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Security of Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes With Limited Tamper Resistance
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Abstract: | Key pre-distribution (KPD) schemes, are inherently trade-offs between security and complexity, and are perhaps well suited for securing large-scale deployments of resource constrained nodes without persistent access to a trusted authority (TA). However, the need to offset their inherent security limitations, calls for some degree of tamper - resistance of nodes. Obviously, if absolute tamper-resistance is guaranteed, KPD schemes are rendered secure. In practice, however, tamper-resistance will have some limitations which will be exploited by attackers. In this paper, we analyze the security of deployments of random key pre-distribution schemes based on some assumptions on the "extent of tamper-resistance." We argue that a "limited extent of tamper resistance" when used in conjunction with a mechanism for "periodic key updates," drastically improves the security of (especially random) KPD schemes. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12062, title={Security of Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes With Limited Tamper Resistance}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / Key Management, Key Pre-distribution}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/089}, note={This is an expanded version of a paper submitted to USMA 2004 ramkumar@cse.msstate.edu 12515 received 6 Apr 2004}, author={Mahalingam Ramkumar and Nasir Memon}, year=2004 }