

# Collisions on SHA-0 in one hour

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# Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Previous Collision Attacks on SHA-0
- 3 New Results on SHA-0
- 4 Conclusion

# Outline


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# Cryptographic hash function

- An algorithm that maps input strings of arbitrary length to "short" fixed length output strings.
- Expected security properties:
  - ▶ Preimage resistance: given any specified output, it is computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to this output.
  - ▶ Second preimage resistance: given any specified input, it is computationally infeasible to find another input which hashes to the same output.
  - ▶ Collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct input which hashes to the same output.


# Domain extender

- The Merkle-Damgård algorithm:




# Compression function

- The Davies-Meyer construction:



# The SHA-0 hash function

- Built in 1993, 160 bits output.



# The SHA-0 hash function

- Message expansion:

$$W_k = \begin{cases} M_k, & \text{for } 0 \leq k \leq 15 \\ W_{k-16} \oplus W_{k-14} \oplus W_{k-8} \oplus W_{k-3}, & \text{for } 16 \leq k \leq 79 \end{cases}$$

- Boolean functions:

step $k$	$f_k(B, C, D)$
$1 \leq k \leq 20$	$f_{IF} = (B \wedge C) \oplus (\overline{B} \wedge D)$
$21 \leq k \leq 40$	$f_{XOR} = B \oplus C \oplus D$
$41 \leq k \leq 60$	$f_{MAJ} = (B \wedge C) \oplus (B \wedge D) \oplus (C \wedge D)$
$61 \leq k \leq 80$	$f_{XOR} = B \oplus C \oplus D$



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
# Chabaud and Joux [CRYPTO 98]

- Local collisions: insert a perturbation and correct it in the next 5 steps.
- Find linear differential path of interleaved local collisions with 3 constraints on the perturbation vector:
  - ▶ no truncated local collisions,
  - ▶ no consecutive perturbations in the first 16 steps,
  - ▶ no perturbation starting after step 74.

```
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
```

- Complexity is evaluated in terms of probability for local collisions to hold.

- Biham and Chen [CRYPTO 04]
  - ▶ Speedup technique during collision search: using neutral bits, the conformance to the differential path is assured up to step 23.
- Biham *et al.* [EUROCRYPT 2005]
  - ▶ Multi-block technique: use several blocks to find a collision.




- Relax the first two constraints on the perturbation vector to find a better one.

```
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
```

- Modify (by hands) the first steps of the differential path to compensate truncated and consecutive local collisions, using different tools:
  - ▶ modular subtraction,
  - ▶ carry effect,
  - ▶ non-linearity of the boolean function  $f_{IF}$ .

- Build from a random first block of message a chaining variable verifying specific conditions.



- Message modifications: another speedup technique.
  - ▶ Complexity is given in terms of number of conditions to fulfill (starts from step 20).

# Naito *et al.* [ASIACRYPT 06]

- Based on the linear and non-linear characteristics of Wang *et al.*
- Submarine modifications: condition counting starts from step 24.
- Complexity:
  - ▶  $2^{36}$  function calls theoretically ...
  - ▶ ... but requires 100 hours on average with a good PC.
  - ▶ Our estimation:  $2^{40,5}$  function calls practically.


Complexity should be given in terms of function calls with an efficient implementation on the same computer (*i.e.* OpenSSL) according to De Cannière *et al.* proposal [Hash Workshop 2007].

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# Possible improvements

- Relax the last constraint to find better perturbation vectors:
  - ▶ no perturbation starting after step 74.
- Then we need:
  - ▶ multi-block technique,
  - ▶ adapted non-linear characteristics,
  - ▶ generic speedup technique.





# Possible improvements

Adapt the tools developed for the recent attacks against SHA-1.

- Non-linear characteristics:
  - ▶ the automated non-linear characteristic generator from De Cannière and Rechberger (2006).
- Speedup technique:
  - ▶ the boomerang attacks from Joux and Peyrin (2007).

# New perturbation vector

- Criteria for vector search:
  - ▶ minimize the number of conditions between steps 16 and 80,
  - ▶ starting step for counting conditions depends on the speedup technique,
  - ▶ adaptability with the non-linear characteristic generator.
- Several good possible vectors found.
  - ▶ Our perturbation vector:

1 0 1 1 0

1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

# The boomerangs

- Boomerangs are a framework:
  - ▶ The attacker build auxiliary differentials that can be used under neutral bits or message modifications settings.
  - ▶ With the neutral bits setting they give a generic easy to use tool for collision search speedup.
  - ▶ Constraints are set to provide good neutral bits that would exist with very low probability on a random differential path.
- Our approach:
  - ▶ First find good generic auxiliary differentials.
  - ▶ Place them so that they do not interfere with the perturbation vector.
  - ▶ Then run the non-linear characteristic generator taking in account these auxiliary differentials.

# The boomerangs

- We build two types of auxiliary differentials:
  - ▶ a light but short one (few constraints but low range),
  - ▶ and a heavy but long one (long range but lot of constraints).
- These auxiliary differentials are used as neutral bits for steps 23 and 28 respectively.
- On average, we can set 5 auxiliary differentials (7 for the first block):
  - ▶ improvement of a factor  $2^5$  on the raw attack.

# First auxiliary differential

$i$	$A_i$	$W_i$
-1:	-----	
00:	-----	-----
01:	-----	-----
02:	-----	-----
03:	-----	-----
04:	-----	-----
05:	-----b--	-----
06:	-----b--	-----a-
07:	-----a-	----- $\bar{a}$ ---
08:	-----0	-----
09:	-----1	-----
10:	-----	-----
11:	-----	----- $\bar{a}$
12:	-----	-----
13:	-----	-----
14:	-----	-----
15:	-----	-----

# Second auxiliary differential

$i$	$A_i$	$W_i$
-1:	-----d--	
00:	-----d--	-----a-
01:	-----e-a-	----- $\bar{a}$ -
02:	-----e-1	-----b-
03:	-----b-0	----- $\bar{b}$ - $\bar{a}$
04:	-----0	----- $\bar{a}$
05:	-----0	----- $\bar{a}$
06:	-----	----- $\bar{b}$
07:	-----	----- $\bar{b}$
08:	-----	-----
09:	-----f--	-----
10:	-----f--	-----c-
11:	-----c-	----- $\bar{c}$ -
12:	-----0	-----
13:	-----0	-----
14:	-----	----- $\bar{c}$
15:	-----	----- $\bar{c}$

# Collision example

	1 <sup>st</sup> block		2 <sup>nd</sup> block	
	$M_1$	$M'_1$	$M_2$	$M'_2$
$W_0$	0x4643450b	0x46434549	0x9a74cf70	0x9a74cf32
$W_1$	0x41d35081	0x41d350c1	0x04f9957d	0x04f9953d
$W_2$	0xfe16dd9b	0xfe16dddb	0xee26223d	0xee26227d
$W_3$	0x3ba36244	0x3ba36204	0x9a06e4b5	0x9a06e4f5
$W_4$	0xe6424055	0xe6424017	0xb8408af6	0x38408ab4
$W_5$	0x16ca44a0	0x96ca44a0	0xb8608612	0x38608612
$W_6$	0x20f62444	0xa0f62404	0x8b7e0fea	0x0b7e0faa
$W_7$	0x10f7465a	0x10f7465a	0xe17e363c	0xe17e363c
$W_8$	0x5a711887	0x5a7118c5	0xa2f1b8e5	0xa2f1b8a7
$W_9$	0x51479678	0xd147963a	0xca079936	0x4a079974
$W_{10}$	0x726a0718	0x726a0718	0x02f2a7cb	0x02f2a7cb
$W_{11}$	0x703f5bfb	0x703f5bb9	0xf724e838	0xf724e87a
$W_{12}$	0xb7d61841	0xb7d61801	0x37ffc03a	0x37ffc07a
$W_{13}$	0xa5280003	0xa5280041	0x53aa8c43	0x53aa8c01
$W_{14}$	0x6b08d26e	0x6b08d26c	0x90811819	0x9081181b
$W_{15}$	0x2e4df0d8	0xae4df0d8	0x312d423e	0xb12d423e

$A_2$	$B_2$	$C_2$	$D_2$	$E_2$
0x6f84b892	0x1f9f2aae	0x0dbab75c	0x0afe56f5	0xa7974c90

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# Complexity comparison

Team	Theoretical	Practical	Time on a PC
Chabaud and Joux (1998)	$2^{61}$		
Biham <i>et al.</i> (2004)	$2^{51}$	$2^{51}$	20 years
Wang <i>et al.</i> (2005)	$2^{39}$		
Naito <i>et al.</i> (2006)	$2^{36}$	$2^{40.3}$	100 hours
Our results	$2^{33}$	$2^{33.6}$	1 hour

# Complexity comparison

Thank you!