A SHUFFLE ARGUMENT SECURE IN THE GENERIC MODEL

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A new efficient CRS-based NIZK shuffle argument



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


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 - Use computer algebra to solve systems of polyn. eq.
 - Esp. to find Gröbner bases



















Lesson from the past:

It is not voters who counts,


Can we get away with that?I'm 140% sure!





- Can we get away with that? - I'm 140% sure!





Data is public (Data, source) is private

Can we get away with that?I'm 140% sure!

Lesson from the past:

It is not voters who counts,

but who counts the votes











"Willier takes his computer anti-vitas protection surfounds"











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




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














A Designation of the second se

"Willier takes his commuter anti-ritus protection surloaxly." Encryption protects against eavesdropping on the Internet Private against each individual server Not enough: what if a server cheats?











"Willow takes his computer anti-vites protection seriously shuffling was correct, send proof to the next server





 Prove that shuffling was correct, send proof to the next server Verify all previous proofs, shuffle, create your own proof





Willier takes his computer


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Verify all proofs







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Prove that shuffling was correct, send proof to the next server

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Verify all proofs



SHUFFLE ARGUMENT

Shuffle argument:

- efficient zero knowledge argument of correctness of shuffling
 - Mix-server permutes ciphertexts, re-encrypt them and provides a proof that he has done it correctly.



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Shuffle argument:

- efficient zero knowledge argument of correctness of shuffling
- Mix-server permutes ciphertexts, re-encrypt them and provides a proof that he has done it correctly.
- Existing CRS model arguments not very efficient



CRS-BASED SHUFFLE ARGUMENTS

Assumption proposed in that paper, proof in GBGM


Assmpt. proposed 2010+, but not in that paper, proof in GBGM

	Lipmaa-Zhang (2012)	Fauzi-Lipmaa (2016)	This paper
CRS length	7n + 6	8n + 17	3n + 14
Communic.	12n + 11	9n + 2	7n + 3
P comp. (units)	36	19.8	24.3
V comp. (units)	196	126	36.3
GBGM?	PSDL, DLIN (comp.)	TSDH, PCDH, PSP (comp.)	Pure GBGM
Soundness	Full	Culpable	Full


1 unit = n million machine cycles
According to speed records on BN curves

n: number of ciphertexts (say 100,000)




























 $V(\operatorname{crs},x,\pi)$: Accepts or rejects






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ZERO KNOWLEDGE: CRS MODEL





 $V(\operatorname{crs}, x, \pi)$: Accepts or rejects



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- **Bilinear map:** $e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$



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- •Generators g_1 of G_1, g_2 of G_2, g_T of G_T
- Bilinear map: e: $G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T$
- Requirements:
 - Efficiently computable
 - Non-degeneracy: $e(g_1, g_2) \neq 1$
 - •Bilinearity: $e(g_1^{a}, g_2^{b}) = e(g_1, g_2)^{ab}$



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


- Inverting pairings should be hard
 Given e (A, B), compute either A or B
 Analogous to DL: given g^a, compute a
- •What else should be hard?

























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Con: each arrow might mean a loss in efficiency



GENERIC MODEL APPROACH



Generic Model

Con: proof in GGM is only for restricted adversaries

Pro: only one arrow, thus smaller loss in efficiency



• Meta-Assumption: adversary only has access to



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- Recursively, **DL** of each computed element is a known polynomial of some indeterminates
- Note: we do not handle $G_{\rm T}$ as a generic group












Random variables (TTP)




Polynomials (TTP knows **X**)



Random variables CRS (TTP) (TTP)






Random variables CRS (TTP) (TTP)

Outputs in argument (adversary)





(TTP)

CRS (TTP)

Outputs in argument (adversary)

 ${h_{ji}} = {f_{ji}, h_{ji}}$

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- Show that solution's coefficients are "nice"
 - = restricted to be as in the honest case



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 Write down main building blocks you need to prove in argument



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CRS composition:

 Compose CRS-s of individual subarguments together, getting one big CRS















Soundness check:

- Is the composed protocol sound?
 - Subarguments get extra inputs in CRS



 If not: introduce new random variables that guarantee CRS elements are used in only correct subarguments, reiterate





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Prover commits to permutation; proves this is done correctly



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PERMUTATION MATRIX ARGUMENT

Lemma. A matrix is permutation matrix iff

- 1. It is stochastic // rows sum to (1, ..., 1)
- 2. Each row is **1-sparse**

At most one coefficient is non-zero



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 $V(\mathbf{X}) := (A_1(\mathbf{X}) + X_{\alpha} + P_0(X)) (A_2(\mathbf{X}) - X_{\alpha} + P_0(X)) - \pi(\mathbf{X}) X_{\varrho} - (1 - X_{\alpha})^2$



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honest prover: $[A_i(X)]_i = [a_i P_i(X) + rX_0]_i$ SOUNDNESS PROOF: IDEA

• In GBGM we know constants $a_{1i}, A_{10}, \dots, \text{ s.t. for } X = (X, X_0, X_\alpha, X_\beta, X_\gamma, X_{sk})$



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 $\pi(\mathbf{X}) = \sum \pi_i P_i(\mathbf{X}) + \pi_0 X_0 + \pi_\alpha (X_\alpha + P_0(\mathbf{X})) + \pi_1 P_0(\mathbf{X}) + \dots$

Verification equation states

 $V(X) = (A_1(X) + X_{\alpha} + P_0(X)) (A_2(X) - X_{\alpha} + P_0(X)) - \pi(X) X_0 - (1 - X_{\alpha})^2 = 0$



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Goal: find coefficients s.t. verification equation is satisfied





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•find coefficients s.t. $V(\mathbf{X}) = 0$



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Step 1:

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- Step 1:
 - V(X) = 0 iff each coefficient $[X_{\alpha}{}^{j}X_{0}{}^{k}...] V(X) = 0$
- This is a system of polynomial equations
 - ... and a nasty one
 - •of more than 20 polynomial equations



```
\{i_1,\ldots,i_4\} |coeff<sub>\mu(i)</sub>(\mathcal{V}_{1sp}(\mathbf{X})\cdot\mathcal{V}^*_{1sp}(\mathbf{X}))
\{1, 2, 1, 0\} | -A_{\rho}(B_{\alpha} + 1) + (A_{\alpha} + 1)B_{\rho} - C_{\alpha}
\{1, 2, 0, 1\} \mid -A_{\gamma}(B_{\alpha} + 1)
\{1, 2, 0, 0\} | -A_{\varrho\beta}(B_{\alpha} + 1)
\{1, 1, 2, 0\} | (A_{\alpha} + 1)B_{\beta}|
\{1, 1, 1, 1\} | (A_{\alpha} + 1)B_{\gamma}|
\{1, 1, 1, 0\} | -a(X)(B_{\alpha} + 1) + (A_{\alpha} + 1)(b(X) + B_1) - A_0(B_{\alpha} + 1)P_0(X)
\{1, 0, 1, 0\} | -(B_{\alpha} + 1)Z(X)a^{\dagger}(X)
\{0, 3, 1, 0\} | A_{a}B_{a} - C_{a}
\{0, 3, 0, 1\} | A_{\gamma} B_{\rho} - C_{\gamma}
\{0, 3, 0, 0\} | A_{\alpha\beta}B_{\alpha} - C_{\alpha\beta}
\{0, 2, 2, 0\} | A_{\rho} B_{\beta}
\{0, 2, 1, 1\} | A_{\gamma} B_{\beta} + A_{\rho} B_{\gamma}
\{0, 2, 1, 0\} | a(X)B_{\rho} + A_{\rho} (b(X) + B_1) + A_{\rho\beta}B_{\beta} +
                                    P_0(X) (A_o(B_{\alpha}+1) + (A_{\alpha}+A_0+1) B_o - C_{\alpha} - C_0) - c(X)
\{0, 2, 0, 2\} | A_{\gamma} B_{\gamma}
\{0, 2, 0, 1\} |A_{\gamma}(b(X) + B_1) + A_{\alpha\beta}B_{\gamma} + A_{\gamma}(B_{\alpha} + 1)P_0(X)
\{0, 2, 0, 0\} |A_{\rho\beta}(b(X) + B_1) + A_{\rho\beta}(B_{\alpha} + 1)P_0(X)
\{0, 1, 2, 0\} | a(X)B_{\beta} + (A_{\alpha} + A_{0} + 1)B_{\beta}P_{0}(X)
\{0, 1, 1, 1\} | a(X)B_{\gamma} + (A_{\alpha} + A_0 + 1)B_{\gamma}P_0(X)
\{0, 1, 1, 0\} = Z(X)c^{\dagger}(X) + P_0(X)(a(X)(B_{\alpha} + 1) + (A_{\alpha} + A_0 + 1)(b(X) + B_1)) +
                                   a(X)(b(X) + B_1) + (A_{\alpha} + A_0 + 1)(B_{\alpha} + 1)P_0(X)^2 - 1 +
                                   B_{\rho}Z(X)a^{\dagger}(X)
\{0, 0, 2, 0\} | B_{\beta}Z(X)a^{\dagger}(X)
\{0, 0, 1, 1\} | B_{\gamma}Z(X)a^{\dagger}(X)
\{0, 0, 1, 0\} | Z(X) (b(X) + B_1) a^{\dagger}(X) + (B_{\alpha} + 1) P_0(X) Z(X) a^{\dagger}(X)
```





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- Obtain that $A_i(X) = a_I P_I(X) =>$ Sound





THANK YOU!

Panoramix

