CryptoDB
Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes
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| Abstract: | In voting systems where a mark in a fixed position may mean a vote for Alice on a ballot,and a vote for Bob on another ballot, an attacker may coerce voters to put their mark at a certain position, enforcing effectively a random vote. This attack is meaningful if the voting system allows to take receipts with them and/or posts them to a bulletin board. The coercer may also ask for a blank receipt. We analyze this kind of attack and prove that it requires the same effort as a comparable attack would require against any voting system, even one without receipts. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-17736,
title={Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={applications / voting, randomizartion attack},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/059},
note={the paper has not been published anywhere poste@gwu.edu 13912 received 3 Feb 2008},
author={Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton},
year=2008
}