
A Stochastic Approach in Side-Channel Analysis in the Presence of Masking

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Power attacks on a block cipher implementation protected by masking

- r (Classical) template attacks: most powerful attack, but **gigantic workload (= # of measurements) for profiling**
- r Second order DPA: no profiling, but only **little efficient**

The Stochastic Approach (Example: Power attack on AES)

$x \in \{0,1\}^8$ (known) part of the plaintext or ciphertext

$z \in \{0,1\}^8$ masking value

$k \in \{0,1\}^8$ subkey

t time

Time t: $I_t(x,z;k) = h_t(x,z;k) + R_t$

Random variable
(depends on x,z,k)

deterministic part
(depends on x,z,k)

Random variable
 $E(R_t) = 0$

quantifies the randomness of the side-channel signal at time t

Noise

1st Profiling Step: Estimation of $h_t(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$

r **Naïve Approach:** Estimate $h_t(x, z; k) = E(I_t(x, z; k))$

independently for each triple


$(x, z; k) \in \{0, 1\}^8 \times \{0, 1\}^8 \times \{0, 1\}^8$

for all $t \in \{t_1, t_2, \dots, t_m\}$ (relevant instants)

r **Drawback:** Gigantic number of measurements

More efficient procedure

- r For any fixed subkey k interpret the function $h_{t;k}(\cdot, \cdot): \{0, 1\}^8 \times \{0, 1\}^8 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $h_{t;k}(\cdot, \cdot) = h_t(\cdot, \cdot; k)$, as an element of a real vector space F .
- r Approximate $h_{t;k}(\cdot, \cdot)$ by its image $h_{t;k}^*$ under the orthogonal projection onto a suitably chosen low-dimensional vector subspace $F_{u;t}$



geometric
visualization

r (clou) The image $h^*_{t;k}$ minimizes a functional on the vector subspace $F_{u;t}$

$h^*_{t;k}$ can be determined without knowing h (.,.,.k)

r (Qualitative) conjectures on the reasons for the leakage signal \rightarrow subspace $F_{u;t}$

r Typical vector space dimensions (\rightarrow Example)

r $\dim(F) = 2^{16}$

r $\dim(F_{u;t}) = 9$ or 17

Non-masking case:

- r introduced by Schindler, Lemke, Paar (CHES 2005)
- r extensive experimental studies by Gierlichs, Lemke, Paar (CHES 2006)
 - r Compared to template attacks:
 - reduces the number of measurements in the profiling phase up to factor 50

Masking case:

The advantages of the stochastic approach are even by an order of magnitude larger than in the non-masking case.

Summary

The stochastic approach

- r reduces the profiling workload by order(s) of magnitude
- r combines engineer's insight into the reasons for the leakage (\rightarrow suitability of the subspace $F_{u;t}$) with precise stochastic methods (\rightarrow optimal approximator in $F_{u;t}$)
- r identifies and quantifies those properties that have significant impact on the side-channel signal
- r supports constructively the design of security implementations

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A Stochastic Model for Particular Designs of Physical RNGs with Robust Entropy Estimators


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Generic Design



Summary

r Goal: Determine the conditional entropy

$$H(R_{n+1} \mid R_1, \dots, R_n)$$

r We formulated and analysed a stochastic model of the noise source.

r We derived **robust entropy estimators**, yielding **practically useful lower entropy bounds**.

Practical experiments:

10^5 random bits / sec (limitations by the USB interface)

entropy / random bit $> 1 - 10^{-5}$

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