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On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512
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| Abstract: | A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is $2^{192}$. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity $k=1,2,\dots,2^{320}$ can be performed with an unknown probability of success $p_k$, where $ 0\le p_1\le p_2\le p_{2^{320}}\le 1$. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18263,
title={On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={Cryptografic hash function, NaSHA},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034},
note={ aleksandra.mileva@ugd.edu.mk 14259 received 15 Jan 2009},
author={S. Markovski and A. Mileva and V. Dimitrova and D. Gligoroski},
year=2009
}