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Encryption Schemes Secure under Selective Opening Attack
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Abstract: | The existence of encryption schemes secure under selective opening attack (SOA) has remained open despite considerable interest and attention. We provide the first public key encryption schemes secure against sender corruptions in this setting. The underlying tool is lossy encryption. The schemes have short keys. (Public and secret keys of a fixed length suffice for encrypting an arbitrary number of messages.) The schemes are stateless and noninteractive, and security does not rely on erasures. The schemes are without random oracles, proven secure under standard assumptions (DDH, Pailliers DCR, QR, lattices), and even efficient. We are able to meet both an indistinguishability (IND-SO-ENC) and a simulation-style, semantic security (SEM-SO-ENC) definition. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18184, title={Encryption Schemes Secure under Selective Opening Attack}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={encryption, selective opening, lossy trapdoor functions, DDH}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/101}, note={A preliminary version of this paper appears as part of our Eurocrypt 2009 paper with Dennis Hofheinz syilek@cs.ucsd.edu 14305 received 27 Feb 2009, last revised 2 Mar 2009}, author={Mihir Bellare and Scott Yilek}, year=2009 }