International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Olivier Pereira

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
ASIACRYPT
Traceable Receipt-Free Encryption
Henri Devillez Thomas Peters Olivier Pereira
CCA-like game-based security definitions capture confidentiality by asking an adversary to distinguish between honestly computed encryptions of chosen plaintexts. In the context of voting systems, such guarantees have been shown to be sufficient to prove ballot privacy (Asiacrypt'12). In this paper, we observe that they fall short when one seeks to obtain receipt-freeness, that is, when corrupted voters who submit chosen ciphertexts encrypting their vote must be prevented from proving how they voted to a third party. Since no known encryption security notion can lead to a receipt-free ballot submission process, we address this challenge by proposing a novel publicly verifiable encryption primitive coined Traceable Receipt-free Encryption (TREnc) and a new notion of traceable CCA security filling the definitional gap underlined above. We propose two TREnc instances, one generic achieving stronger guarantees for the purpose of relating it to existing building blocks, and a dedicated one based on SXDH. Both support the encryption of group elements in the standard model, while previously proposed encryption schemes aiming at offering receipt-freeness only support a polynomial-size message space, or security in the generic group model. Eventually, we demonstrate how a TREnc can be used to build receipt-free protocols, by following a standard blueprint.
2020
TOSC
Towards Low-Energy Leakage-Resistant Authenticated Encryption from the Duplex Sponge Construction 📺
The ongoing NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process highlights the importance of resistance to side-channel attacks, which has renewed the interest for Authenticated Encryption schemes (AEs) with light(er)-weight sidechannel secure implementations. To address this challenge, our first contribution is to investigate the leakage-resistance of a generic duplex-based stream cipher. When the capacity of the duplex is of c bits, we prove the classical bound, i.e., ≈ 2c/2, under an assumption of non-invertible leakage. Based on this, we propose a new 1-pass AE mode TETSponge, which carefully combines a tweakable block cipher that must have strong protections against side-channel attacks and is scarcely used, and a duplex-style permutation that only needs weak side-channel protections and is used to frugally process the message and associated data. It offers: (i) provable integrity (resp. confidentiality) guarantees in the presence of leakage during both encryption and decryption (resp. encryption only), (ii) some level of nonce misuse robustness. We conclude that TETSponge is an appealing option for the implementation of low-energy AE in settings where side-channel attacks are a concern. We also provides the first rigorous methodology for the leakage-resistance of sponge/duplex-based AEs based on a minimal non-invertibility assumption on leakages, which leads to various insights on designs and implementations.
2020
TOSC
Spook: Sponge-Based Leakage-Resistant Authenticated Encryption with a Masked Tweakable Block Cipher 📺
This paper defines Spook: a sponge-based authenticated encryption with associated data algorithm. It is primarily designed to provide security against side-channel attacks at a low energy cost. For this purpose, Spook is mixing a leakageresistant mode of operation with bitslice ciphers enabling efficient and low latency implementations. The leakage-resistant mode of operation leverages a re-keying function to prevent differential side-channel analysis, a duplex sponge construction to efficiently process the data, and a tag verification based on a Tweakable Block Cipher (TBC) providing strong data integrity guarantees in the presence of leakages. The underlying bitslice ciphers are optimized for the masking countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Spook is an efficient single-pass algorithm. It ensures state-of-the-art black box security with several prominent features: (i) nonce misuse-resilience, (ii) beyond-birthday security with respect to the TBC block size, and (iii) multiuser security at minimum cost with a public tweak. Besides the specifications and design rationale, we provide first software and hardware implementation results of (unprotected) Spook which confirm the limited overheads that the use of two primitives sharing internal components imply. We also show that the integrity of Spook with leakage, so far analyzed with unbounded leakages for the duplex sponge and a strongly protected TBC modeled as leak-free, can be proven with a much weaker unpredictability assumption for the TBC. We finally discuss external cryptanalysis results and tweaks to improve both the security margins and efficiency of Spook.
2020
CRYPTO
Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical Security in Symmetric Cryptography: A Practical Guide Through the Leakage-Resistance Jungle 📺
Triggered by the increasing deployment of embedded cryptographic devices (e.g., for the IoT), the design of authentication, encryption and authenticated encryption schemes enabling improved security against side-channel attacks has become an important research direction. Over the last decade, a number of modes of operation have been proposed and analyzed under different abstractions. In this paper, we investigate the practical consequences of these findings. For this purpose, we first translate the physical assumptions of leakage-resistance proofs into minimum security requirements for implementers. Thanks to this (heuristic) translation, we observe that (i) security against physical attacks can be viewed as a tradeoff between mode-level and implementation-level protection mechanisms, and (i}) security requirements to guarantee confidentiality and integrity in front of leakage can be concretely different for the different parts of an implementation. We illustrate the first point by analyzing several modes of operation with gradually increased leakage-resistance. We illustrate the second point by exhibiting leveled implementations, where different parts of the investigated schemes have different security requirements against leakage, leading to performance improvements when high physical security is needed. We finally initiate a comparative discussion of the different solutions to instantiate the components of a leakage-resistant authenticated encryption scheme.
2019
TCHES
TEDT, a Leakage-Resist AEAD Mode for High Physical Security Applications 📺
We propose TEDT, a new Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) mode leveraging Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs). TEDT provides the following features: (i) It offers full leakage-resistance, that is, it limits the exploitability of physical leakages via side-channel attacks, even if these leakages happen during every message encryption and decryption operation. Moreover, the leakage integrity bound is asymptotically optimal in the multi-user setting. (ii) It offers nonce misuse-resilience, that is, the repetition of nonces does not impact the security of ciphertexts produced with fresh nonces. (iii) It can be implemented with a remarkably low energy cost when strong resistance to side-channel attacks is needed, supports online encryption and handles static and incremental associated data efficiently. Concretely, TEDT encourages so-called leveled implementations, in which two TBCs are implemented: the first one needs strong and energy demanding protections against side-channel attacks but is used in a limited way, while the other only requires weak and energy-efficient protections and performs the bulk of the computation. As a result, TEDT leads to more energy-efficient implementations compared to traditional AEAD schemes, whose side-channel security requires to uniformly protect every (T)BC execution.
2017
TOSC
On Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption with Decryption Leakages
At CCS 2015, Pereira et al. introduced a pragmatic model enabling the study of leakage-resilient symmetric cryptographic primitives based on the minimal use of a leak-free component. This model was recently used to prove the good integrity and confidentiality properties of an authenticated encryption scheme called DTE when the adversary is only given encryption leakages. In this paper, we extend this work by analyzing the case where decryption leakages are also available. We first exhibit attacks exploiting such leakages against the integrity of DTE (and variants) and show how to mitigate them. We then consider message confidentiality in a context where an adversary can observe decryption leakages but not the corresponding messages. The latter is motivated by applications such as secure bootloading and bitstream decryption. We finally formalize the confidentiality requirements that can be achieved in this case and propose a new construction satisfying them, while providing integrity properties with leakage that are as good as those of DTE.
2013
CRYPTO
2012
ASIACRYPT
2011
CRYPTO

Program Committees

CHES 2012