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Universally Composable and Forward Secure RFID Authentication and Key Exchange
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Abstract: | Protocols proven secure in universally composable models remain secure under concurrent and modular composition, and may be easily plugged into more complex protocols without having their security re-assessed with each new use. Recently, a universally composable framework has been proposed for Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication protocols, that simultaneously provides for availability, anonymity, and authenticity. In this paper we extend that framework to support key-compromise and forward-security issues. We also introduce new, provably secure, and highly practical protocols for anonymous authentication and key-exchange by RFID devices. The new protocols are lightweight, requiring only a pseudo-random bit generator. The new protocols satisfy forward-secure anonymity, authenticity, and availability requirements in the Universal Composability model. The proof exploits pseudo-randomness in the standard model. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21939, title={Universally Composable and Forward Secure RFID Authentication and Key Exchange}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols /}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/448}, note={RFID Authentication Protocols, key exchange, anonymity, forward security, universal composability levan@cs.fsu.edu 13487 received 27 Nov 2006, last revised 5 Dec 2006}, author={Tri van Le and Mike Burmester and Breno de Medeiros}, year=2006 }