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Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys
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Abstract: | This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-22924, title={Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography /}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/023}, note={This paper is the English version of the publication in the Japanese domestic symposium, Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, SCIS 2010, which will be held on Jan. 19-22, 2010. takahashi.junko@lab.ntt.co.jp 14624 received 15 Jan 2010}, author={Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga}, year=2010 }