} \dots a_{36} : \quad a_{2n} = z_{2n} \oplus z_n \oplus z_{n+70}$$

$$a_{38} \dots a_{74} : \quad a_{2n} = z_{2n} \oplus z_n \oplus z_{n+51}$$

$$a_{76} \dots a_{88} : \quad a_{2n} = z_{2n} \oplus z_n$$

$$\text{a odd bits : } a_{01} \dots a_{37} : \quad a_{2n+1} = z_{2n+1} \oplus z_{n+45}$$

$$a_{39} \dots a_{87} : \quad a_{2n+1} = z_{2n+1} \oplus z_{n+45} \oplus z_{n+26}$$

- Compute odd $z_{01} \dots z_{19}$ directly
- Solve equations for other z_n :

$$a_{01} = z_{01} \oplus z_{46} \quad \Rightarrow \quad z_{46} = a_{01} \oplus z_{01}$$

Gate-Depth Tradeoff

<u>XOR Gates</u>	<u>Depth</u>	
3872	6	
387	35	selected
287	65	

- Developed special circuit with relatively small number of XOR gates (387) and depth (35)
- Faster with more gates, but traded speed for size


Hardware Architecture & Design

- Full VHDL implementation that can be targeted to FPGA or ASIC
 - Bottom up approach
- I/O Interface – intended to be used as a memory-mapped device
 - Hang off of microprocessor bus
 - 16-bit address bus
 - 8-bit data bus
 - Control Signals
 - Interrupt signals used to indicate signature status, error or signature completion

Hardware Architecture & Design

- Functionality
 - Signature, SHA-1 Hash Algorithm, Pseudo-random number generation
- Flexibility
 - Input message or hash of message
 - Input random per-message nonce, or seed for a pseudo-random nonce
 - Parameters: private key, generating point (Curve equation)
 - Output: signature, message hash, public key

Secure Signature Chip Design



Gate counts

- Chip: 191,000
 - Control: 27,000
 - SHA-1: 13,000
 - Remainder: 6,700
 - Signature Algorithm: 143,000
 - Control: 15,000
 - Multiply: 6,200
 - Remainder: 6,800
 - Point Multiplication: 112,000
 - Register & Control: 30,000
 - Point Addition: 52,000
 - Point Halving: 29,000

Power control in hardware design

- Clock gating
 - Inactive portion of chip turned off
 - Point halver
 - Point adder
 - Remainder
 - Multiplier
 - Finer granularity possible

Other Hardware Optimizations

- SHA-1 shift register to reduce area & power
- Radix 16 field multiplication
- Almost Inverse
 - Fast degree comparison
 - Fast radix 4 low-order 1 circuit
 - Fast radix 256 fix up step

Results

- Complete Register-Transfer-Level VHDL Design - fully transferable
- Final Synthesized Gate Count: 191,000
- Signature Sign Time: 4.4ms at 20Mhz
 - Initialization 0.25 ms
- Nominal Operating Speed: 20Mhz
- Nominal conditions: CMOS library 5V, .5 μ m 25°C
- Power Estimation: 150mW while signing, 6uW while idle
- Improved performance with more advanced technology

Future Work

- Counter side channel attacks
- Improve worst case path (remainder)
- Additional improvements to point multiplication
- Verification algorithm
- Tech transfer: VHDL available
- More applications