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Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols
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Abstract: | We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protocols. Our main tool is a fragment of a symbolic protocol logic. We demonstrate that proofs of key agreement and key secrecy in this logic imply simulatability in Shoup's secure multi-party framework for key exchange. As part of the logic, we present cryptographically sound abstractions of CMA-secure digital signatures and a restricted form of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, which is a technical result of independent interest. We illustrate our method by constructing a proof of security for a simple authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12507, title={Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={Cryptographic protocols / key exchange, formal methods, symbolic analysis}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/171}, note={Extended abstract of this paper was published in the 3rd ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering shmat@cs.utexas.edu 13041 received 9 Jun 2005, last revised 15 Sep 2005}, author={Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov}, year=2005 }