

Adaptively Secure Multi-Party Computation with Dishonest Majority

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
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Secure Multiparty Computation


- A set of **mutually distrustful** parties (n) wish to compute a **joint** function of their **private** inputs [Yao86, GMW87]
- Adaptive Adversaries: Security desired in face of **arbitrary malicious** behavior by some of the participants that adversary chooses **on the fly** [CFGN96]
- Very **fundamental** notion in cryptography

Multiparty Computation

For every real adversary **A**



there exists an adversary **S**



\approx

Computational Indistinguishability: no probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher can distinguish between the input/output distribution of the honest parties and the adversary, in IDEAL and REAL world except with negligible probability.

Party

Real World

Ideal World

Proto



Motivating Example: a **secret sharing** **protocol** [CFG96]

- Consider a setting with **n parties** and a **dealer** with a secret sk
- Dealer **secret shares** sk among random \sqrt{n} parties (and publishes the set of parties that get the shares)
- Consider an **adversary** that can corrupt $t = O(\sqrt{n})$ out of n parties
- **Non-Adaptive (or Static)** adversary succeeds in obtaining secret with the negligible probability
- While **Adaptive adversary** always succeeds

Previous Results

- Adaptively secure MPC protocol in the **standalone** setting assuming **honest majority**.
[CFGN96]
- Doing better than honest majority
 - ZK and OT [Bea96a,Bea96b]
 - two-party computation [Bea98, KO04]
 - adaptively secure MPC protocol without honest majority but using a **common random string**
[CLOS02]

Can we do adaptively secure
MPC without honest
majority and without
assuming a trusted setup?

A very simple approach

- We know
 - adaptively MPC when given access to an **ideal commitment** [e.g. CLOS02, CDMW09, GWZ09]
 - adaptively secure protocols for securely realizing the **commitment** functionality (e.g. [Bea98, PW09])
 - Composition theorem of Canetti [Can00]
- Surprisingly direct application of these results does not yield adaptive MPC.
- This subtle issue was overlooked in the literature as it was thought as obvious.
- Let's see why!

Adaptively Secure Composition: **More than Meets the Eye**

- 2-party adaptively secure protocol **does not** guarantee security in the setting of n-parties, **even if only two of the parties are ever talking to each other (quiet parties also have secret state)**
- Consider an adaptive 2PC protocol with a black-box simulation
- Relies on **rewinding**
- In the n-party case adversary can **also corrupt parties that do not communicate**
- This was never handled in the 2-party case...

Our Results

- **Round complexity:** **Constant** **round** **in the setting**

constant round

if corruption of up to $n-1$ parties is allowed (in non-erasure model)

Or if erasures are allowed


Linear in depth of circuit otherwise

Does not hold in the setting of Super-polynomial simulation


– As good as **semi-honest** setting

Impossibility Result – Building the rewinding intuition

Consider $o(n/\log n)$ round protocol between 2-parties



Real World Execution



The protocol has $o(n/\log n)$ rounds and so a maximum of $n/2$ parties are corrupted in the main execution

Implications of the above problem

- The simulator **can not rewind** in any round
 - This allows us to conclude that using black box simulation round efficient adaptive MPC is impossible
- Circumvent this with **large round** complexity
 - There always exists a round where no one is corrupted
 - Other issues of **non-malleability**
 - But we focus on a constant round protocol using **non-black box** simulation

Constant round protocol

- We can not rewind the adversary
- **Straight line** or **non-rewinding** simulation
 - non-black box simulation technique of Barak
 - Problem is that Barak's protocol is far from being adaptively secure
- How do we get it to work?

Conclusions

- [CFGN96] constructed the first adaptive secure MPC protocol in the setting of honest majority
 - Left open the question in the setting of dishonest majority
- We resolve this question
 - non-black box simulation is essential for round efficient solutions

Thank You!