International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Christophe Clavier

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2017
CHES
Improved Blind Side-Channel Analysis by Exploitation of Joint Distributions of Leakages
Christophe Clavier Léo Reynaud
Classical side-channel analysis include statistical attacks which require the knowledge of either the plaintext or the ciphertext to predict some internal value to be correlated to the observed leakages.In this paper we revisit a blind (i.e. leakage-only) attack from Linge et al. that exploits joint distributions of leakages. We show – both by simulations and concrete experiments on a real device – that the maximum likelihood (ML) approach is more efficient than Linge’s distance-based comparison of distributions, and demonstrate that this method can be easily adapted to deal with implementations protected by first-order Boolean masking. We give example applications of different variants of this approach, and propose countermeasures that could prevent them.Interestingly, we also observe that, when the inputs are known, the ML criterion is more efficient than correlation power analysis.
2014
CHES
2012
PKC
2011
CHES
2007
CHES
2007
CHES
2006
CHES
2004
CHES
2001
CHES
2001
CRYPTO
2000
CHES

Program Committees

CHES 2020
CHES 2018
CHES 2017
CHES 2014
CHES 2013
CHES 2010
CHES 2009 (Program chair)
CHES 2008
CHES 2007