CryptoDB
TASTY: Tool for Automating Secure Two-partY computations
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| Abstract: | Secure two-party computation allows two untrusting parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their respective private inputs while revealing no information beyond the outcome. Existing cryptographic compilers can automatically generate secure computation protocols from high-level specifications, but are often limited in their use and efficiency of generated protocols as they are based on either garbled circuits or (additively) homomorphic encryption only. In this paper we present TASTY, a novel tool for automating, i.e., describing, generating, executing, benchmarking, and comparing, efficient secure two-party computation protocols. TASTY is a new compiler that can generate protocols based on homomorphic encryption and efficient garbled circuits as well as combinations of both, which often yields the most efficient protocols available today. The user provides a high-level description of the computations to be performed on encrypted data in a domain-specific language. This is automatically transformed into a protocol. TASTY provides most recent techniques and optimizations for practical secure two-party computation with low online latency. Moreover, it allows to efficiently evaluate circuits generated by the well-known Fairplay compiler. We use TASTY to compare protocols for secure multiplication based on homomorphic encryption with those based on garbled circuits and highly efficient Karatsuba multiplication. Further, we show how TASTY improves the online latency for securely evaluating the AES functionality by an order of magnitude compared to previous software implementations. TASTY allows to automatically generate efficient secure protocols for many privacy-preserving applications where we consider the use cases for private set intersection and face recognition protocols. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23266,
title={TASTY: Tool for Automating Secure Two-partY computations},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols /},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/365},
note={Preliminary full version of ACM CCS 2010 paper. thomas.schneider@trust.rub.de 14782 received 22 Jun 2010, last revised 22 Jun 2010},
author={Wilko Henecka and Stefan Kögl and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Thomas Schneider and Immo Wehrenberg},
year=2010
}