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Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation

Authors:
Guillaume Fumaroli
David Vigilant
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/143
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Abstract: As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in any finite abelian group with only limited time and storage overhead.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21636,
  title={Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={implementation / public-key cryptography, side-channel analysis, fault attacks.},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/143},
  note={To appear in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography - FDTC 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer. guillaume.fumaroli@tremplin-utc.net 13425 received 12 Apr 2006, last revised 4 Oct 2006},
  author={Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant},
  year=2006
}