International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Security of Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes With Limited Tamper Resistance

Authors:
Mahalingam Ramkumar
Nasir Memon
Download:
URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/089
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract: Key pre-distribution (KPD) schemes, are inherently trade-offs between security and complexity, and are perhaps well suited for securing large-scale deployments of resource constrained nodes without persistent access to a trusted authority (TA). However, the need to offset their inherent security limitations, calls for some degree of tamper - resistance of nodes. Obviously, if absolute tamper-resistance is guaranteed, KPD schemes are rendered secure. In practice, however, tamper-resistance will have some limitations which will be exploited by attackers. In this paper, we analyze the security of deployments of random key pre-distribution schemes based on some assumptions on the "extent of tamper-resistance." We argue that a "limited extent of tamper resistance" when used in conjunction with a mechanism for "periodic key updates," drastically improves the security of (especially random) KPD schemes.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12062,
  title={Security of Random Key Pre-distribution Schemes With Limited Tamper Resistance},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={secret-key cryptography / Key Management, Key Pre-distribution},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/089},
  note={This is an expanded version of a paper submitted to USMA 2004 ramkumar@cse.msstate.edu 12515 received 6 Apr 2004},
  author={Mahalingam Ramkumar and Nasir Memon},
  year=2004
}