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Separating two roles of hashing in one-way message authentication
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Abstract: | We analyse two new and related families of one-way authentication protocols, where a party wants to authenticate its public information to another. In the first, the objective is to do without shared passwords or a PKI, making use of low-bandwidth empirical/authentic channels where messages cannot be faked or modified. The analysis of these leads to a new security principle, termed separation of security concerns, under which protocols should be designed to tackle one-shot attacks and combinatorial search separately. This also leads us develop a new class of protocols for the case such as PKI where a relatively expensive signature mechanism exists. We demonstrate as part of this work that a popular protocol in the area, termed MANA I, neither optimises human effort nor offers as much security as had previously been believed. We offer a number of improved versions for MANA I that provides more security for half the empirical work, using a more general empirical channel. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18236, title={Separating two roles of hashing in one-way message authentication}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols /}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/003}, note={a short verion of this paper has been published in the Proceedings of FCS-ARSPA-WITS'08 workshop (Foundation of Computer Security, Automated Reasoning Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security). long.nguyen@comlab.ox.ac.uk 14243 rece}, author={L. H. Nguyen and A. W. Roscoe}, year=2009 }